


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Final Report

IRR Preassignment Test
Baseline Data Collection and Analysis



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Litton Mellonics Systems Development 8111 Gatehouse Road Falls Church, Virginia 22042

Prepared for the Department of the Army Contract DAAG 39-76-C-0033 May 1977

FINAL REPORT


IRR PREASSIGNMENT TEST BASELINE DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS

by Victor W. Hobson John R. Chiorini Doris C. Berger





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IS. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) Preassignment IRR Mobilization System IRR Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System IRR Alternative Preassignment Systems Test Direct IRR Mobilization Baseline Data	
This report presents the results of the collection to support the evaluation logic for testing alternation FY78, identifies certain additional data that she during the testing and evaluation, and describes the of the Test Directorate designed to conduct the test Preassignment Test Plan.	on and analysis of baseline data tive IRR preassignment systems ould also be developed for use the organization and functions

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PREFACE

This is the final report for the study entitled "IRR Preassignment Test Baseline Data Collection and Analysis". It was prepared by the Mellonics Systems Development Division of Litton Systems, Inc., as required by Contract Number DAAG 39-76-C-0033, issued by Harry Diamond Laboratories, Department of Army (DA). The Office of the Deputy Chief for Personnel, DA, is the sponsoring agency for this project.

CONTENTS

		Paragraph	Page
PREFACE			ii
EXECUTIVE S	UMMARY		ix
CHAPTER 1.	INTRODUCTION		1-1
	Purpose	1-1	1-1
73	Background	1-2	1-1
CHAPTER 2.	BASELINE DATA CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION S	YSTEM	2-1
	System Definition	2-1	2-1
	General System Description	2-2	2-1
	Establishing and Processing IRR Requirements	2-3	2-2
	Selecting, Alerting and Ordering IRR Fillers to Active Duty	2-4	2-6
	Receiving and Processing IRR Fillers at Mobilization Stations	2-5	2-9
	Integration of IRR Fillers Into Units	2-6	2-11
	Estimated Time Factors for IRR Mobilization	2-7	2-12
	Baseline Data-Current IRR Mobilization System	2-8	2-15
	Readiness Category	2-9	2-22
	Resource Requirements Category	2-10	2-26
	Attitudes Category	2-11	2-30
	Special Problems Category,	2-12	2-32
	Additional Baseline Data	2-13	2-33

	Paragraph	Page
CHAPTER 3.	BASELINE DATA, THE VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT SYSTEM	3-1
	System Description	3-1
	Baseline Data	3-1
	Additional Baseline Data	3-19
CHAPTER 4.	ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF TEST DIRECTORATE	4-1
	Background 4-1	4-1
	Mission and Organization of Test Directorate	4-4
	Detailed Activities of Test Directorate	4-7
	Overview of Field Test Activities 4-4	4-12
	Detailed Functions of Key Members of the Test Directorate 4-5	4-21
TABLES		Page
2-1	Estimated Time Required for IRR Fillers To Reach Receiving AA and RC Units	2-15
2-2	Sizes of Populations, Samples and Useable Survey Returns by Stratified Subgroup	2-19
2-3	Data Elements Related to MOBEX-76 IRR Survey	2-20
3-1	Additional Baseline Data (VMP)	3-21
4-1	Tentative IRR Preassignment Test Planning Calendar	4-10
4-2	JRX Test Activities by Functional Area and IRR Preassignment Test Subobjectives	4-14
4-3	JRX Data Collection Plan	4-15
4-4	CPX Test Activities by Functional Area and	4 10

TABLES		Page
4-5	Mobilization Station Data Collection Concepts During CPX	4-20
FIGURES		Page
2-1	Processing of Personnel Requisitions at Full Mobilization	2-4
4-1	Organization for Test and Evaluation	4-1
4-2	Organization of Test Directorate	4-6
ANNEXES		Page
A	DETAILED BASELINE DATA CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM	A-1
	Inclosure 1 Description of Format, DCSPER-178-Part 1	A-30
	Appendix 1 RCPAC MOBEX-76 Cost Estimates	A-32
В	DETAILED BASELINE DATA, VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT (VMP) PROGRAM	B-1
	Inclosure 1 Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment Orientation	B-46
	Inclosure 2 Sample RCPAC Monthly Reports	B-49
	Inclosure 3 Sample Copy Individual Preassignment Orders	B-56
	Inclosure 4 Memorandum for Record, ODCSPER (DAPE-PBP), Voluntary Preassignment Impact on RC Recruiting, 15 Sep 76	B-61
С	BASELINE DATA COLLECTED AND DATA STILL REQUIRING COLLECTION, CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM	C-1
D	BASELINE DATA COLLECTED AND DATA STILL REQUIRING COLLECTION, VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT SYSTEM	D-1
E	TASKING FOR PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY PREASSIGNMENT	E-1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report presents the quantitative and qualitative baseline data developed to support the testing and evaluation of alternative IRR preassignment systems in FY 78, identifies remaining baseline data needed for the test of the systems, and describes actions to be performed by the IRR Preassignment Test Directorate. The baseline data focus on the same issues, subobjectives, essential elements of analysis and subordinate data requirements as those developed for the IRR Preassignment Test Plan of June 1976 which also includes the evaluation logic for the alternative preassignment systems test. Principal sources of the baseline data were the FORSCOM mobilization CPX conducted 8 November - 9 December 1976 (MOBEX-76); the voluntary IRR preassignment system implemented by the Army on 15 March 1976; and Army operational and mobilization files.

The baseline data collected are considered adequate for test and evaluation of the alternative preassignment systems except in the four following areas where additional research is required:

- Determination of the flexibility of the current IRR system in meeting demands for IRR personnel in real world situations and the adaptability of the system to changing IRR assets and requirements.
- Determination of the impact of the current IRR system on unit personnel and training readiness including MOS qualifications of IRR fillers and requirements for refresher training.

- Estimates of IRR availability and their timeliness of arrival at mobilization stations.
- Estimates of the workloads, time factors and individual clothing and equipment requirements associated with the reception and processing of IRR fillers at mobilization stations.

This report is organized as follows to present the results of the study requirements.

- <u>Chapter 1 Introduction</u>. Essential background information including brief descriptions of phased interim reports
 ("Baseline Data Requirements and Data Sources" and "Baseline Data Collection Plan") that established the framework for development of this report.
- Chapter 2 Baseline Data, Current IRR Mobilization System.

 A description of the current system for mobilizing the

 IRR (excluding voluntary preassignees), the baseline data

 for the current system, and remaining data needed for the

 FY 78 test.
- Chapter 3 Baseline Data Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System. A description of the Voluntary Mobilization
 Preassignment System, the baseline data for this system,
 and remaining data needed for the FY 78 test.
- Chapter 4 IRR Alternative Preassignment Systems Test,
 Organization and Functions of the Test Directorate.
 The organization, basic functions and detailed activities of the Test Directorate.

Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION

- 1-1 PURPOSE. This report completes Phase II (Preassignment Test Baseline Data Collection and Analysis) of the support provided by Litton Mellonics in assisting the Army in preparing for the IRR Alternative Preassignment Systems Test (IRR-APST) in FY 78. Its purpose is:
- a. To present the results of the collection and analysis of baseline data to support the evaluation logic for the testing of alternative IRR preassignment systems in FY 78.
- b. To identify remaining data needed prior to the start of the FY 78 test.
- c. To describe actions to be undertaken by the Test Directorate to be established for the FY 78 test.

1-2 BACKGROUND

a. The current system for mobilizing the IRR, except for the voluntary preassignment program discussed below, is based on retaining maximum flexibility in selecting and ordering the IRR to active duty. Basically, this is accomplished by: (1) assigning the IRR to four USAR Control Groups which are centrally administered by the Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC); (2) employing the requisitioning (pull)

¹The two major groups are the "annual training" and "reinforcement" groups. Other control groups are the "mobilization designee" and "officer active duty obligor" groups.

system to determine unit quantitative and qualitative requirements for IRR personnel after the need to expand the Army is at hand or an emergency has been announced; and, (3) issuing individual IRR mobilization orders after the requisitioning cycle has been completed. A detailed description of the system together with baseline data pertaining thereto is given in Chapter 2.

- b. The Army is taking steps to reduce the time required to mobilize the IRR in the event of full mobilization. These actions pertain to voluntary and involuntary preassignment of IRR personnel in peacetime as outlined below.
- (1) Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment Program. On 15 March 1976 the Army initiated a program which provides members of the IRR the opportunity to preselect the units to which they will be assigned in the event of full mobilization. Army personnel being released from active duty at Army transfer stations who are designated for assignment to the IRR may choose preassignment to specified units of the Active and Reserve Components programmed for early mobilization. Upon administrative processing into the IRR volunteers are provided with orders, which become effective upon announcement of full mobilization, to report to their units within a specified time period. Members of the IRR at the time this program was initiated were also afforded the opportunity to volunteer for mobilization preassignment. Volunteers are not required to participate with their preassigned units prior to mobilization. A detailed description of the voluntary system together with baseline data pertaining thereto is given in Chapter 3.

²HODA Letter 135-76-1, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment, February 1976.

- (2) Involuntary Preassignment. To establish the most effective system for preassigning IRR personnel who do not volunteer, the Army will test alternative involuntary (mandatory) preassignment systems in FY 78.

 Through contractual support, 3 a plan has been developed to test the alternative of mandatory preassignment to early deploying units or mandatory preassignment to mobilization stations. The objective of the test plan is to determine the dollar and non-dollar costs, operational benefits, strengths and weaknesses of each test alternative as the basis for determining the preferred alternative. If neither proves acceptable, further evaluation of the test data should provide information on other possible courses of action. Subobjectives and EEA for testing are categorized into readiness, resource requirements, attitudinal factors and special problems. Three testing methods will be applied during FY 78 as follows:
- (a) Test exercises to be conducted in conjunction with JTX BOLD EAGLE 78 (test of unit preassignment systems) and a corps-level CPX-78 (test of mobilization station preassignment) during which questionnaires, interviews and personal observations will be used to collect data.
- (b) A survey addressed to samples of the IRR population including voluntary and involuntary preassignees, personnel who participate in the test exercises and other members of the IRR.
- (c) File analysis of data that may now be available or will be generated in the future.

³Litton Mellonics Systems Development, Final Report, Plan for Testing Alternative Preassignment Systems, Volume I - Main Report and Volume II - Annexes, June 1976.

- c. The above preassignment test plan is based on the premise that pretest baseline data be developed and analyzed to support scientific evaluation of the FY 78 preassignment test data and to facilitate detailed test planning. Accordingly, the Army tasked Litton Mellonics to develop these data. Primary data sources were designated as: (1) the FORSCOM mobilization CPX to be conducted 8 November-9 December 1976 (MOBEX-76); (2) the Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System implemented by the Army on 15 March 1976; and, (3) Army operational and mobilization files. Planning for the collection and analysis of baseline data was conducted in two phases as documented in the two interim reports referenced below.
- (1) First Interim Report, IRR Preassignment Test, Baseline Data
 Requirements and Data Sources, Litton Mellonics, July 1976. A discussion
 of the evaluation logic for the candidate IRR preassignment systems, application of the logic to the development of baseline data requirements,
 specifications of the resultant baseline data elements, preliminary
 identification of planned sources for procurement of these baseline data
 and an initial data collection schedule.
- (2) Second Interim Report, IRR Preassignment Test, Baseline Data Collection Plan, September 1976. An extension and expansion of the First Interim Report which presents the detailed plan for systematic collection, analysis and documentation of the baseline data required for test and evaluation of the alternative IRR preassignment systems. The plan also discusses the estimation of baseline levels of system performance and provides a schedule for data collection and analysis.

CHAPTER 2

BASELINE DATA

CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

- 2-1 SYSTEM DEFINITION. For purposes of this study the current IRR mobilization system is defined as Army policies and procedures effective under conditions of full mobilization to -
- a. Establish and process requirements (requisitions) for IRR fillers to bring mobilizing Army units to full (wartime) TOE and TDA strength.
- b. Select, alert and order IRR fillers to active duty at mobilization stations.
- c. Receive and process IRR fillers at mobilization stations including accessioning into the Standard Installation Division Personnel System (SIDPERS) data base.
 - d. Integrate IRR fillers into units to which assigned.

2-2 GENERAL SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

a. General. During peacetime, RCPAC, a field agency of the Adjutant General, administers the IRR, including the maintenance of an automated personnel accounting and reporting system, and plans for IRR mobilization in coordination with other Army agencies. The policies and procedures for mobilizing the IRR are given in AR 135-301, INDIVIDUAL READY RESERVE (IRR), 18 July 1973, and AR 135-300 (DRAFT IV), ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND ARMY RESERVE, MOBILIZATION OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS AND PROCESSING OF RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS FOR RELEASE FROM ACTIVE DUTY, 1 August 1976. Additional insights into the detailed operations of the system

have been gained from observations and reports pertaining to a mobilization test exercise (TESTEX) conducted by FORSCOM at Ft. Stewart, Ga., (16 April - 19 May 1976) in preparation for Mobilization Exercise - 76 (MOBEX-76), and from MOBEX-76 itself conducted by FORSCOM during the period 8 November - 9 December 1976.

- b. System Orientation. Fundamentally, the design of the current Army system for mobilizing the IRR is oriented on the basic objective of the IRR as enunciated in AR 135-301. This objective is to provide qualified reinforcements for expansion of the Army in any degree of mobilization. A major factor in the achievement of the objective is the maintenance of maximum flexibility in selecting and ordering members of the IRR to active duty.
- c. <u>Detailed Description</u>. A detailed description of the current IRR Mobilization System as outlined in the System Definition (Para 2-1 above) is presented in subsequent paragraphs and is followed by estimates of the time factors involved.

2-3 ESTABLISHING AND PROCESSING IRR REQUIREMENTS

a. <u>General</u>. Full mobilization is an expansion of the active Armed Forces resulting from action by Congress and the President to mobilize all units in the existing approved troop basis, all individual reservists, and the material resources needed for their support. Active Army personnel and members of the IRR are used to bring units of the troop list to full wartime TOE and TDA strength where the assigned strengths of the


units are less than full TOE or TDA. Unit personnel requisitions serve as the basis for levies on the personnel assets of the Active Army and the IRR to meet these personnel requirements.

b. Requisitioning Process. Figure 2-1 shows the channels for processing requisitions for fillers by Active Army (AA) and Reserve Component (RC) units as well as the routing of feedback reports of actions taken on these requisitions. A key element in this process is the availability of up-to-date data on unit organizational structures and personnel authorizations for use by AA and RC units and by higher-level echelons where the requisitions are audited and processed. For example, DA-ODCSOPS must provide Active Army Locator (AALOC) files and Army Authorization Document System (TAADS) data to MILPERCEN and to major commands for distribution to appropriate mobilization stations and designated support installations. For RC units, their orders to active duty should provide specific guidance with respect to wartime personnel authorizations. These orders will specify the MTOE/TDA, including the command and control number (CCNUM) and standard requirements code (SRC), under which the unit is to be mobilized.

c. AA Requirements.

(1) Upon receipt of alert of impending full mobilization, AA units submit requisitions to their installation commanders for the personnel needed to reach wartime authorized strength.

Each installation commander fills requisitions to the extent pos-



*Requisitions must be based on wartime personnel authorizations (MTOE/TDA) specified in mobilization orders.

Figure 2-1. Processing of Personnel Requisitions at Full Mobilization

sible from locally available installation resources. He then forwards the remaining personnel requirements to MILPERCEN for action. Those requisitions that cannot be met by MILPERCEN from AA resources are reformatted into EAM/ADP cards and dispatched by AUTODIN to RCPAC for fill from the IRR. To ensure receipt, back-up requisitions are hand-carried to RCPAC by air courier.

- (2) In a similar manner installations also submit personnel requisitions to MILPERCEN to reach authorizations established in their Mobilization TDAs (MOB TDAs) and the MOB TDAs of inactive installations for which they have mobilization responsibility. If AA assets are unavailable, MILPERCEN forwards the requisitions to RCPAC for IRR fill in accordance with DA priorities.
- (3) Requisitions from MILPERCEN that cannot be filled by RCPAC from IRR assets are returned to MILPERCEN with listings of non-matching IRR assets remaining.

d. RC Requirements.

effective date of order to active duty, ARNGUS units manually prepare hard copy rosters of filler requirements. These rosters are consolidated at battalion level and forwarded through the respective State Adjutants General to the CONUS Army commander (AR135-300). If AUTODIN is unavailable, couriers are used to transmit requirements through channels. The State AGs edit the filler requirements data for grade/branch/MOS accuracy prior to forwarding to the CONUSA. As filler requirements are received from the State AGs, the CONUSAs also edit the data for grade/branch/MOS accuracy, key punch EAM/ADP requisition cards and

transmit the cards to RCPAC by AUTODIN and air courier unless otherwise directed in the mobilization order.

(2) <u>USAR</u>. IRR filler requirements for USAR units are processed in a manner similar to ARNGUS units except that USAR requirements rosters are submitted through Army Reserve Commands (ARCOMs) to the CONUSAs. In an urgent emergency, USAR unit commanders may send requisitions direct to the CONUSAs with information copies to the ARCOMs. The CONUSAs process the requisitions as outlined above for the ARNGUS units.

2-4 SELECTING, ALERTING AND ORDERING IRR FILLERS TO ACTIVE DUTY

a. Selecting IRR Fillers

- (1) DA furnishes RCPAC the RC mobilization troop list, the priorities for fill of units submitting requisitions, the criteria for selecting IRR to meet requirements and other special policies or procedural instructions. To assist RCPAC in the manual MOS substitution phase, MILPERCEN dispatches a team of MOS technicians to RCPAC.
- (2) RCPAC processes IRR requisitions from MILPERCEN for the Active Army and from the CONUS Armies for the Reserve Components, matching resources against requirements using computer programs.

 Those IRR personnel whose MOS, grade, branch, and other selection criteria match a valid requirement are selected for mobilization.

 Grade substitutions as authorized by regulations are made by computer.
- (3) Using authorized substitution criteria and assisted by the MILPERCEN MOS Team, RCPAC converts unmatched IRR requirements (shortfalls) into substitute requisitions for a new match with remaining IRR resources. This process continues until

either IRR resources are depleted, all requisitions are filled, or the remaining resources do not match requisitions.

(4) Requisitions from RC units which cannot be filled from the IRR are forwarded by AUTODIN and air courier to MILPERCEN for fill from AA resources.

b. Alerting and Ordering IRR Fillers to Active Duty.

- (1) Title 10 of the U.S. Code (Section 672(e)) provides that a reasonable time (alert period) be allowed between the date a member of the IRR ordered to active duty is alerted for that duty and the date he is required to enter upon that duty. When the military situation permits, a 30-day alert period will be granted. On the other hand, the Secretary of the Army is authorized to order members of the IRR to active duty with little advance notice if military requirements so warrant. Because of the nature of the current major military threat, DA normally employs a 7-day planning factor for the alert period. (The IRR alternative preassignment systems to be tested are also based on the assumption that the 30-day alert period will be waived and that IRR members called up will be granted a 7-day alert period to arrange their personal business affairs before reporting for duty.)
- (2) RCPAC orders IRR personnel selected for mobilization to the mobilization station of the requisitioning unit, for active duty with that unit. Active duty orders are generated by computer, reproduced in quantity and dispatched to IRR members by certified mail, return receipt requested. RCPAC estimates that orders can be dispatched at a rate of about 50,000 per week. This estimate is based on the time required

to complete the selection of qualified personnel for specific units, to process and publish the orders and to place the orders in the postal system. An information package pertaining to the handling of personal affairs accompanies each set of IRR orders.

- (3) To provide the basis for accessioning fillers ordered to active duty into the Active Army data base (SIDPERS), RCPAC forwards rosters (name/grade/MOS) and filler data accession cards to the respective mobilization stations or to designated SIDPERS support installations if the mobilization stations do not possess a SIDPERS computer facility, e.g., semiactive or inactive installations.
- (4) If IRR personnel selected for mobilization have not undergone a physical examination within the preceding 12 months, they will first be ordered to active duty without pay for the examination (AR 135-301).* Concurrently they will be notified that such orders represent the mobilization alert for active duty on a full-time basis provided they meet the required physical fitness standards. If pre-entry medical examinations are impractical because of the urgency of the military situation, lack of medical facilities, or excessive travel requirements, IRR personnel will either be ordered to report to a suitable AA

^{*}In October 1976 RCPAC estimated that 75-80% of IRR members required physical examinations. During MOBEX-76, 85% of IRR personnel selected for assignment to M+1 units required a physical examination.

installation near their homes for purposes of undergoing the examination while enroute to their duty or mobilization stations, or be ordered to report directly to their duty or mobilization stations for medical examination within 10 days of arrival.

(5) RCPAC is prepared to provide transportation requests and travel information as requested by IRR personnel ordered to active duty. Having this information, IRR fillers should be satisfactorily prepared to travel by private means or public conveyance to their mobilization stations.

2-5 RECEIVING AND PROCESSING IRR FILLERS AT MOBILIZATION STATIONS

a. Reception and processing requirements for fillers are discussed in detail in ARs 135-300 and 135-301, previously cited. DA Pamphlet 600-8 (Military Personnel Office Management and Administrative Procedures) provides a guide for required AA personnel actions and the development of a personnel management program. The processing requirements involve administrative activities such as initial orientation, issue of clothing and equipment, records processing, classification interview, testing if needed, legal counseling, personal affairs interview, preparation of financial records, partial pay, initiation of allotments, recording emergency data, arranging life insurance and survivor benefits, medical examinations (See paragraph (4) page 2-8), immunizations, initiating security clearances and other administrative actions that may apply in special cases.

- b. Although the division of processing responsibilities between the mobilization station and units receiving IRR fillers is not fixed by Army regulations, the objective is to make the soldier-filler as administratively ready as practical when he reaches his unit thus minimizing the impact of the personnel processing workload on unit training requirements. Accordingly, a centralized filler screening and processing operation is desirable for most processing requirements in order to streamline and facilitate these actions, eliminate confusion, fix responsibilities and best assure that all requirements are met. Although certain processing activities are not best suited for a centralized operation (e.g., issue of organizational equipment and initiation of security clearances), those activities which should be handled centrally will probably require the operation of housing and feeding facilities for IRR personnel by the mobilization station normally on a short-term basis for each filler (approximately 2-3 days).
- c. The reception and processing of IRR fillers is an integral part of the planning conducted by mobilization stations. However, the methods and procedures developed for implementation will vary depending upon the peacetime status of the particular installation, i.e., whether active, semiactive or inactive/state-operated. For example, active mobilization stations have the necessary administrative organizations and facilities available in peacetime but mobilization planning must provide for the relief of early-deploying AA administrative units by mobilizing

RC administrative units to maintain the processing capabilities required for incoming RC units and IRR fillers. Further, at semiactive and inactive/state-operated installations, administrative support units must be mobilized and operational on site in sufficient time to receive and process the mobilizing RC units and IRR fillers. In either case finite processing policies, procedures and responsibilities must be developed and coordinated as required.

d. Not mentioned above is the entry of IRR filler personnel reporting for active duty into the Active Army personnel information and accounting system. This function is performed by the mobilization station or by installations designated to provide SIDPERS support to mobilization stations without a SIDPERS capability. The supporting SIDPERS activity at the mobilization station receives accession data cards for IRR fillers from RCPAC, manipulates the data into FID "Q" format, accesses them into the SIDPERS data base and transmits them via AUTODIN to MILPERCEN for processing into AA strengths.

2-6 INTEGRATION OF IRR FILLERS INTO UNITS

a. IRR fillers will not normally be ordered to report to mobilization stations prior to the arrival of their receiving units. Moreover, RCPAC will forward computer-generated rosters to the receiving units which will provide advance notice with respect to the name, grade, MOS or SSI

of the fillers. Using these rosters, the receiving unit commanders can plan more specifically for assignment and processing of the fillers when they arrive, including any personnel adjustments that may be needed.

- b. After completion of mobilization station processing, the mobilization station will transport the IRR fillers to their receiving units. For fillers ordered to divisional units, this may be the Administration Company of the Division Support Command -- an intermediate stop for divisional processing prior to reporting to a divisional unit at a lower or parallel echelon. In the case of smaller units such as a separate brigade the routing may be more direct.
- c. Receiving unit commanders (company/squadron) establish SOPs for processing new arrivals. This includes orientation on the specific unit mission, showdown inspection to ensure individual clothing issue is complete, issue of organizational type equipment and other local requirements. The IRR filler is then oriented on his specific assignment and integrated as rapidly as possible into the postmobilization training cycle.
- 2-7 ESTIMATED TIME FACTORS FOR IRR MOBILIZATION. Based on the preceding discussion of IRR mobilization activities, the estimated time required for IRR fillers to reach their units is given below. These time factors are based on professional judgment. There has been no opportunity to officially validate or otherwise assess these factors through experience during a mobilization exercise or an actual emergency situation.

a. Estimated Time Required for IRR Fillers to Reach AA Receiving Units

	Sequential Action	Average Time (days)
(1)	On receipt of alert for full mobilization, installation commanders fill EDUs to extent possible from installation resources	1
(2)	Installation commanders report unfilled personnel requirements to MILPERCEN	2
(3)	MILPERCEN reports requirements which cannot be filled from AA assets to RCPAC for IRR fill	6
(4)	RCPAC processes AA requisitions for IRR fillers	2-3
(5)	RCPAC dispatches, by certified mail, active duty orders to IRR fillers selected for AA units	1
(6)	Intransit time for active duty orders	5
(7)	IRR filler alert period	7
(8)	IRR filler travel time to mobilization station	2
(9)	Mobilization station processing, culminating in delivery of IRR filler to assigned unit	2-3
	Total	28-30

b. Estimated Time for IRR Fillers to Reach RC

Receiving Units.*

	Sequential Action	Average Time (days)
(1)	After alert at home stations, RC unit commanders prepare hard copy rosters of IRR fill requirements	2
(2)	CONUSAs receive IRR filler requirements via courier or AUTODIN	2
(3)	CONUSAs consolidate RC filler requirements rosters and convert them to EAM/ADP filler requisition cards	3
(4)	RCPAC receives keypunched requisition cards from CONUSAs	2
(5)	RCPAC processes RC requisitions for IRR fillers	2-3
(6)	RCPAC dispatches, by certified mail, active duty orders to IRR fillers selected for RC units	1
(7)	Intransit time for active duty orders	5
(8)	IRR filler alert period	7
(9)	IRR filler travel time to mobilization station	2
(10)	Mobilization station processing culminating in delivery of IRR filler to assigned unit.	2-3
	Tota1	28-30

c. <u>Summary</u>. Based on the above, Table 2-1 summarizes the estimated times required, under the current IRR mobilization system, for IRR fillers to reach RC or AA units to which assigned under conditions of full mobilization.

^{*} See Para 2-9e(2), page 2-24 for MOBEX-76 experience data as reported by RCPAC.

Со	mpleted Action	Time Required (days) Active Army and Reserve Component Requisitions
1.	Receipt of IRR requisitions by RCPAC	9
2.	RCPAC processing of IRR requisitions and publication of orders	3-4
3.	Dispatch (mailing) of orders to IRR plus intransit time	5
4.	IRR alert period	7
5.	IRR travel to mobilization station	2
6.	Processing at mobilization stations and assignment to unit	2-3
	Total	28-30

d. Additional baseline data on the current IRR mobilization system are discussed below.

2-8 BASELINE DATA-CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

a. The IRR-APST plan specifies in detail the test data to be developed for evaluating the alternative preassignment systems. Similarly, the Baseline Data Collection Plan was tailored to meet the pretest data requirements implicit in the evaluation logic for

the systems. Accordingly, the baseline data address, where applicable and feasible, the same issues as those developed for the alternative preassignment systems. The data are designed to provide reference points for estimating the effects of changes in the current IRR mobilization system, e.g., estimating improvements; diagnosing deficiencies, shortcomings and limitations; and identifying side effects that may not have been foreseen in developing the preassignment concepts to be tested.

- b. Plans for collecting baseline data are detailed in the two interim reports described in paragraph 1-2c, page 1-4. The principal planned sources of data on the current IRR mobilization system were (1) draft MOBEX-76 after action reports, (2) results of the MOBEX-76 survey of IRR personnel, 4 (3) file analysis and (4) interviews of knowledgeable DA personnel.
- (1) MOBEX-76 did not include pre-set situations, procedures or data requirements specifically designed to support the development of baseline data for the current IRR system.

 However, the generation of these data was inherent in the personnel play planned for MOBEX-76 since emphasis was placed on the development of filler requirements and the allocation of IRR and Active

⁴ USA Military Personnel Center, Report on Results of November 1976 Special Survey on Mobilization of Reserve Personnel, Survey Number 132-S, 3 March 1977, Alexandria, Va.

Army resources to meet these requirements. The approach to data collection was, therefore, to analyze planned personnel inputs, outputs and associated procedures and to identify data that would contribute to the development of baseline data. These data were keyed to subobjectives, EEA and subordinate data requirements, and served as the basis for data collection activities at DA, FORSCOM, RCPAC and two mobilization stations (Ft. Benning, Ga., and Camp Roberts, Cal.). It was anticipated that the MOBEX after action reports would prove to be the best source of baseline data. However, this did not prove to be the case, and can be attributed to problems encountered during the exercise with respect to: the availability of accurate (wartime) unit personnel authorization data, operation of readiness reporting systems, operation of the SIDPERS system, confusion at various levels of command concerning the definitions of non-mobilizable and non-deployable personnel, and incompatibilities in the estimated arrival of IRR fill with the departure dates of units to which the fill was to be assigned. (At this writing, the official MOBEX-76 after action report is being staffed at DA and contains detailed discussion of problems encountered and corrective action necessary.)

(2) As mentioned above, it was originally planned to also use data from the MOBEX-76 survey of IRR personnel. This survey was a mail-out to a random sample of IRR personnel stratified by grade. Population sizes, sample sizes and

numbers of useable returns are depicted in the Table 2-2.

Overall the response was 36% for the IRR portion of the survey and ranged from a low of 20% for the E-1 through E-4 sample to a high of 54% for the WO sample.

- (a) Because of the low response rates, using the data as received would require the assumption that the population of non-respondents was adequately represented by the respondents. There are any number of reasons for failure to respond. Typical of these are: failure to receive the questionnaire, indifference, lost or misplaced questionnaires, and hostility to the originator. Of the four illustrative reasons, two and possibly three could be the basis for concluding that non-respondents differ in attitudes, opinion or background from respondents. Verification of group similarity or difference could not be made from the collected data. All responses were anonymous thus preventing any follow-up contacts or post hoc profile analyses. Moreover only four background variables were obtained on the survey (grade, number of dependents, employment status and civilian occupation) thus preventing any analysis of the degree to which respondents resemble the IRR population.
- (b) Since the non-respondent group was so large relative to the respondent group and hypotheses about group similarities could not be tested, it was decided not to use the survey data as a part of the baseline statement. The reliability of the results cannot be determined nor can extrapolations be made with reasonable confidence to the IRR population as a whole or in part.

Table 2-2
Sizes of Populations, Samples and Useable Survey Returns by
Stratified Subgroup

Category	Population Size	Sample Size	Useable Returns
Officer/Warrant Officer	8,022	2,442	1,210
(06-04)	(1,243)	(935)	(456)
(03-01)	(6,104)	(935)	(443)
(All WO)	(675)	(572)	(311)
Enlisted Personnel	72,492	4,198	1,166
(E9-E7)	(298)	(269)	(154)
(E6-E5)	(6,834)	(1,929)	(613)
(E4-E1)	(65,360)	(2,000)	(399)
Totals	80,514	6,640	2,376

(c) The unsuitability of these survey data affect the ability to describe certain data elements in the "Readiness" category that are important to the overall analysis of the IRR. Table 2-3 lists these data elements. Three of them, quality of the IRR, availability and timeliness of arrival are of considerable importance. If IRR personnel are not called to participate in the IRR Preassignment Test, empirical data concerning the quality of the IRR in terms of availability, training readiness and timeliness of arrival cannot be provided. Historical data are lacking or limited in their

Table 2-3

Data Elements Related to MOBEX-76 IRR Survey

	Readiness Subobjectives	Survey Data Elements
1.	Unit Personnel Readiness	(a) Physical fitness
		(b) MOS qualification
		(c) Refresher training requirements
2.	Quality of IRR Fillers	(a) Physical fitness
		(b) MOS qualification
		(c) Refresher training requirements
3.	IRR Availability	(a) Exemption claims
		(b) Reasons for exemption claims.
1.	Timeliness of IRR Arrival	(a) Time required before departure for mobiliza- tion station after order to active duty.
		(b) Reasons for requiring more than 30 days before departure.
· .	Impact on Training Readiness	(a) Physical fitness
	Readiness	(b) MOS qualification
	(c) Refresher training requirements	

currency. The most recent empirical data are job supervisor ratings of the MOS qualifications of 137 IRR called to participate in Test Number 9 (IRR Roundout) of the OSD Reserve Component Study test series conducted at Fort Carson, Colorado, in 1972. After observation in field exercises, 42.4% were rated as being above average in MOS qualifications, but the study also concluded that two weeks of refresher training was generally insufficient to permit full reattainment of skill levels. The data, however, are too limited a sample and too dated to be used in the current baseline study. More current data are unlikely since involuntary call up of IRR for AT has been suspended as a matter of policy.

- (d) From data collection attempts during
 MOBEX-76 it must be concluded that valid reliable estimates
 of the quality of the IRR, their willingness to report for
 duty and the timeliness of their arrival cannot be stated
 for the present IRR population. Moreover, simple mailout
 surveys to IRR members in the future which are based solely
 on voluntary cooperation cannot be expected to produce
 sufficiently high response rates to ensure that this data
 collection method will prove suitable.
- c. The <u>detailed</u> results of baseline data collection for the current system are given in <u>Annex A</u>. These data are keyed directly to the data collection categories, subobjectives, EEA and CLQ established in the baseline data collection plan. In the paragraphs that follow the baseline data are <u>summarized</u> by category and subobjective.

The final paragraph (2-13) indicates areas where additional data should be developed for use in evaluating the alternative preassignment systems. Further, the matrix in Annex C keys the results of baseline data collection on the current IRR mobilization system to each data requirement (EEA, CLQ) indicating those requirements answered satisfactorily, those where additional research is needed and the data elements required.

2-9 READINESS CATEGORY

a. Flexibility and Adaptability. Flexibility and adaptability are key factors in the organization and operation of the current IRR mobilization system if the Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System is not considered. However, this flexibility is reduced by the requirement that IRR personnel be selected for involuntary active duty in priorities based on previous active duty and exposure to hostile fire, and the requirement that IRR personnel being ordered to active duty undergo a physical examination if not examined within the previous year. On the other hand, the flexibility and adaptability of the system are enhanced by MOS/grade substitution criteria which may be applied to meet requirements. In sum, the system pools the IRR assets (less voluntary preassignees) allowing freedom of action at mobilization to assign IRR assets as needed, regardless of the particular mobilization situation, the IRR-assets available and IRR requirements. Approximately 4% of the IRR have volunteered for the preassignment program and under conditions of full mobilization must report to units designated in their preassignment orders.

b. <u>Unit Personnel Readiness</u>. The current IRR mobilization system per se has no impact on unit personnel readiness. Although detailed data on unit readiness conditions (REDCONs) are classified, it is estimated that only a few Active Army unit REDCONs will be improved by adding fillers whereas the REDCONs of about 40% of ARNG units and 60% of USAR units can be improved.

c. Quality and Quantity.

- (1) Requirements for fillers and replacements have been identified by CMF for the period FY78-FY82. These classified data are available in ODCSPER (DAPE-PBP). Specific requirements for IRR have not been separated from the training base output and the Standby Reserve. IRR assets alone will not meet the filler and replacement requirements.
- (2) MOBEX-76 was not designed to test the adequacy of the IRR to meet full mobilization needs. IRR filler requirements for non-participating National Guard and Active Army units were not generated and processed. For IRR-APST purposes, full mobilization needs should be processed to gain better insight into the qualitative and quantitative IRR shortfalls that exist.
- d. IRR Availability. The availability of IRR personnel is estimated by OSD as 70% of the population.

e. Timeliness of IRR Arrival.

(1) As previously mentioned IRR personnel are granted a 30-day period to report to active duty when the military sit-

uation permits. However, the Secretary of the Army may reduce the length of this time period based on the contingency involved. A planning factor of 7 days is widely used in Army planning.

- (2) RCPAC, based on the results of MOBEX-76, estimates that a minimum of 17-20 days (plus alert time) is required from the time a Reserve Component unit initiates a requisition for IRR fillers until the fillers arrive at the RC unit's mobilization station. If the full alert period of 30 days is authorized, the reporting time becomes 47-50 days; if the abbreviated alert planning figure of 7 days is applied, the reporting period is 24-27 days.
- (3) The in-processing time for IRR fillers at mobilization stations is estimated to average 2-3 days.
- have procedures for processing "replacements" in peacetime. It is logical to assume that wartime procedures will build on the existing procedures recognizing that processing requirements for IRR filler personnel will greatly exceed those for AA fillers. On the other hand, it is necessary for semi-active and inactive mobilization stations to plan in peacetime for early establishment of the necessary processing capability and ensure that the necessary administrative units are included on the mobilization TDA. Sampling of two mobilization stations during MOBEX-76 (Ft. Benning and Camp Roberts) revealed the above to be the case.

The principal problem identified was that these mobilization stations did not know how many IRR fillers to expect and when they would arrive.

- (1) Mobilization planning directives require unit commanders to plan for post-mobilization training. During MOBEX-76, numerous problems arose with respect to coordinating training plans with mobilization stations and specifying training requirements such as ranges and training areas. Post-mobilization training plans, in general, assume that fillers will be available to increase strength (if required) enough to conduct meaningful unit training.
- (2) Presently, RC units are prevented from attaining fully trained status because of inadequate training areas, MOS imbalance, shortage of personnel, excessive personnel turnover, and equipment shortages. In the post-mobilization environment, after units receive IRR fillers, the problems of equipment shortage and sufficient time to complete unit training would still remain. Adequate training areas might still be a problem, depending on the type unit and the mobilization station facilities (e.g., a tank battalion at a station without tank firing ranges).
- (3) There are insufficient IRR personnel to supply predicted casualty replacements with qualified personnel if it is assumed that IRR is the sole and first priority source for such fillers. POR qualification requires completion or up-date after the filler reports for active duty. All IRR would require POR qualification.

(4) The time-phased reporting of training readiness was not operational during MOBEX-76. However, Active Army units are maintained fully trained at training REDCON C-1. Reserve component units vary from fully trained units to some that estimate 12 weeks are required to reach REDCON C-1.

2-10 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY

- a. <u>Changes in Unit Fill Requirements</u>. Force structure changes and changes in unit strengths do not affect the current system for managing the IRR. However, these changes are continuous in nature. The average time to complete the cycle for a change is unknown but MILPERCEN personnel estimate it may require as much as 13 months.
- b. Changes in IRR Orders. Under the current system no orders are issued before M-Day to IRR personnel who have not volunteered for preassignment. IRR personnel ordered to active duty on mobilization may be granted delays and exemptions pursuant to policies established in AR 601-25. Approvals are granted by DA. In addition, active duty orders may be changed if such changes best satisfy the needs of the Army. No quantitative data are available with respect to the number of changes that may be required.

c. Mailing and Notification.

(1) Mobilization orders are sent to IRR members by certified mail, return receipt requested. The cost of this procedure is approximately \$1.45/man (25¢ for personnel cost, 17¢ for supplies and \$1.03 for postage). It is estimated that

an average of 5 days will be required for the orders to reach the individual. The reliability of this procedure under postmobilization conditions cannot be determined.

be prepared and issued as required to fit the needs of the mobilizing units including making the best choice of mobilization stations and selecting the most appropriate time for reporting. The disadvantages are delay in receipt of orders, problems in locating personnel who may change residence, and a time-consuming method of enforcing orders. (AR 135-210 describes actions to be taken when IRR personnel fail to report for active duty in compliance with orders.)

d. RCPAC and Transfer Point Workloads.

(1) In general terms RCPAC administers the IRR in peacetime including maintaining and updating personnel records, executing notifications of Service obligations, performing personnel screening and classification actions, complying with security requirements as they relate to the IRR, maintaining an automated IRR management information system, developing and disseminating IRR management reports and preparing for IRR mobilization. Transfer Activities separate Army personnel from active duty and initiate initial administrative actions which transfer obligated personnel into the IRR. Additional details are provided under this subobjective in Annexes A and B. Costs are discussed in paragraph f. below.

(2) The functions performed by RCPAC in mobilizing the IRR are described in preceding portions of this Chapter.

Resources required for personnel and ADPS augmentation on mobilization are discussed in detail under this subobjective in Annex A. Transfer Activities normally perform no functions related to the IRR on mobilization.

e. Unit and Mobilization Station Workloads.

- (1) During peacetime units and mobilization stations perform no functions specifically related to IRR fillers.

 Requisitioning, processing and assignment of IRR are exercised in varying degrees in mobilization CPXs. M-Day planning is performed by stations and units with respect to reception and processing of fillers. In MOBEX-76, installation planning was incomplete because of lack of knowledge of number of IRR fillers arriving and their times of arrival.
- (2) Additional personnel are not needed to accomplish the planning required for the reception and processing of IRR fillers. This planning can be absorbed within other personnel planning functions and responsibilities. Mobilization stations should prepare detailed plans for receiving and processing mobilized units and IRR fillers.
- (3) Responsibilities for processing mobilized IRR personnel are centralized at the mobilization station level to the extent possibile with most completed before the IRR filler arrives at his unit. Local conditions will dictate specific assignment of these responsibilities.

- (4) Data on specific IRR reception and processing capacities for all mobilization stations are unavailable. However, planning for reception of mobilizing units is based on the unit wartime strength. Thus, overall planning figures include unit operating strength plus fillers.
- (5) Mobilization plans must take into account the loss of administrative capabilities at an installation when administrative units deploy. This loss should be covered by timely call-up of similar type units to perform the required administrative processing functions.

f. Incremental Dollar Costs.

- (1) Annual operating costs for the current IRR system are not readily identifiable. This fact was noted by the Defense Manpower Commission in its report of April 1976.
- (2) The total RCPAC budget is about \$18 million annually with approximately 80% attributable to the IRR. This covers manpower, ADPS and other O&M costs. Based on an enlisted IRR strength of 173,200 in 1976, the estimated cost per IRR enlisted man is \$49.50. Other costs are incurred at the DA level.
- (3) The most feasible costing procedure is to consider incremental/decremental costs of new candidate systems to the present cost (amount unquantified) and compare on a relative rather than an absolute basis.

(4) If the present IRR system remains unchanged, no additional incremental costs are foreseen at this time. A number of changes requiring new legislation have been proposed for the IRR. There are substantial costs associated with these proposals (i.e., NPS enlistment in IRR for a bonus or other economic incentives). A mobilization would, of course, involve substantial costs. Estimated RCPAC costs for MOBEX-76 are given in Appendix 1 to Annex A.

2-11 ATTITUDES CATEGORY

a. <u>IRR Satisfaction</u>. Data available during the baseline collection period show that 1,645 enlisted personnel are serving in the IRR although they are in a non-obligated status. There is no other direct evidence available that bears specifically on IRR motivation or job satisfaction. These areas could be explored further through the IRR-APST surveys if considered necessary.

b. IRR Complaints.

IRR members update DA Form 3725 semi-annually. This form gives the reservist an opportunity to correct personnel, educational and occupational data. Members may also request a review of their reserve status and transfer to "Standby" if employed in a critical civilian or key government position, preparing for the ministry, or under a religious missionary obligation. Moreover, if entry on extended active duty would create an extreme personal hardship, personnel may request discharge from the IRR. They also must certify that they are physically able to serve and understand

their service obligation. IRR members with other problems may enclose letters, requests, etc., when they return this form. The form serves to keep the files current on available IRR members. The disadvantages are that it depends on the voluntary verification and return of the form by the individual reservist and there is no solicitation of other queries and problems.

(2) Investigation at DA level revealed no instances of complaints by IRR personnel attributable to their IRR status.

Official complaints have dealt almost universally with unresolved matters relating to the individual's active duty or his veteran's status and benefits, but not with his IRR status. Since the IRR no longer are required to serve on active duty for training, there is no correspondence that is IRR related, except for the special category of officers in the mobilization designee program.

c. Social and Political Impacts.

- (1) The DA Office of Public Affairs reports that the current IRR system has not been publicized. An examination of periodical indices shows little discussion of the IRR. Only three articles were located. Their orientation is primarily on the inability of the IRR to meet mobilization requirements and the lack of quantitative IRR requirements.
- (2) The current IRR system is committed by policy to equal treatment of both sexes and all races with the exception of the exclusion of women from combat. Although current regulations do not require females to serve in the IRR, they may serve as IRR volunteers. The DCSPER 46 report of 30 November 1976 shows

1,002 officers and 1,156 enlisted members of the Woman's Army Corps in the IRR.

evidence that the current IRR system exerts any measurable effect on Active Army or Reserve Component recruiting and retention. At the present time approximately 4% of personnel leaving the Active Army with an IRR obligation are enlisting in the ARNG and approximately the same number are enlisting in the USAR. Specific reasons for not reenlisting in the Active Army nor enlisting in the Reserve Components are not available but may be gathered in the IRR-APST survey. Personnel interviewed at the Transfer Activity at Ft. Dix believe that recent REFRAD personnel reenlist in the Active Army because they cannot find satisfactory employment; join RC units for the extra income; and accept a mobilization preassignment to avoid a possible mandatory assignment or call to annual training.

2-12 SPECIAL PROBLEMS CATEGORY

a. <u>Geographic Distribution</u>. The geographic distribution of the IRR by state is given in the DCSPER-46 Report, Strength of the Army (U), Part III, Strength, Reserve Components, USAR. (See Table A-5, page A-28, for distribution as of 30 November 1976.) On mobilization, distance is not a specific criterion for assignment of IRR personnel. However, RCPAC first tries to match requirements with assets available in the state where the gaining unit is being mobilized; if this fails, an attempt is made to meet requirements from the Army Area involved; and finally, if the requirement is not met, RCPAC looks nationwide.

b. <u>Compromise of Classified Information</u>. The current IRR mobilization system minimizes the possibility of compromise of classified information because the administration of the IRR and the status of IRR personnel do not reveal details of mobilization planning.

2-13 ADDITIONAL BASELINE DATA

- a. For IRR-APST purposes, the Army should develop a better definition of IRR requirements for various contingency situations. Given the requirements, it would then be easier to measure the flexibility and adaptability of IRR systems and the adequacy of the IRR in filling mobilization needs.
- b. Baseline data are also lacking in the area of inprocessing of fillers at mobilization stations. Planning and procedures are extensive but testing has only been during CPXs. IRR filler inprocessing differs from that of fillers from Active Army sources since they require almost complete equipping, medical examination and updating of their records. The principal data need is for current time factors, station workload (manhours) and required material estimates. These cannot be adequately assessed in a CPX. IRR are no longer available for a "live" test of notification, movement to mobilization station, and inprocessing. A simulation using Reserve Component unit personnel on AT (or even IDT) or IRR volunteers could provide data on inprocessing time and workload.

- c. For reasons given in paragraph 2-8b(2), page 2-17, data developed during the MOBEX-76 IRR survey were not considered valid for this report. Consequently, the areas investigated in the survey require additional research. These include IRR readiness, availability, timeliness of arrival and requirements for refresher training.
- d. The IRR Preassignment Test Baseline Data Collection Plan defined EEA and CLQ to support a comparative evaluation of the current system, mandatory unit preassignment and mandatory mobilization station preassignment. Data collected were adequate to respond to all major EEA/CLQ except those discussed above, listed with explanatory comment in Table 2-4 and presented in detail in the matrix at Annex C.
- e. The additional data would not be required by the Test Directorate until the results of JRX BOLD EAGLE are being compiled during the fall of 1977. However, data with respect to IRR readiness, availability, timeliness of arrival and requirements for refresher training should be developed during the IRR-APST survey.

Table 2-4

Additional Baseline Data

I. READINESS CATEGORY

Subobjective 1: Determine the flexibility of the system in meeting demands for IRR personnel in real-world situations and the adaptability of the system to changing IRR assets and requirements.

<u>CLQ 1a(4)</u>: Will IRR assets meet requirements for OPLAN 4102? for other OPLANS? Full mobilization? Partial mobilization? (Other OPLANs and IRR-specific requirements not defined.)

EEA 1c: What are the procedures and associated time factors for reassigning or diverting IRR personnel during post-mobilization?

(Requires field test to obtain time factors.)

Subobjective 2: Determine the effect of the system on unit personnel readiness.

EEA 2a: What is the unit's personnel REDCON before and after addition of IRR fillers? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

CLQ 2a(1): What percentage of authorized strength is the unit's assigned strength, both before and after receiving IRR fillers? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

<u>CLQ 2a(2)</u>: What percentage of authorized strength is MOS qualified, both before and after receiving IRR fillers? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

EEA 2b: What is the state of readiness of IRR personnel?

(The MOBEX-76 IRR survey addressed this area but the high rate of non-response from the survey sample made the confidence level unacceptable for baseline data purposes.)

<u>CLQ 2b(1)</u>: What percentage of the IRR is non-deployable?
(Data not currently available, an area for IRR-APST survey.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(3)}}$: How many of the unit's IRR fillers are MOS qualified? (See EEA 2b.)

EEA 2c: What percentage of the unit operating strength is non-deployable before and after the fillers report for duty? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

CLQ 2c(1): What percentage of the unit operating strength is POR qualified before and after IRR fillers report for duty? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

Subobjective 4: Determine the probable IRR availability rates.

(Same reason as EEA 2b.)

Subobjective 5: Determine the timeliness of arrival of IRR fillers. (Same reason as EEA 2b.)

EEA 5a: How many fillers are expected to arrive at home/mobilization stations on or before the date specified? (Same as EEA 2b.)

EEA 5b: What percentage of fillers are expected to arrive at mobilization stations later than 30 days after alert? (Same as EEA 2b.)

EEA 5c: What are the principal reasons for late arrival of fillers at mobilization? (Same as EEA 2b.)

Subobjective 7: Determine the impact of the integration of the IRR fillers on unit training readiness.

<u>EEA 7b</u>: What percentage of the fillers require refresher training? (See EEA 2b.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 7b}(1)}$: What are the MOSs of fillers requiring such training? (Same as EEA 2b.)

CLQ 7c(3): How many weeks are estimated to be required for units to attain a fully trained status both before and after IRR fillers report? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect these anticipated data.)

II. RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

<u>Subobjective 3:</u> <u>Determine the most cost-effective mailing/</u> notification procedures for contacting IRR fillers.

CLQ 3c(1): How reliable is the procedure (official notification)? (Peacetime conditions cannot adequately test the post-mobilization environment.)

CHAPTER 3

BASELINE DATA

THE VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

3-1 SYSTEM DESCRIPTION

- a. Introduction. The voluntary mobilization preassignment system is a subsystem of the overall IRR management and mobilization system. It controls personnel who have left Active Army (AA) service and upon release from active duty (REFRAD) elected to accept orders to report to a selected unit* if full mobilization is declared. A detailed description of this system is discussed in subsequent sections of this chapter.
- b. Background. In addition to the comprehensive alternative mandatory IRR preassignment systems designed in FY 76 and planned for testing in FY 78, the Secretary of the Army announced in November 1975 that the Army would implement voluntary preassignment in early 1976. The voluntary preassignment system was planned and developed by a General Officers' Conference (29 December 1975) and a working group under direction of DAPE-PBP that met in early January 1976. This effort resulted in action to initiate and implement the voluntary

^{*}A selected unit is an early deploying unit chosen by ODCSOPS and listed as available to REFRADs to choose for a mobilization preassignment.

⁵Department of Army, Letter, Honorable William K. Brehm, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Manpower and Reserve Affairs) from Martin R. Hoffman, Secretary of the Army, 20 November 1975.

preassignment system effective 15 March 1976.⁶ The responsibility for project management was assigned to RCPAC. This agency was authorized additional resources (2 officers, 6 civilians, and \$6,000 in travel funds) to launch the program.

c. System Description.

- (1) <u>Purpose</u>. The voluntary preassignment system is designed to enable the Army to mobilize selected early deploying units, and others as designated, with optimum timeliness and personnel readiness in the event of a full mobilization. This is to be achieved through elimination of time required to identify and notify IRR required for these selected units. One advantage of this system is obvious when it is considered that these preassignees may report as early as 10 days after an announcement of a full mobilization while current procedures for IRR not preassigned would probably require more than 20 days.
- (2) <u>Identification of Units</u>. Units are selected and preassignment requirements prepared for them by ODCSOPS. ODCSOPS provides RCPAC with updated lists of units with their mobilization and peacetime authorized strengths by MOS. From these basic fill requirements RCPAC prepares the preassignment authorizations by unit, MOS and number required. The initial list of units, primarily those required to deploy from home and mobilization stations all between D+15 and D+60 days, includes:

⁶HQ DA Letter 135-76-1, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment, 6 February 1976.

Priority One: Early deploying AA units and their RC

Roundout/Affiliated units.

Priority Two: Early deploying RC Brigades.

Priority Three: Selected RC Divisions.

(3) <u>Fill Requirements</u>. Fill requirements are defined as the difference between peacetime authorized and wartime mobilization strengths. There is no impact on operating strengths. Preassignments are permitted up to 120% of wartime mobilization MOS fill requirements.

(4) Selection of Unit by Volunteers. At release from active duty (REFRAD)*, personnel, both officer and enlisted, may select a unit to which they will report at full mobilization. This assignment lasts as long as the volunteer remains in the IRR. Personnel residing in the CONUS may select only CONUS based units. A few units based in Hawaii are available to permanent residents of that state. Officers and enlisted men may select Active Army, USAR or ARNG units wherever the need may be. Personnel volunteer (or refuse to elect voluntary preassignment) by completing (including signature) DA Form 4489, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment at REFRAD (Inclosure 2 to Annex B). This form is offered and explained as part of the orientation briefing personnel receive at separation from active service. Lists of 3-digit MOS, consolidated at the highest headquarters for each participating unit, are available at REFRAD. Qualified enlisted personnel possessing a verified primary MOS (VPMOS) may select a unit listing his PMOS. Officers volunteering may select a MOS in their primary specialty.

^{*} In addition to REFRAD, personnel already in the IRR before the voluntary preassignment system was implemented were solicited to volunteer in a one-time solicitation. All conditions applying to REFRAD personnel hereinafter apply to these personnel also.

(5) Eligibility.

- (a) Personnel transferred to IRR (into two of the control groups: Annual Training (AT), or Reinforcement (REIN)) at REFRAD are eligible. Personnel so assigned must have a remaining service obligation of more than 24 months and VPMOS required by the units on the selection list. Personnel whose discharge codes bar their reenlistment in the Active Army are eligible to volunteer for this program.
- (b) Women may volunteer for preassignment although, in the majority of instances, they are not assigned to the IRR at REFRAD. They must be authorized to serve in the MOS and unit selected in accordance with AR 600-200 and AR 611-201.
- (6) Terms of Preassignment. Duration of preassignment will coincide with the time the preassignee remains in the IRR. This is normally a period of 12-24 months. However, personnel may voluntarily elect to remain in the IRR and to retain their preassigned slots.

 Personnel may also voluntarily cancel their participation at any time prior to full mobilization alert. Orders will automatically be cancelled for the following reasons (includes those previously discussed):
 - (a) request of member
 - (b) transfer to Standby Reserve
 - (c) discharge/death
 - (d) transfer to an IRR control group other than AT or REIN
 - (e) assignment to ARNG or USAR troop program units
 - (f) reenlistment in AA

- (g) enlistment in another branch of the Armed Forces
- (h) any other action that removes member from IRR (includes non-locatee).

(7) Preparation and Issuance of Orders.

- (a) Orders will be prepared and issued to the preassignee by RCPAC after the member is accessioned into the strength of the IRR. These orders contain the selected unit designation, the reporting station (mobilization station for ARNG/USAR or unit location or home station for AA), and the span of days during which reporting is required. This reporting period is within 15 days of full mobilization announcement.
- (b) The requested preassignment is confirmed and orders mailed by RCPAC approximately 4-6 weeks after separation from service. A sample copy of the orders is displayed in Annex B.
- (8) Notification of Gaining Units. RCPAC provides rosters of preassigned members to commanders of gaining units semiannually. No additional administrative burden is placed on units because of this program. Moreover, unit administrative duties at M-day are reduced since requisitions are not required for the positions filled by preassignees.
- (9) Unit Contact with Preassignees. There is no requirement for unit contact with preassignees. Some Active Army units may recruit volunteers for preassignment from their personnel reaching REFRAD who do not choose to reenlist. RC units may solicit volunteers for unit enlistment from among their preassignees.

- (10) <u>Preassignee Participation in Training.</u> Preassignees have no obligation to participate in any active duty for training or reserve unit training. They may, however, participate in active duty for training voluntarily and their requests will be honored when possible.
- (11) Changing and Updating Orders. When necessary, RCPAC notifies preassignees of changes in orders. Reasons for failure to confirm original orders, listed in Paragraph (6), page 3-4, also apply as reasons for cancelling orders. RCPAC will contact preassignees by mail semi-annually to determine any change in essential data (i.e., address, medical condition). Orders are valid for the duration of the individual's assignment to IRR control.
- (12) <u>Implementation of Orders</u>. Preassignment orders will be activated by a presidential announcement of full mobilization through the news media. Personnel may verify the media announcement by contacting RCPAC by telephone or telegraph. Numbers and addresses for this purpose are included as part of orders. Preassignees will be reimbursed for transportation costs at reporting stations.
- (13) Advantages/Disadvantages to Individual. Unit preassignment offers several advantages to the individual. In event of a full mobilization, preassignees are not selected by computer but have a contract to serve with the unit of their choice. Additionally, officers with only two years of active duty will be exempt from mandatory assignment to RC unit vacancies. All personnel are exempt from recall for AT.

Disadvantages, as perceived by the individual, might be the fact that they may report for active duty earlier than other IRR on full mobilization and that volunteers may be recalled to any assignment for a partial mobilization.

3-2 BASELINE DATA

a. General. Baseline data have been collected, reduced, and analyzed in 19 subobjective areas. The detailed essential elements of analysis and checklist questions required to describe and define the system were prepared as a part of the IRR Preassignment Test Baseline Data Collection Plan. The comprehensive presentation of the data collected to answer the EEA and CLQ is found in Annex B, Detailed Baseline Data, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment (VMP) Program. Further, the results of the baseline VMP system data collection effort are displayed in matrix form in Annex D, indicating by subobjective, the EEA and CLQ answered satisfactorily, the EEA and CLQ requiring additional research and the data elements needed. A summary of the principal findings in each category and subobjective area follows.

b. Subobjectives.

(1) Readiness Category

(a) Flexibility and Adaptability. The Army retains 100% flexibility to reassign voluntary preassignees in a partial mobilization. There is no flexibility to reassign at full mobilization until after accessioning when IRR are treated as other AA assets. Approximately 4% of the IRR are "fixed" by the VMP program; if all authorized spaces were

full, 6%. As the IRR strength declines, the percentage of assets unavailable for any assignment at full mobilization will increase.

- (b) Unit Personnel Readiness. Personnel REDCONs, both strength and MOS qualification, have been calculated for units that have a preassignee roster* using data in Unit Detail Readiness Reports to show REDCONs as they would be if VMP were counted as part of operating strength. These REDCONs were compared with those stated in the Readiness Reports. About 36% of the units increased their strength REDCON and 50% increased their MOS qualified REDCON. This in turn increased the personnel REDCONs in 39% of the units and the overall REDCON in 30%. Since all preassignees are preassigned to a space that requires their primary MOS, the addition of these personnel makes a significant improvement in all selected units except those few that are 90-100% filled and qualified and those chosen by only a few preassignees.
- (c) Quality and Quantity. The VMP program has less than 50% of all authorized spaces filled. The officer/warrant officer spaces were 13% filled; the enlisted, 41%.** Currently, an overfill problem exists in certain units and MOS. Overfill is considered acceptable up to 120% of requirements. On this basis, 52 officer spaces of 405, and 5,342 enlisted spaces of 12,033 are occupied within the allowable limits. However, 3,185 IRR have orders assigning them to the units in the VMP program but are overfill to

^{*} Does not include unlisted units whose spaces contribute to a parent unit's requirement.

^{**} Data as of 17 January 1977, RCPAC Report, PRE04, Preassignment Statistics and projected losses.

valid MOS above the 120% allowed (2,329 persons) or are assigned to units that have no requirement for their MOS (856 persons). Most are preassigned to a unit that requires their PMOS/SSI. The grade/rank match, although not a criterion, is within acceptable limits in most cases. For example, the structure of one Active Army division provides 51 spaces for 11B10 based on the structure of a subordinate mechanized infantry battalion. As of 23 September 63 men were assigned to this division based on their primary 3-digit MOS - 11B. Of this number there were 41 Specialists 4th class, 1 Private E-2, 6 Privates First Class, 1 Corporal, 12 Sergeants, and 1 First Sergeant. No serious problems of grade mismatch, even though most preassignees spaces are in the lower ranks/grades, may be anticipated. So far, few of the IRR are in the higher ranks/grades. For example, on 31 August 1976 there were 1,091 (0.65%) enlisted personnel in grades E-6 through E-9 and 5,973 officers (Majors through Colonel) in the Reinforcement and Annual Training Control Group. Few of these eligibles volunteered for preassignment. Only 23 officers or 0.39% of eligibles (MAJ, LTC, COL) and 63 E-6 to E-9 or 5.77% of eligibles are preassignees. Some mismatch may arise in the area of special qualifications, as designated by the fifth MOS digit. This may be illustrated with an airborne battalion, presumed to require parachute jump qualified personnel, indicated by a P in the fifth position. In the case of the 82nd Airborne Division, 51 of 61 light weapons infantry men (11B) preassigned to this unit are jump-qualified, and 10 are not. The extent of any problem in this area of special qualification is not known. Thirty-one MOS are authorized 71% of the preassignee spaces. These MOS are only 45% filled and all are among those listed as critical in AR 135-30. (See Table B-6.)

- (d) IRR Availability Rate. The availability rate for preassignees is estimated to fall in the range of 70-95%, i.e., higher than the estimated 70% IRR availability rate and lower than the estimated 95% availability rate for RC unit personnel. The foregoing rates are OSD estimates. Thus far, less than 1% of the preassignees have withdrawn from the program while they were still eligible. A more accurate rate may be determined (with variations for officer, enlisted or other identifiable personnel subsets) by the IRR-APST survey.
- (e) <u>Timeliness of Arrival</u>. Paragraph 4 of the Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment agreement (DA Form 4489) signed by each volunteer reads as follows: "Preassigned members will be required to report to their mobilization assignment within a specified period of not less than 10 days after announcement of a full mobilization." In the absence of contradictory data, approximately 100% of the preassignees may be assumed to report in a timely manner, subject to unforeseen travel and transportation conditions arising on or after M-Day. As discussed in Category 4, Subobjective 1, Geographic Distribution, approximately 50% of the preassignees live within 600 miles (estimated 2 days travel time) of their mobilization stations. However, there are a large number (> 800) who would require air transport if they are to be on time. This could pose a problem as the number of VMP spaces increase and are filled. Since preassignee orders carry a reporting date, presumably VMP are aware that they have only 2 weeks from M-Day until they are required to report. It is not possible to simulate media announcement of M-Day to determine the number who would be late because they missed the announcement. More precise reporting time factors may be available after the analysis of the IRR-APST survey.

- processing and orienting preassignees are the same as those for unpreassigned IRR (see Chapter 2 and Annex A). POR qualification is included in part of the required processing procedure for all personnel scheduled for deployment. Inadequate data are available on plans of units with rosters of preassignees to orient and assimilate these personnel. One USAR brigade has written letters and sent brigade literature to its preassignees

 living in a four state area surrounding the brigade. Several ARNG battalions are known to have made similar contacts. The State Adjutants General have recently requested and have been sent rosters of all persons preassigned to the ARNG and living in the state. As this program continues, more contact between units and preassignees may take place. Eighteen preassignees have indicated a desire to attend AT with their units. Planning is underway to fund and encourage volunteer AT attendance.
- the precise effect of VMP on unit training readiness. Currently Active
 Army units are at training REDCON C-1. The USAR units with VMP are at
 C-3 and C-4 (one exception at C-1). ARNG units with VMP are primarily
 at C-2 and C-3. Taken as a whole, RC units with VMP are 4% at C-1; 26%
 at C-2; 44% at C-3; and 26% at C-4. The preassignment program in peacetime does not change the pre-mobilization posture of the unit. However,
 after M-Day these orders will add a block of fully qualified men to the
 unit with recent professional, full-time experience. This should decrease
 the post-mobilization training time required for the unit. Pre-mobilization training (AT and IDT) might be more effective because of increased
 numbers of qualified (and total) personnel present if preassignees begin
 to participate voluntarily in training in sizeable numbers. RC units

in the VMP program now require 2-13 weeks to attain training REDCON 1.

- (2) Resource Requirements Category.
- (a) Changes in Unit Fill Requirements. Unit fill requirements have been established as the difference between wartime structure strength and authorized strength. The VMP system is not rapidly responsive to changes in these requirements. Such changes may take up to 13 months to become effective, up to 6 more months to reach RCPAC from ODCSOPS (a tape of authorized VMP spaces is sent to RCPAC every quarter), and one more month to reach the Transfer Activities. However, the troop list in the VMP program was artificially stabilized during the first year of the program and was not updated periodically to reflect changes in the PMDL. One unit has lost 48 spaces, a 0.3% reduction in the authorized total.
 - (b) <u>Changes in IRR Orders</u>. RCPAC data (as of 30 November 1976) show orders rescinded to date as follows:

Non-locatee	129
Voluntary request	9
Joined ARNG	65
Joined USAR	218
Transferred to Standby	592
Discharged	96
Death	1
Entered Active Duty	53
Total	1,163

This represents 11.6% of all orders issued. Only 9 men eligible to continue have withdrawn. This is too small a sample to be significant or use to identify trends or motivation. No preassignees have requested that their orders be changed, assigning them to other units.

- (c) Mailing and Notification. Direct contact with preassignees is maintained by RCPAC by mail, to obtain the most current
 address and other personal data. M-Day notification will be by news
 media (i.e., radio, TV announcement). The principal advantage of the
 preassignment system is that it does not depend on the U.S. Postal
 System as it will exist on M-day to deliver orders. The principal disadvantage is that it depends on the individual preassignee hearing
 the activation orders by the news media and acknowledging the activation
 orders. Official notification or verification may be made by telephoning
 or telegraphing RCPAC. The telephone number and address of RCPAC are
 contained in the original orders.
- the system through the Mobilization Preassignment Office. This office formulates, develops and administers approved plans and programs pertaining to the Preassignment Program and Mobilization Designation Program. Within this Office, the preassignment program is managed by the Preassignment Branch. This Branch plans, coordinates, supervises and implements approved plans and programs pertaining to the preassignment of members of the IRR. It monitors MOS vacancy lists and advises separation activities; maintains program statistics for current and future analysis; processes DA Form 4489 (Voluntary Preassignment/Refusal Form); analyzes and coordinates computer programs pertaining to preassignment; and dis-

tributes preassignee rosters. Thirty new computer programs (2 man years of work) have been written to support the program. Preassignment procedures at Transfer Activities vary. At one of the largest (Fort Dix), the transfer activity briefs personnel being released from active duty (REFRAD) on the VMP program after they have been briefed on their option to join ARNG and USAR units. A descriptive film prepared by RCPAC is also shown to REFRADs. Forms for accepting/rejecting preassignment and listing of units/MOS/mobilization stations are passed out. Each man selecting preassignment receives individual counseling to assure that a correct selection of unit/MOS has been made. Officers receive individual briefings covering all their options. The briefings and counseling are performed by currently assigned RC counselors (4). No new personnel have been added for this task. It is estimated that a large REFRAD load (such as at Fort Dix) adds about 1-2 hours per day to the counselor's workload. Approximately 2 days per month are required for preparation of reports to TRADOC (by phone, monthly, and written reports, quarterly) and to FORSCOM (CSRSV-130(R1) - USAR ARNG). The normal Transfer Activity staffing at Fort Dix is 4 officers, 40 enlisted persons and 37 civilians. It outprocessed 32,817 people during the period 1 April 1976 - 31 December 1976, 2,473 of whom volunteered for preassignment. At M-Day preassignees report for active duty and are accessioned. RCPAC forwards their personnel data to MILPERCEN. The precise data to be furnished is currently being staffed and a final decision on this matter has not been made. The establishment of the system decreases the number of IRR available for any assignment but does not change mobilization procedures at RCPAC.

(e) Mobilization Station and Gaining Unit Workloads.

No functions or additional manpower are required from units or mobilization stations during peacetime. Units receive rosters of their preassignees. They are not required to perform any functions related to them. Some have initiated mailings of unit information, letters of welcome, etc., to strengthen ties with their preassignees on a voluntary basis. Other units (as a result of MOBEX-76) have made some plans to equip preassignees at M-Day. Mobilization stations and units will perform the same functions for preassignees as for other IRR. These functions are described in Chapter 2. Some processing will occur at each location. The bulk will probably be completed at the mobilization station. The ARs in this area have not been updated to address the processing of preassignees in a specific manner. The objective is to relieve individual units of as much administrative workload as possible after M-Day.

ment cost of the VMP program is \$93,948 at RCPAC. Costs to other commands and agencies have been absorbed in current operating budgets. Based on the first five months of the program, the annual operating cost will be approximately \$188,000 per year (unadjusted for inflation factors). At present no additional major investment costs are contemplated. The expansion of the system to include management of several thousand additional spaces in Phase II is the only present foreseen expense.

(3) Attitudes Category

(a) IRR Satisfaction. As volunteers, preassignees are presumed to be satisfied with their assignments. Of all persons assigned since the program was initiated (10,027) only 9 have requested removal

(as of 30 November 1976). Preassignees have not been queried as to their attitudes and motivation. This area may be investigated by the IRR-APST survey. Job satisfaction and motivation with their unit assignment after recall to active duty cannot be assessed but the exact MOS match and good agreement of rank and grade within a permissible range should contribute to satisfactory acceptance of a post-mobilization assignment. It is too early to assess whether this program will attract volunteers who are not obligated to serve in the IRR.

- (b) <u>IRR Complaints</u>. There is no record of complaints, either direct or through official and Congressional channels, that are related to the VMP program or the individual's preassignment status.
- impact of the program have been examined from the standpoint of current sensitive issues, such as minority group (race and sex) integration; and Congressional, news media and public reaction. The VMP program has been publicized within the Army. RCPAC conducted an extensive orientation program for Transfer Activities, FORSCOM and other DA elements. A color film was prepared and is being shown to separatees as part of their out-processing. The film explains this post-separation option. Several articles have appeared in the Army-oriented publications such as Army, The Armed Forces Journal and The National Guardsman. An examination of the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature and the Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals 8

⁷Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature Unabridged, March 1975 - January 1977. The H. W. Wilson Company, Vol. 75 - Vol. 77.

⁸Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals - July-Sep 1976, Vol. 27, No. 3; April - June 1976, Vol. 27, No. 2: January - March 1976, Vol. 27, No. 1; Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

with follow-up examination of potentially relevant articles revealed no publicity on or reference to the VMP program. OCINFO sources say that they have not issued any publicity on the program as it was not considered a public issue. Eighty-one percent of the preassignees are Caucasian; 17%, black; 2%, other. Minority group members are electing preassignment in slightly lower percentages than in the IRR population. There are 15 women in eight units residing in 13 states. Eleven are Caucasian and four are black. Since Phase I of the VMP program consists primarily of early deploying combat units, not many spaces were available to women. The sample of females is too small to be significant. The racial distribution shows a slight preference for USAR units by black members of the IRR. No evidence of potential problems are foreseen at this time. Percentage distribution by race among preassignees is approximately that of distribution in the Active Army, USAR and ARNG.

area has been examined two ways. The first addresses recruiting for and retention in the VMP. Approximately 17% of eligible personnel have volunteered for preassignment. However, 2% have not been assigned for reasons that include invalid MOS, invalid unit, no MOS vacancies and ineligibility. Transfer Activity personnel state that a small additional number would volunteer if their MOS were listed. If this program is enlarged, a wider variety of MOS may become available. The program has not been operational long enough to assess retention in VMP. No measurable impact on recruiting and retention in the Active Army and Reserve Component units has been identified as attributable to the VMP program.

(4) Special Problems Category

(a) Geographic Distribution. There are preassignees from all states in CONUS and from the District of Columbia. Any preasignee located outside the CONUS is immediately dropped from the program with the exception that residents of Hawaii and Puerto Rico may be preassigned to units located in their respective area of residence. The distance from an individual's residence to his unit's mobilization or home station is not a criterion for preassignment. However, preassignees are not distributed in units in the same proportion as the national distribution of the entire IRR, and a statistically significant sample have chosen units close to their intended residence. There are a few examples of excessive travel - individuals, for example, with orders to travel from Maine to Fort Carson; New Hampshire and Florida to Fort Lewis; and Arizona and California to Fort Drum. Approximately half of the preassignees live within 600 miles of their reporting station, computed using RCPAC's program employing a grid location system that gives a near maximum mileage traveled. The actual distances traveled, whether by commercial or private vehicle, will probably be more direct and less lengthy and time consuming. On the other hand, certain units have consistently attracted personnel from remote locations. Examples are units on the west coast and airborne units. As the system is refined and monitored, the access to any unit can be limited if desired to avoid such preassignments. The motivation for choice of a unit is not known at this time but should be probed in the IRR-APST Survey. Since personnel know only the name of the unit, that it requires their primary MOS, the location of its mobilization station and whether it is Active Army, ARNG or USAR, the reasons for choice are limited (discounting personal experience

or hearsay knowledge of the unit). RC units that report to home stations and then move to mobilization stations are faced with travel requirements equal to or, in a few cases, exceeding those of individual preassignees. Three-fourths are within 600 miles of their mobilization station but many units with preassignees must move great distances. Most preassignees should arrive at approximately the same time or before their units. The exception might be those assigned to spaces required for early deploying Active Army units (not their RC round-out or affiliated units). These are principally officers. The small number of spaces available to officers has resulted in their selection of a unit without regard to mobilization station and most reside long distances from their reporting station.

(b) <u>Compromise of Classified Information</u>. No cases of compromise of classified information have been identified and, although the potential always exists in the areas of unit personnel shortages, mobilization and deployment plans, the voluntary program does not appear to have increased the risk of such compromise.

3-3 ADDITIONAL BASELINE DATA

a. As a subsystem of the current system, preassignees represent less than 5% of the IRR. Although some additional baseline data are critical to an evaluation of the VMP program, their effect on the current system assessment is not large. Data were not available in three principal areas. The first is data required to define preassignee status and VMP system operation in the post-mobilization environment. ARs have not been amended to cover the VMP post-mobilization, and the

M-Day announcement and notification of recall cannot be tested. Second, some data are not available because the VMP program has not been operational long enough for sufficient assessment. These are data related to effect of the program on recruiting and retention, number of systemand individual-generated orders changes, and unit preassignee contact and interaction. Third, data that can be supplied by individual preassignees through surveys, questionnaires or interviews are nonexistent. These are data on availability, timeliness of arrival, satisfaction with status, and training readiness. Assessment of the VMP system can be made from the IRR-APST Survey.

- b. The IRR preassignment Test Baseline Data Collection Plan defined EEA and CLQ critical to an evaluation of the voluntary mobilization preassignment system. Data collected were adequate to respond to all major EEA/CLQ except those discussed above and listed with explanatory comment in Table 3-1.
- c. The additional data would not be required by the Test
 Directorate until the results of all tests and analysis are being compiled during the summer of 1978. Much should be developed during the IRR-APST Survey. They are identified in Annex B and are presented in detail in the matrix at Annex D.

Table 3-1

Additional Baseline Data (VMP)

I. READINESS CATEGORY

Subobjective 1: Determine the flexibility of the system in meeting demands for IRR personnel in real-world situations and the adaptability of the system to changing IRR assets and requirements.

CLQ 1a(2): Will IRR assets meet requirements for OPLAN
4102? for other OPLANS? Full mobilization? Partial mobilization?
(Other OPLANs and IRR-specific requirements not defined.)

Subobjective 2: Determine the effect of the system on unit personnel readiness.

EEA 2b: What is the state of readiness of the preassigned personnel? (Data to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}$: What percentage of the preassigned personnel are nondeployable? (Data to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(2)}}$: What are the principal reasons for non-deployability? (Data to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

<u>CLQ 2b(3)</u>: What percentage of the preassignees are POR qualified? (Data to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

EEA 2c: What percentage of the unit operating strength is nondeployable before and after addition of preassignees? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect anticipated unit data; data on preassignees to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2c(1)}}$: What percentage of the unit operating strength is POR qualified both before and after the preassignees report for duty? (MOBEX-76 reports did not reflect anticipated unit data; data on preassignees to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

Subobjective 5: Determine the timeliness of the arrival of preassignees. (Data on all the subsequent EEA 5a-5e required for Subobjective 5 to be sought in the IRR-APST Survey.)

EEA 5a: How many preassignees are expected to arrive at the home/mobilization station on or before the data specified?

EEA 5b: How many preassignees are expected to arrive at mobilization stations late?

EEA 5c: What were the principal reasons for late arrival of preassignees at mobilization stations or units?

EEA 5d: What percentage of preassignees consider the alert period in the system to be adequate?

EEA 5e: If full mobilization were declared today, how soon would preassignees be able to start traveling?

EEA 5f: What is the predicted average delay imposed on preassignees by processing at mobilization stations? (Requires field test to obtain time factors.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 5f(1)}}$: What are the principal causes for delay at the mobilization station? (Requires field test to obtain time factors.)

Subobjective 7: Determine the impact of the integration of the IRR fillers on unit training readiness.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 7a(2)}}$: Were adequate training equipment and facilities available at the mobilization station to meet the added training requirements for the preassignees. (Requires identification of training requirements of preassignees.)

II. RESOURCE REQUIREMENT CATEGORY

Subobjective 2: Estimate the frequency of changes in individual preassignment orders for IRR personnel.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 2d}}$: How often is it estimated that individual orders are changed? (Requires longer system operation for evaluation.)

III. ATTITUDES CATEGORY

<u>Subobjective 1:</u> <u>Determine the degree of motivation and job</u> satisfaction of preassignees.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c(1)}}$: What were the principal reasons for satisfaction/dissatisfaction? (Data to be sought in IRR-APST Survey.)

CHAPTER 4

ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTIONS OF TEST DIRECTORATE

4-1 BACKGROUND

a. Overall Organization for Test and Evaluation. The basic

Army organization established to prepare for and conduct the IRR preassignment test program is shown in Figure 4-1. Responsibilities of
the various agencies, including detailed activities of the Test Directorate, follow.*




Figure 4-1. Organization for Test and Evaluation

b. <u>Test Proponent</u>. ODCSPER exercises overall staff responsibility for monitorship of actions to prepare for and conduct the IRR preassignment test.

^{*} HQDA Ltr 135-76-2, Individual Ready Reserve - Alternative Preassignment Systems Test (IRR-APST), 24 September 1976

c. Testing versus Evaluation.

- (1) The IRR-APST plan addresses both "testing" and "evaluation". Initially, as the foundation for the test plan, the evaluation logic is presented and is then translated into data requirements which in turn form the basis for specifying the required preassignment test activities.
- (2) The IRR-APST Directorate will conduct the test of the alternative systems. This includes, as outlined in the test plan, establishing test conditions, collecting and analyzing the test data required to meet test objectives and developing findings. In reporting test results, the Directorate will not draw conclusions, make recommendations or advance preevaluation judgments.
- (3) The IRR-APST Steering Group will establish a Test Evaluation Group to review and evaluate the test report developed by the Test Directorate. This Evaluation Group will assess the test design and test report; extrapolate from other evidence including experimental, historical and analytical data; and apply military judgment in assessing the military utility and operational effectiveness of the preassignment systems.

d. IRR-APST Steering Group.

- (1) $\underline{\underline{\text{Mission.}}}$ The responsibilities of the Steering Group are as follows:
- (a) Guide and monitor actions that are to be accomplished prior to testing in FY 78. (See paragraph 4-1d(3)).
- (b) Establish and augment, as necessary, the Test Directorate.

- (c) Serve as the advisory body to the Test Directorate during detailed planning for and conduct of the test.
- (d) Monitor progress of the test, including data collection and analysis, in order to recommend continuation/modification/halting of conduct of test.
 - (e) Receive the final test report from the Test Directorate.
- (f) Establish a Test Evaluation Group to review and evaluate the final test report developed by the Test Directorate and to determine proposed DA course(s) of action regarding involuntary preassignment systems.
 - (g) Submit recommendations to CSA for approval.
- (2) <u>Composition</u>. The Steering Group consists of representatives from ODCSPER (chairman, secretary, and working members as required), ODUSA(OR), ODASA (RA), OCSA (PAED), ODCSOPS, ODCSLOG, OCA, OCE, TAGO, OACSI, OTEA, OCLL, OCPA, NGB, OCAR, MILPERCEN, FORSCOM and TRADOC.
 - (3) On-Going Pre-Test Steering Group Activities.
- (a) Currently the Steering Group is guiding and monitoring the following major actions under development by commands and agencies in accordance with provisions of the IRR Preassignment Test Plan:
- Detailed definitions of the alternative preassignment system concepts to support comprehensive testing of each system.

- Detailed planning for partially implementing the alternative systems on 1 July 1977 to provide adequate samples of personnel with mobilization orders under each system for the required IRR attitude surveys.
- Development of computer programs for operating the partially implemented preassignment systems and for conducting required analyses of file data.
- Collection and analysis of baseline data, as reported herein, for use in analyzing and evaluating the alternative preassignment systems.
- (b) Annex E provides summaries of the current status of Steering Group actions pertaining to partial implementation of the alternative preassignment systems, the detailed definitions of the systems and the development of computer programs.


4-2 MISSION AND ORGANIZATION OF TEST DIRECTORATE

- a. <u>Mission</u>. The Test Directorate will accomplish detailed planning for and conduct of the FY 78 IRR preassignment test program including -
 - (1) Participating in field tests
 - (2) Analyzing agency files for pertinent test data.
- (3) Providing questions to and tasking MILPERCEN through ODCSPER for conduct of the survey of IRR personnel.
- (4) Preparing interim reports of the validity and types of data collected.

(5) Preparing a report of final test results for submission to the Steering Group for evaluation.

b. Organization.

- (1) Figure 4-2 depicts the organization of the Test Directorate as currently planned. FORSCOM will establish the Directorate with a sub-element at RCPAC.
- (2) The organization is oriented on the tasks described in the IRR-APST Plan and reviewed in paragraph 4-4 below. Each of the principal staff assistants to the Test Director will be concerned with the broad functional fields of interest indicated by his title. This structure will facilitate planning for and participating in field exercises and file analysis and in collecting and analyzing the data required to respond to data requirements.
- (3) The basic organization in Figure 4-2, which excludes the augmentation, shows the personnel required on a continuous basis. It is planned that an Active Army Colonel be assigned as Test Director and that other positions in the Directorate be manned by Reserve Officers on active duty for training (ADT).
- (4) The augmentation to the Test Directorate provides personnel needed for special or non-recurring situations thus promoting economy of effort and flexibility to meet peak workloads. This augmentation may consist of either military, civil service or contract personnel (or a combination thereof) with the requisite skill qualifications.



*Part-time as needed

Figure 4-2. Organization of Test Directorate

4-3 DETAILED ACTIVITIES OF TEST DIRECTORATE

- Preparatory Work Performed For the Test Directorate. A substantial amount of pre-test work has been accomplished, or is in process, which will directly support tasks of the Test Directorate when it is activated. This includes completion of the detailed and comprehensive test plan which describes the evaluation logic, test hypotheses and data collection techniques. The plan also specifies, based on preassignment test objectives, the subobjectives, essential elements of analysis and subordinate data requirements as well as procedures for reducing, processing and analyzing the test data. In addition, as discussed above, the IRR-APST Steering Group is supervising other important pre-test actions. Although the foregoing will greatly assist the Test Directorate in beginning its work, there will be a need for the Directorate to continuously update, refine and amend the IRR-APST Plan of June 1976 as may be required by (1) the detailed definition of the alternative preassignment systems now under development by the Steering Group, (2) the results of baseline data collection, (3) any Army decisions, policies, programs or systems implemented by the Army after publication of the Test Plan, and (4) other developments during preparation for and execution of the test program that impact on subsequent test exercises and data collection.
- b. <u>Coordination With Exercise Directors of JRX BOLD EAGLE and</u>
 FORSCOM FY 78 Corps CPX.
- 1) As previously mentioned, the Army plans to test the unit preassignment system <u>during</u> the BOLD EAGLE exercise and the mobilization station preassignment system <u>during</u> a Corps Command Post exercise. Each exercise director will plan his exercise, assemble and organize the

necessary support, assemble the participants, conduct the exercise and terminate it. Exercise objectives will be established for each organizational level. Accordingly, it will be necessary for the Test Director to coordinate the accomplishment of preassignment test objectives with the Exercise Director and his staff within the range and scope of scheduled exercise activities and exercise objectives. This coordination would apply in the preparation of the exercise directive, the conduct of exercise planning conferences, the development of exercise control details and in the orientation of exercise personnel.

(2) At this stage of planning for the <u>exercises</u> which will include play of IRR preassignment, detailed specification of the activities of the Test Directorate is limited by a number of uncertainties. For example, finite information is unavailable regarding the nature and scope of the exercises, scenarios, objectives, schedule of events and Reserve Component troop lists. The problem is further compounded by the fact that the Test Director must rely on coordination and cooperation by the Exercise Director in integrating preassignment test activities into the exercises.

c. IRR Preassignment Test Planning Calendar.

(1) <u>Milestones</u>. This discussion of the detailed activities of the Test Directorate is based on the assumption that the pre-test actions of the Steering Group as outlined in Annex C will be completed prior to the organization of the Directorate on 1 July 1977. Thereafter, it is assumed for planning purposes that the following milestones announced by DA will remain generally unchanged:

- 1 September 1977 Publish Test Directive including Test Design Plan and Test Support Plan.
- 15 September 1977 Complete augmentation of Test Directorate.
 - 11 October 10 November 1977 -- JRX BOLD EAGLE.
 - 19 January 1978 Mail out IRR Survey.
 - 13-24 February 1978 Corps level CPX.
 - 3 April 1978 Start file analysis.
 - 1 August 1978 Start Final Report Preparation.
 - 30 September 1978 Final Preassignment Test Report.
- (2) Tentative Test Planning Calendar. In extension of paragraph (1) above, Table 4-1 shows a tentative detailed breakout of the most significant test planning events with estimated dates of completion.
- (3) Field Test Activities. As background for specification of the detailed duties and responsibilities of key members of the Test Directorate (Figure 4-2) the preassignment test activities to be addressed in field exercises, as presented in the IRR-APST plan, are reviewed below.

TABLE 4-1

TENTATIVE IRR PREASSIGNMENT TEST PLANNING CALENDAR .

	Preassignment Test Event	Estimated Date
1.	Complete organization of Test Directorate	1 July 77
2.	Complete partial implementation of preassignment systems to be tested.	1 July 77
3.	Publish Test Directorate planning schedule for BOLD EAGLE.	13 July 77
4.	Initiate development of IRR survey questionnaire.	14 July 77
5.	Participate in Exercise Planning Conferences (BOLD EAGLE and Corps CPX); submit preassignment test input for exercise plans and directives as required.	As necessary
6.	Complete detailed BOLD EAGLE unit preassignment test plan including test design, test support and test control plans.	1 Sept 77
7 <u>a</u> .	Complete augmentation of Test Directorate for the field exercises.	15 Sept 77
<u>b</u> .	Complete augmentation of the Test Directorate for file analysis.	30 Sept 77
8.	Complete orientation of units participating in BOLD EAGLE test of unit preassignment.	30 Sept 77
9.	Unit preassignment field test - BOLD EAGLE.	11 Oct - 10 Nov 77
10.	Deliver IRR survey questionnaire to MILPERCEN Survey Branch.	14 Oct 77
11.	Publish Test Directorate Planning Schedule for File Analysis.	21 Oct 77
12.	Start collection of file data.	To be determined
13.	Publish Test Directorate planning schedule for Corps CPX test of mobilization station preassignment.	4 Nov 77
14.	Complete detailed CPX mobilization station test plan in- eluding test design, test support and test control plans.	23 Dec 77
	Complete analysis of BOLD EAGLE test data.	13 Jan 78

Table 4-1 (continued)

	Preassignment Test Event	Estimated Date
	Treassignment rest Event	Date
16.	Mailout IRR survey (RCPAC).	19 Jan 78
17.	Complete training of augmentation personnel for CPX.	31 Jan 78
18.	Complete orientation of units/installations participating in CPX mobilization station preassignment test.	1 Feb 78
19.	Mobilization station preassignment test (CPX).	13-24 Feb 78
20.	Complete analysis of CPX test data.	31 Mar 78
21.	Start analysis of file data (RCPAC).	3 Apr 78
22.	Complete analysis of IRR survey returns.	31 May 78
23.	Complete File Analysis.	1 Aug 78
24.	Start preparation of Final Report.	1 Aug 78
25.	Complete Final Report with supporting documentation.	30 Sept 78
26.	Revise Final Report.	As necessary

4-4 OVERVIEW OF FIELD TEST ACTIVITIES.

a. Introduction. It will be the responsibility of the Test

Directorate to plan for data collection in coordination with JRX BOLD

EAGLE and a FORSCOM CPX as well as to capture and analyze data generated

by a year's operation of a partial implementation of both systems and

to conduct a DA file analysis. The general scenarios of the JRX and

mobilization CPX (notification, movement (assembly), processing and training) provide a structure for planning for this collection. A discussion

of these activities and their relation to IRR-APST data collection follows.

b. Joint Readiness Exercises.

- (1) General. The JCS exercise program is composed of "JCS-directed" and "JCS-coordinated" exercises designed to test contingency plans, demonstrate rapid response capability and may, in oversea areas, be conducted in cooperation with Allied Forces. They are, therefore, in their initial stages mobilization exercises and, as such, ideal test beds for the IRR-APST.
- (2) <u>JRX BOLD EAGLE</u>. JRX BOLD EAGLE is "JCS-directed" and has been selected as the most suitable field exercise for testing IRR-APST activities. ⁹ This JRX provides the opportunity to test preassignment of IRR personnel to a broad range of both Active Army and Reserve Component units in a sequence of activities closely paralleling the actual post-M-day environment. Volunteer IRR will participate in this exercise. IRR-APST data collection activities will take place concurrently with JRX activites

⁹For detailed discussion of the selection process see Litton Mellonics System Development, Plan for Testing Alternative Preassignment Systems, First Interim Report, 15 December 1975 prepared for ODCSPER.

in specific functional areas to provide data necessary for the comparison of preassignment test plans. Table 4-2 displays these test activities and the JRX functional areas (notification, movemement (assembly), processing and training) during which they might take place. The processing of individual fillers is of special importance. IRR personnel will be participating in this exercise on a volunteer basis. This is the only exercise available to test: (a) the administrative processing of IRR fillers, (b) the ability to provide them with individual and organizational equipment on a timely basis, and (c) their assimilation into the units to which assigned.

(3) IRR-APST Activity During JRX BOLD EAGLE.

- structure, objectives, scenario and data requirements is not yet available. Accordingly, detailed association of IRR-APST data requirements with BOLD EAGLE activities has not been completed. As detailed exercise data and information become available they should be shared with the IRR-APST Directorate without delay. This will enable the Test Director to identify data required by both the Exercise Director and the Test Director. (An example of such data might be personnel REDCONs of participating units.) This will provide economy of effort by eliminating double collection of identical data from the same participants in the exercise. The IRR-APST collection activities planned for BOLD EAGLE with the most probable data sources are displayed in Table 4-3.
- (b) Other unit-related data (e.g., unit structure, authorized and assigned strengths) required for the IRR-APST and already available in standard Army reports or in Army management information

TABLE 4-2

JRX Test Activities by Functional Area and IRR Preassignment Test Subobjectives

	Test Subobjectives	JRX Test A	Post			
	(Short Title)	Notification	Movement (Assembly)	Processing & Equipping	Integration & Training	Test Analysis
	Flexibility & Adaptability					X
SS	Unit Personnel Readiness			х	x	х
	Quality/Quantity of the PRP				x	х
Readiness	IRR Availability					х
Rea	Timeliness of IRR Arrival		х	х		х
	IRR Orientation & Assimilation		х	х	х	х
	Impact on Training Readiness				x	х
Resource Requirements	Changes in Unit Fill Requirements				x	х
	Changes in IRR Orders			х		x
	Mailing & Notification					x
	RCPAC/MILPERCEN/ Workloads	X				x
	Unit/Mob. Station Workloads	X	х	х	х	
Res	Incremental Dollar Costs					x
•	IRR Satisfaction	х	х	х	х	x
Attitudes	IRR Complaints	X	X	x	x	x
Atti	Social & Political Impacts				х	x
	Recruiting & Retention					х
Problems	Geographic Distribution					x
Sro.	Compromise of Classified Information					x

Table 4-3 JRX Data Collection Plan

1

 $\frac{a}{b}$ Numbers in columns refer to data collection methods. $\frac{b}{b}$ If sufficient preassignees do not participate, data marked 1 and 2 will be collected by survey or by simulation.

The state of the s

systems (e.g., TAADS, RCPAC tape files) should be identified early and preparation made for their extraction. If convenient, IRR-APST data tape files can be created. When the list of participating units is made available, arrangements can be made to begin collecting the data.

will be analyzed so as to schedule the IRR-APST activities in such a way that all unique data will be collected concurrently with JRX activities without interference. This will require coordination and cooperation between the Test and the Exercise Directorates. Unique data (e.g., opinions of participating unit CO's) and forms for their collection should be prepared and field data collectors/interviewers trained well in advance. The IRR-APST test activities depend on the detailed schedule of the JRX since timing of interviews, questionnaires, observation of workloads and examination of test-generated documents must be scheduled in such a manner to avoid any interference with the JRX.

c. FORSCOM Mobilization Command Post Exercises.

(1) General. FORSCOM has directed that each assigned corps schedule a corps CPX annually to identify problem areas and solutions for deployment and employment of corps forces. Objectives for this type exercise, for example, include: (a) determining/refining light/heavy corps unit movement data and deployment time factors, (b) exercising alert notification systems, (c) exercising installation support procedures for participating units, (d) verifying troop list requirements

- and (e) providing training for participating units and staffs. The FORSCOM directive also requires that the CPXs be developed to maximize Reserve Component participation.
- (2) CPX Program. Details pertaining to FORSCOM Corps CPXs to be conducted in FY 1978 are unavailable. However, the general configuration of a CPX is predictable and the scope of test activities pertaining to unit notification, fill requisitioning, processing and other test activities are known. A FORSCOM Corps CPX has merit as a test vehicle for IRR preassignment to mobilization stations. The scenario for a particular CPX can be written to accommodate the requirements of the IRR-APST. Assessment of installation capacity and capability to receive, process, equip and otherwise support incoming troops is normally part of a mobilization CPX and is essential to an evaluation of the mobilization station concept.
- Suitable for a Corps CPX. A Corps CPX with simulated IRR filler participation offers the opportunity to exercise most of the test activities necessary to assess the mobilization station preassignment concept.

 Table 4-4 displays the proposed test activities by the CPX functional areas during which they might take place including notification, movement (assembly), in-processing, equipping, assignment and requisitioning. The corps-level CPX will primarily be an operational test of a personnel management system and will be utilized as a test vehicle for IRR preassignment to mobilization stations with the selected installations maintaining rosters of assigned IRR personnel, simulating the reception,

Table 4-4

CPX Test Activities by Functional Area and IRR Preassignment Test Subobjectives

		Ι	CPX Test	Activities	by Function	onal Area
TEST	SUBOBJECTIVES	Notifi-	Movement	In-Proc-	Assign-	Requisi-
		cation	(Assembly)	essing	ment	tioning
ſ						
	exibility &				,	v
Ad	daptability				X	X
	it Personnel				x	X
	eadiness					
s Qua	ality/Quantity f Mob. Station					
SOD				x	х	X
.E\	reassignees					
Readiness ISI	R Availability				Х	X
1111	meliness of					
	RR Arrival			X	X	
	R Orientation					
	Assimilation			X	Х	
	pact on Train-					
ir	ng Readiness					X
	anges in IRR					
	tation Comple-				v	v
z me	ent	X			X	X
5 Cha	anges in IRR	v			x	
5 10	rders iling &	X				
in Man	otification					
E) 100	PAC/MILPERCEN/					
≥ KC						
o Wo	rkloads	x			x	
Resource Requirements	it/Mob. Sta.					
os Wo	orkloads	x	x	X	Х	X
≥ Inc	cremental					
	ollar Costs					
(
IR	R Satisfaction				X	X
Attitudes In Social Section 1						
E / IRE	R Complaints					
E Soc	cial & Political					
H In	mpacts					
Red	cruiting &					X
S Re	etention					^
	ographic					
= \ C	istribution					
5 60	mpromise of lassified Info					
	lassified into		1	1		

processing, equipping and assignment of IRR (both as casualty replacements and unit fillers) under mobilizaton conditions and the filling of requisitions from Active Army and Reserve Component units mobilizing at the stations from the preassignee roster.

(4) IRR-APST Activity During the CPX.

- (a) The CPX will require coordination and cooperation among FORSCOM, the Corps CPX Director and the IRR-APST Director. The IRR-APST Director should be ready to indicate the range of units (size, type, component) and installations (active, semi-active, inactive) that best provides data on the system operation under as many foreseen variations as possible. The IRR-APST collection activities planned to take place during the CPX with the most probable data sources are displayed in Table 4-5.
- (b) The IRR-APST Directorate will work in conjunction with the Corps CPX Directorate in developing plans, tasking documents, scenarios, and data collection forms that will meet all the data requirements to assess the Corps exercise by the CPX evaluators and the unique data on the operation of the mobilization station preassignment system required by the IRR-APST. At each point in the simulated mobilization, both qualitative and quantitative data will be gathered through observation by the collection teams of the Test Directorate. Other data will be acquired through interviews/questionnaires of unit COs and mobilization station COs. Following the CPX, these data and other test-generated documents will be analyzed. As with the JRX, data already available in Army reports, management information systems, etc., should be identified before the CPX so that data Collectors/Analysts can avoid

TABLE 4-5

Mobilization Station Data Collection Concepts During CPX

, ,	9		Mob.	Station				-		1.2	1.2			1.2	1				1,2,3							
Source no	271000 110			Unit CO		-		-	2	1.2	1.2	1.2		1.2					1.2		1.2			1		
Data Collection Sources	333			MILPERCEN														1,2								
				RCPAC														1,2,3								
		Test Subobjectives	(Short Title)		Flexibility & Adaptability	Unit Pers. Readiness	Quality/Quantity of	Mob. Station Preassignees	IRR Availability	Timeliness of IRR Arrival	IRR Orientation & Assimilation	Impact on Training Readiness	Changes in Station IRR	Component	Changes in IRR Orders	Mailing & Notification	RCPAC/MILPERCEN	Workloads	Unit/Mob. Station Workloads	Incremental Dollar Costs	IRR Satisfaction	IRR Complaints	Social & Political Impacts	Recruiting & Retention	(cographic Distribution	Compromise of Classified Info.
Methods		Obser-	vation	(3)														×	×							
	S	Inter-	view	(2)					×	×	×	×		×				×	×		×					
Data Collection	Test	Quest-	ionnaire	(1)		×		×	×	×	×	×		×	×			×	×		×			×		

a/ Numbers in columns refer to data collection methods.

1124 - 231-

time-consuming collection of data available from other sources. Every effort should be made to identify unique data since the time for collection activity during the CPX will be limited. Again, well-coordinated plans should be made so that the conduct of the CPX and IRR-APST may proceed simultaneously. The timing of interviews, questionnaires, and other IRR-APST activities must be planned to avoid interference with other CPX test activities.

(c) <u>Detailed Functions</u>. The detailed duties and responsibilities of key members of the Test Directorate are described in the paragraphs that follow.

4-5 DETAILED FUNCTIONS OF KEY MEMBERS OF THE TEST DIRECTORATE

a. General.


- (1) The limitations imposed by the non-availability of finite information on the field exercises that will include IRR preassignment test activities have been mentioned previously. This lack of information also limits the degree of detail in which the duties of the Test Directorate can be specified at this time.
- (2) Based on the IRR-APST Plan, the Test Directorate will develop and maintain a set of explicit instructions for directing each phase of the preassignment test program with emphasis on control of test operations, data collection and data analysis. This detailed test plan (which may consist of several documents) is essentially a working plan which tells participants what each is supposed to do, when he is to do it, and where. Since the test plan for IRR preassignment is directly related to plans for the associated field exercises and is quite


sensitive to changes therein, the detailed preassignment test plan should be maintained as a continual draft or working document rather than as a formal finished product. Moreover, the detailed test plan should not normally be circulated outside the Test Directorate. 10

- (3) In general, the Test Directorate staff will serve as advisors, planners, coordinators and supervisors within their assigned functional areas of responsibility. The detailed duties and responsibilities given below are based on mission analysis and include tasks specified in the test plan as well as implied tasks. On the other hand, the Test Director may choose to deviate from these task assignments depending on individual requirements, resources available and other factors.
- b. <u>Test Director</u>. The Test Director commands the Test Directorate and is responsible for performing the mission assigned the Directorate (Para 4-2, page 4-4). This includes -
- (1) Detailed test planning and test execution including test control and the collection, processing, validation, reduction, analysis and documentation of test data from the field exercises, the IRR survey and file analysis.
- (2) Training the Test Directorate, ensuring that the IRR-APST is conducted in keeping with established principles and practices for scientific testing and that test results are consistent with Army policies with respect to objectivity, timeliness and economy of testing.
- (3) Preparing and submitting to the Steering Group a formal test report presenting the data derived from field exercises, the IRR survey and file analysis; a description of conditions that prevailed during the test and the collection of data; and an analysis of test results versus test objectives.

¹⁰AR 71-3. FORCE DEVELOPMENT, USER TESTING, 17 March 1975.

- (4) Managing the allocation of resources authorized the Test Directorate and submitting program and budget estimates as required.
- (5) Developing policies for safeguarding classified information and supervising the implementation of these policies.
- (6) Contributing to the development of a Public Affairs plan with respect to the IRR-APST program.
- (7) Receiving and accommodating official visitors to test activities including members of the news media.
- (8) Serving as a Contracting Officer's Representative if contractual support is authorized.
- c. <u>Scientific Advisor</u>. The Scientific Advisor serves part time as needed to -
- (1) Provide scientific support to FORSCOM with respect to organizing the Test Directorate and defining the duties and responsibilities assigned the Directorate and members of the Directorate staff.
- (2) Review the detailed test plan for adherence to established principles and practices for scientific testing and provide recommendations for change as needed.
- (3) Monitor the conduct of the IRR-APST including the data collection, processing and analysis.
- (4) Review and assess test results for adequacy, quality and credibility and recommend corrective action where needed.





- (5) Assist in developing the IRR-APST report to be submitted to the Steering Group for evaluation.
 - d. Plans and Operations Officer. This Officer -
- (1) Serves as the principal staff assistant to the Test Director in the field of IRR-APST planning, training and operations.
- (2) Develops, in coordination with the Deputy for Exercises and the Deputy for File Analysis, the overall control plan for IRR-APST data collection. The Control Plan will (a) update and refine the data collection system described in the basic IRR-APST Plan, (b) provide test scenarios which will explicitly delineate test events that will occur and when and where they occur, (c) identify data points and (d) specify schedules, distribution and assignment of ORSA specialists, statisticians, interviewer/analysts, interviewers and research assistants to augment the Test Directorate.
- (3) Prepares direct input or supplementary material for BOLD EAGLE and Corps CPX directives including the purpose and objectives of the IRR-APST, a description of IRR play with times and schedules, an orientation plan and other matters identified during exercise planning conferences.
- (4) Prepares training program for Test Directorate and augmentation personnel and supervises execution of the program.
- (5) Coordinates with FORSCOM and RCPAC PA Offices for preparation and distribution of information pertaining to the IRR-APST program based on security, political and public relations implications.
- (6) Advises other members of the Test Directorate on the control plan and assists them in handling data collection and analysis problems.

- (7) Organizes system to keep abreast of the testing situation and to guide the collection of data to ensure that data collection objectives are achieved.
 - (8) Keeps Test Director up-to-date on the progress of the IRR-APST.
 - (9) Prepares applicable portions of IRR-APST reports.
 - e. Deputy For Exercises. The Deputy For Exercises -
- (1) Serves as Deputy to the Test Director for testing the unit preassignment system in JRX BOLD EAGLE and the mobilization station preassignment system in a FORSCOM Corps CPX. As appropriate, employs augmentation personnel shown in Figure 4-2 to assist in performing the tasks that follow.
- (2) Provides questions to and tasks MILPERCEN through ODCSPER for conduct of the survey of IRR personnel.
- (3) Participates in the field exercise planning conferences and monitors the development of the exercises.
- (4) Advises exercise planners of IRR preassignment data collection needs and activities and coordinates the integration of these requirements within the structure of the field exercises.
- (5) Establishes liaison and coordination with test units and mobilization stations participating in the field exercises, including orientation of these units/installations on the test activities as authorized by the exercise director.
- (6) Develops detailed methodologies for play of the unit and mobilization station preassignment systems in the JRX and CPX respectively. This includes specification of test activities to be exercised and those to be

simulated by playing units and mobilization stations and a schedule of test events based on exercise scenarios.

- (7) Coordinates with the Plans and Operations Officer in the development of the overall IRR-APST control plan and the preparation of input for exercise directives.
- (8) Prepares detailed IRR preassignment data collection plans for the field exercises including exercise data points appropriate for data retrieval, methods of data collection, ADP support and data forms to be employed.
- (9) Trains, supervises and controls data interviewers and interviewer/analysts who augment the Test Directorate.
- (10) Exercises quality control during data collection; collates, reduces and analyzes the test data.
- (11) Assists MILPERCEN in analysis of IRR survey and documents survey results for the test report.
 - (12) Prepares applicable portions of IRR-APST reports.
 - f. Deputy For File Analysis. The Deputy for File Analysis -
- (1) Serves as Deputy to the Test Director for all basic file analysis that pertains to the simulation and operation of both the unit and mobilization station preassignment systems, including operation of the unit preassignment system during the JRX and the mobilization station preassignment system during the Corps CPX. As appropriate, employs augmentation personnel shown in Figure 4-2 to assist in performing the tasks that follow.

- (2) Coordinates with the Plans and Operations Officer in the development of the overall IRR-APST control plan and the preparation of input required for exercise directives.
- (3) Prepares detailed IRR preassignment data collection plan for file analysis including data generation and collection schedules, methods of collection, ADP support and data formats.
- (4) Trains, supervises and controls data analysts who augment the Test Directorate.
- (5) Exercises quality control during data collection; extracts, reduces and analyzes file data.
 - (6) Prepares applicable portions of IRR-APST reports.
 - g. Augmentation Personnel (Deputy For Exercises) (Figure 4-2)
- (1) ORSA Specialist. This Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst will assist the Deputy for Exercises at FORSCOM in -
- (a) Developing the plan for collecting, controlling, processing and analyzing IRR-APST data generated during JRX BOLD EAGLE and the FORSCOM Corps CPX.
- (b) Supervising implementation of the data collection and analysis plan for the field exercises.
- (c) Supporting MILPERCEN in developing the IRR survey and in analyzing survey results.

- (d) Structuring data bases required for analyzing and evaluating the unit and mobilization station preassignment systems.
 - (e) Preparing interim data collection and analysis reports.
- (f) Developing input for the formal test report including data displays, analyses of test results versus objectives, and findings.
 - (g) Coordinating ORSA activities with ORSA Specialist at RCPAC.
- (2) <u>Statistician</u>. The Statistician will assist the Deputy For Exercises at FORSCOM in -
- (a) Developing detailed data preparation procedures including data collection formats, procedures for editing and ordering numerical data, statistical packages for data reduction, and tabular or ADP formats for data analysis.
- (b) Developing the detailed data analysis plan and procedures including (where applicable) performance measures to be computed, data comparisons to be made, statistical tests and analyses to be performed, and methods for transforming performance measures into measures of effectiveness.
- (c) Analyzing and verifying the adequacy, quality and credibility of the data generated from JRX BOLD EAGLE, the FORSCOM CPX and IRR survey.
- (d) Preparing interim statistical reports and developing statistical input for test reports.

- (3) <u>Interviewer/Analyst</u>. The Interviewer/Analysts will assist the Deputy for Test Exercises in -
- (a) Developing and coordinating the detailed data collection, reduction and analysis plan for assigned portions of JRX BOAD EAGLE and FORSCOM CPX test activities.
- (b) Constructing and pretesting questionnaires and interview and observation data collection instruments.
- (c) Identifying test scenario data points including activities to be observed, personnel to be interviewed, personnel to complete questionnaires and data to be extracted from records generated during the test exercises.
- (d) Developing detailed data processing plan including data formats, worksheets, checklists and associated procedures for coding and tabulation.
- (e) Implementing the data collection and analysis plan by collecting data through interviewing and observation activities, analyzing data for adequacy, accuracy and credibility, and organizing data into logical order based on significant dimensions pertaining to test issues.
- (f) Establishing data files, providing interim data collection and analysis reports and developing input for IRR-APST reports.
 - (g) Training and supervising the interviewer assigned to his team.

- (4) <u>Interviewer</u>. The Interviewers will each be teamed with an Interviewer/Analyst and will assist him in implementing the data collection and reduction plan by -
- (a) Conducting interviews, administering questionnaires, and extracting data from designated files.
 - (b) Editing and checking numerical data for accuracy.
 - (c) Organizing data as specified for analysis.
 - h. Augmentation Personnel (Deputy For File Analysis).
- (1) ORSA Specialist. This Senior Operations Research/Systems Analyst will assist the Deputy For File Analysis in -
- (a) Developing the plan for collecting, controlling, processing, and analyzing IRR-APST data generated at RCPAC during the test period. This will include a simulated system operation (computerized) of the proposed preassignment systems as well as field tests of the systems during the JRX BOLD EAGLE and the FORSCOM Corps CPX.
- (b) Supervising implementation of the data collection and analysis at RCPAC.
- (c) Coordinating work at RCPAC with the ORSA Specialist at
 FORSCOM to provide RCPAC-generated data as required by FORSCOM to accomplish
 JRX and CPX play unique to RCPAC and to prevent unnecessary overlap of
 collection, analysis and documentation of IRR-APST activity.

- (d) Identifying computer programs and support required to provide comparative data items necessary to evaluate the unit and mobilization station preassignment systems, and setting up separate files (tapes or other) to capture any data that are not presently required for the RCPAC master personnel files. This data base will meet the file analysis requirements of the JRX, the CPX and the simulated total system operations.
 - (e) Preparing interim data collection and analysis reports.
- (2) <u>Statistician</u>. The Statistician will assist the Deputy For File Analysis in -
- (a) Developing detailed data preparation procedures including data collection formats, procedures for editing and ordering numerical data, institution of quality control measures, selection of data reduction methods and tabular and/or ADP formats for data analysis.
- (b) Selecting, adapting and overseeing installation of a suitable software package of statistical programs at RCPAC. The program should provide output formatted to display requisite comparative analysis, graphs, scatter diagrams and other tabular presentations suitable for inclusion in test documentation.
- (c) Developing detailed data analysis and evaluation procedures including (where applicable) identification of usable performance data and standards for measuring performance. This also includes identifying statistical tests to be employed and methods for transforming performance measures into measures of effectiveness.

- (d) Preparing interim statistical reports and documentary analysis with accompanying tables, charts, scatter diagrams, etc. of statistical input for test reports.
- (3) Research Assistant. The Research Assistants support the Deputy For File Analysis by -
- (a) Extracting and collecting data from RCPAC files, computer outputs and test-generated documents and preparing suitable display tables, figures, scatter diagrams, histograms, etc. of these data.
- (b) Managing/maintaining files set up to collect numerical data generated by simulation and/or partial system implementation during the test period.
 - (c) Preparing data in formats suitable for ADP/EDP input.
- i. Administrative Support Elements (Figure 4-2.). It is anticipated that FORSCOM and RCPAC will provide facilities, supplies and common-user services to the elements of the Test Directorate at those locations. However, the Administrative Support elements will be required to perform tasks such as -
 - (1) Requisitioning, storing and distributing supplies and equipment.
 - (2) Maintaining property records as needed.
 - (3) Arranging for printing and reproduction services.
- (4) Providing administrative services such as preparation of correspondence and reports, distribution of mail, and handling of messages.
 - (5) Maintaining correspondence and publication files.

- (6) Performing duplicating services.
- (7) Coordinating transportation requirements.
- (8) Providing for the administration of classified material.

CONTENTS

		Paragraph	Page
READINESS	CATEGORY	A-1	A-1
RESOURCE R	REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY	A-2	A-14
ATTITUDES	CATEGORY	A-3	À-23
SPECIAL PR	COBLEMS CATEGORY	A-4	A-27
TABLES			Page
A-1	Ready Reserve Personnel Participating (Not Authorized Pay) and Non- Participating by Section and Grade		A-2
A-2	Possible Priority Groups		A-4
A-3	MOBEX-76 Personnel Requirements and Fill		A-6
A-4	Training REDCON Criteria		A-13
A-5	IRR and Voluntary Mobilization Preassigne (VMP) Distribution by Location of Residence	e	A-28
FIGURES			Page
A-1	Organization of RCPAC		A-15
A-2	RCPAC Relations With DA Staff		A-16
A-3	RCPAC Relations With Commands and Agencie	s	A-17
A-4	Fort Dix Transfer Activity		A-21
	Inclosure 1. Description of Format, DCSPER-178-Part 1		A-30
	Appendix 1. RCPAC MOREX-76 Cost Estimat	e	A-32

ANNEX A

DETAILED BASELINE DATA

CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

ANNEX A

DETAILED BASELINE DATA

CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

A-1 READINESS CATEGORY

a. Subobjective 1: Determine the flexibility of the system in meeting demands for IRR personnel in real-world situations and the adaptability of the system to changing IRR assets and requirements. "Flexibility" and "adaptability" are key factors in the organization and operation of the current system for IRR mobilization if the voluntary IRR mobilization preassignment program initiated in March of 1976 is not considered. However, certain policies do serve to limit flexibility. These include: (1) the requirement that IRR personnel be selected for involuntary active duty during mobilization by priority groups, i.e., Group 1-individuals with less than 1 year of active duty and no exposure to hostile fire, Group 2 - individuals with 1-2 years active duty and no exposure to hostile fire, Group 3 -individuals with more than two years active duty and no exposure to hostile fire and Group 4 - individuals who have performed active duty in a hostile fire area. (These constraints dictate that the individual with the least combat experience be selected first.); (2) the requirement that personnel without a physical examination within the past year be required to take an exam prior to entry on extended active duty.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 1a:}}$ How are IRR assets apportioned under the system? See Chapter 2 and discussion below.

<u>CLQ 1a(1)</u>: What are total IRR assets, by MOS and grade? Current IRR assets by MOS and branch/occupational area are as shown in Table A-1. The detailed strength by four-digit MOS is given in DCSPER-178, Consolidated Authorized and Actual Strength of Reserve Components of the Army, prepared for ODCSPER (DAPE-PBM) by RCPAC. An example of the DCSPER-178 format is displayed in Inclosure 1 to this Annex.

CLQ 1a(2): What categories will IRR be assigned to, by percentage (assignment to EDUs, AA, RC units by type, casualty replacements, etc.)? Estimated requirements for IRR at mobilization by category are not presently well defined. Approximate bulk requirements by time period are given in the Mobilization Station Preassignment Concept* which states that "Pre-assignees will be assigned to meet the following approximate time-phased requirements: M-day to M+30 days - 63,000; M+31 to M+60 days - 178,000; and M+61 to M+90 days - 94,000." More precise definition (time-phased, MOS, etc.) is associated with contingency plans and is thus not appropriate for this report. However, a possible way of establishing priorities for fill by time period is shown in Table A-2.

^{*} Final Report, Plan for Testing Alternative Preassignment Systems, Annex A, Volume II, Litton Mellonics Systems Development, June 1976.

Table A-1

READY FESERVE PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING (NOT AUTHORIZED PAY)
AND AON-PARTICIPATING BY SECTION AND GRADE A/ B/

	B BY CH	GENERAL	Ë.	LIEU- TENANT COLONEL	MA JOR	CAPTAIN	FIRST LIEU- TENANT	SECOND LIEU- TENANT	CHIEF WARRANT OFFICERS	WARRANT OFFICERS
TOTAL OFFICERS	0.28	! "	1,926	3,017	4,504	5	19,532	5,729	1.197	•
MALE	49.287	1,7	1.878	2,977	4,448	13,903	19.244	5,566	1.194	0,
FEMALE	(1002)		(48)	64)	(96)	(405)	(288)	(163)	(3)	(3
GENERAL OFFICERS	- :	17	;					•		
AIR DEFENSE	2:		24	106	0 1	480	1,147	107		
	11.		6 60	157	200	0000	100	259		
CIVIL AFFAIRS	7		106	156	101	51	2			
CHEMICAL CORPS	684		30	51	83	176	321	23		
COLAPLAINS	525		•	*	20	0	9			
CORPS OF ENGINEERS	9		208	309	354	1,153	m,	***		
FIELD ARILLERY	7		195	610	67.5	87.	98			
FINANCE COMPS	7.76		4 10	4 4 5 6 6 7	474	2.400	3.256	000		
JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL'S CORPS			6	112	0.90	'n	, 2	1		
MEDICAL SERVICES:										
ARMY NURSE CORPS	-		-			42	24	n		
(ARMY YURSE CORPS)			(34)	(22)	(23)	(278)	(165)	(10)		
	-		20			442	25			
(DENTAL CORPS)					,	33				
CARDICAL CORPS	1,2,1		6	*	25	(6)	(3)			
MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS	-		82	191	236	622	1,116	1,490		
(MEDICAL SERVICE CORPS)	-		(2)	(3)		(4)		(110)		
ARMY MEDICAL SPECIALISTS	n;		4	0 (4 .	30	410			
WATERTANDS CORP.	V +		6	3	(2)	(22)	(62)			
(VETERITARY CORPS)	(2)		7		;	(5)	•			
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE	,36		115	162	272	1,036	669	68		
MILITARY POLICE	1.497		65	72	118	380	747	1 4 1		
CHURANCE CURPS	35		0 1		237	9 9	10	155		
CAN COAN COAN	27		77	100	23.5	440	1.630	252		
STAFF SPECIALISTS	200		11			27		40		
TRANSPORTATION CORPS	20		106	0	206	629	19	207		
CACHEN'S APMY COAPS)	280		(4)	(13)	(27)	(83)	(62)	(43)	(3)	(2
UNASSIBLED (CADO OFF ONLY)	941			•			10	231		

A-2

150000

Table A-1 (continued)
READY RESERVE PERSONNEL PARTICIPATING (NOT AUTHORIZED PAY)
AND NON-PARTICIPATING BY SECTION AND GRADE (CONCLUDED) A/ B/

			ENLISTED	TED						
0 C C C P A T 1 O N A L A P E A	TOTAL ENLISTED	0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00	MSG,1SG F-8	SFC PSG,SP7 E-7		SGT, SP5 E-5	CPL, SP4 E-4	7 H	P v 2	Pv1
TOTAL MALE AND WAC (HOMEN'S ARMY CORPS)	156,732 (1156)	6.5	153	(80)	516 (23)	15,625	109,400	20,235	10,050 (102)	344
TACTICAL OFERATIONS	41,695	27	57	80 30	127	3,532	27,787	6,645	3,359	73
INFANTRY ARMOR COMBAT ENGINEERING	17,687	23	9 4 n	72	104	2,112	11,029	2,896	1.563	16
FIELD CANNON AND MOCKET ARTILLERY MISSILES AIR DEFENSE MISSILES	6.816 3.107 7.571	•	60	▼	۰	135	2,428	989	506 1316 881	12 2
COMBAT SURVEILLANCE AND TARGET ACCUISITION	1,201				-	103	832	193	71	-
MISSILE AND FIRE CONTROL ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE	3,372			-	ĸ	583	2,417	267	101	
GENERAL ELECTRONIC MAINTENANCE	10.690	-	•	15	21	666	7,595	1,344	687	22
PRECISION AINTENANCE	3,247		3		1	296	2,293	24.0	215	23
AUXILIARY SERVICES	6,809		1	15	21	412	4,695	1.078	553	28
HOTORS (JAC)	22,496	ю	10	33	50	1,616	16,573	2,659	1,469	83
CLERICAL (WAC)	30,962	£ £	20	116	110	3,478	21,889	3,467	1.762	38
GRAPHICS	2.600		-	n	2	375	1,876	255	86	n
GENERAL TECHNICAL	27,246	n	20	63	87	3,379	19,110	3,143	1,412	53
SPECIAL ASSIGNMENT	6.459	19		22	61	771	4,612	689	305	•
(MAC)	(10)				3	(3)	3		(1)	3

AZ EXCLUCES PEFSONNEL ON EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY IN THEIR RESERVE STATUS. BZ SEPARATE OCCUPATIONAL AREA TOTALS ARE REFLECTED FOR MALE FULISTED AND MAC WHERE APPLICAPLE, WITH MAC TOTALS IN PARENTHESES.

4. 4.

Table A-2
Possible Priority Groups
(Numbered in Priority Order)

After M+90	15.Casualty Replacements Required M+91-M+120
M+61-M+90	10.Casualty Replacements Required M+61-M+90 11.Fill for AA Units Deploying after M+60 12.Fill for RC Units Deploying after M+60 13.Fill for Unmanned Units 14.Fill for GSF
M+31-M+60	7.Casualty Replacements Required M+31-M+60 8.Fill for AA Units Deploying M+31-M+60 9.Fill for RC Units Deploying M+31-M+60
M-Day-M+30	1. Forward Deployed Units 2. AA Units Deploying on or before M+14 3. RC Units Deploying on or before M+14 4. Casualty Replacements Required by M+30 5. Fill for AA Units Deploying M+15-M+30 6. Fill for RC Units

CLQ 1a(3): What will be the composition, by MOS and grade, of that portion of IRR not assigned to units? Reliable data are not available to answer this CLQ. During MOBEX-76 total IRR requirements for full mobilization were not processed. Specifically, the National Guard Bureau and MILPERCEN did not process IRR requirements for non-participating units. Therefore, residual IRR assets (if any) could not be identified. These data are also not available from other sources.

CLQ 1a(4): Will IRR assets meet requirements for OPLAN 4102? for other OPLANs? Full mobilization? Partial mobilization? Specific data to respond to this CLQ are not available. As mentioned above, MOBEX-76 IRR requirements processed by RCPAC represent, in effect, those of a partial mobilization consisting of Active and Reserve Component units mobilizing at six mobilization stations plus the remaining IRR requirements for the USAR, i.e., non-participating USAR units. IRR fill requirements for non-participating ARNG and AA units were not included. Also, the Standby Reserve was employed to assist in meeting fill requirements after M+2. Table A-3 presents the overall quantitative results of IRR fill during MOBEX-76.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 1b}}$: What are the procedures and associated time factors for changing $\overline{\text{IRR}}$ requirements for fillers? Requirements for fillers change as unit strength requirements change. See discussion below.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b}(1)}\colon$ Who initiates changes? Changes are officially initiated by ODCSOPS. Other commands and agencies may recommend changes at any time.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b(2)}}$: What are the causes for changes in requirements for unit fillers? Changes are basically caused by modernization and adjustments in the force structure as required by budgetary constraints and strategic considerations, including adjustments in unit authorizations and MOS/SSI.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b(3)}}$: What is the estimated frequency of changes? Although these data were requested from ODCSOPS, results had not been received at this writing. These data are being derived from the experience gained in operating the Personnel Accounting System (PERSACS) by ODCSOPS.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b}(4)}$: What agency implements the changes? ODCSOPS implements the changes.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ 1b(5)}}{\text{of a change and its final implementation?}} \text{ The time from initiation to implementation of a change may be as much as one year and often requires } 13 \text{ months.} 11}$

¹¹Dept. of Army, People Management, The Final Report of the People Management Committee, ODCSPER, 25 April 1975.

Table A-3

MOBEX-76 Personnel Requirements and Fill

TOTAL	88412	85242 (80514) (4728)	3170	%96
ENL	78333	76565 (72492) (4073)	1768	%26
WO	1029	779 (675) (104)	250	75%
OFF	0506	7898 (7347) (551)	1152	87%
	RQMTS	FILL IRR STANDBY	SHORTFALL	% OF FILL

EEA 1c: What are the procedures and associated time factors for reassigning or diverting IRR personnel, during Post-mobilization? After reporting to mobilization stations, IRR fillers are accessioned into the Active Army by SIDPERS. Units with overstrengths, improperly assigned personnel, or for other administrative reasons report personnel involved to the mobilization station commanders. Reassignments are then made by the installation commander or by instructions from MILPERCEN.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ lc(1)}}{\text{above.}}$ Who initiates changes in individual orders?

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c(2)}}$: What are the causes of changes in individual orders? Fillers received in excess of authorizations, fillers with inappropriate MOS/SSI, non-deployable fillers, hardship cases, medical exemptions and others.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c(3)}}$: What is the estimated frequency of changes? Data are unavailable to respond to this CLQ.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c}(4)}$: What is the estimated time period between initiation of a change in orders and receipt of orders by the person involved? Data are unavailable. This time period will vary depending on the communications and computer facilities available at the filler's mobilization station.

b. <u>Subobjective 2</u>: <u>Determine the effect of the system on unit personnel readiness</u>. The current IRR mobilization system per se has no effect on unit personnel readiness, if the voluntary mobilization preassignment system is not considered. The effect of the latter is discussed in Annex B.

EEA 2a: What is the unit's personnel REDCON before and after addition of IRR fillers? Although included in the MOBEX-76 plan the FORSTAT readiness reporting system was not operational during the exercise and the SIDPERS system did not provide accurate and timely information concerning personnel status. Consequently, data are insufficient to answer this EEA and most of the following CLQ for even a sample of Active Army and Reserve Component units. Although detailed data on REDCONs are classified, it is estimated that only a few Active Army unit REDCONs will be improved by adding fillers; on the other hand, the REDCONs of about 40% of ARNG units and about 60% of USAR units can be improved.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(1)}}$: What percent of structure strength is the unit's assigned strength, both before and after receiving IRR fillers? Data unavailable.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(2)}}$: What percentage of authorized strength is MOS qualified, both before and after receiving IRR fillers? Data unavailable.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(3)}}$: Which is the lower of the personnel indicators listed above, strength or MOS? Data unavailable.

- EEA 2b: What is the state of readiness of IRR personnel? The MOBEX-76 survey was designed to generate data in this area but the survey results did not provide a valid basis for projecting the readiness of IRR personnel because of the high non-response rate.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}$: What percentage of the IRR is non-deployable? All IRR available for unit assignment are assumed deployable during a full mobilization.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ 2b(2)}:}{\text{Reasons for nondeployability are not known.}} \text{ What are the principal reasons for nondeployability?} \\ \text{Reasons for nondeployability are not known.} \\ \text{Data may be gathered in IRR-APST survey.} \\ \text{Experience in MOBEX-76 indicated that current policies in this area are vague and require clarification.}$
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(3)}}$: How many of the unit's IRR fillers are MOS qualified in their assigned position? Data are unavailable.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(4)}}$: How many unit fillers, by MOS/grade, is the unit still short after receiving initial IRR fillers? Data are unavailable.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ 2b(5)}}{\text{See Chapter 2 of this report.}}$ What are the detailed steps of the requisitioning
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b}(6)}$: How much time is required to receive additional IRR fillers if needed? Based on the results of MOBEX-76, RCPAC estimates that the minimum time is 17-20 days plus the alert period granted the filler. The estimates given in Chapter 2 are slightly higher.
- EEA 2c: What percentage of the unit operating strength is non-deployable before and after the fillers report for duty? Data are unavailable.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2c(1)}}$: What percentage of the unit operating strength is POR qualified before and after IRR fillers report for duty? Data are unavailable.

c. <u>Subobjective 3</u>: <u>Determine the adequacy of IRR in terms of quality and quantity.</u>

EEA 3a: What substitution criteria are authorized by grade and MOS? AR 135-301 defines the IRR selection process and substitution criteria for IRR as follows: Reinforcements will be selected for order to active duty on the basis of the awarded primary MOS and the awarded secondary MOS, in that priority. A particular effort will be made for a direct match by MOS and grade when providing reinforcements to fill vacancies in mobilized units. Substitution in MOS and grade becomes an integral part of selection when resources are limited or begin to dwindle from repetitive levies. Headquarters, Department of the Army, will dispatch to the United States Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center a team of MOS technicians to assist in selecting reinforcements for order to active duty. When warranted by shortages in MOS areas, the team will be delegated DA authority to determine when the resources of a particular priority group will be committed and to prescribe MOS and grade substitutions in excess of those authorized by this regulation. The team will resort to substitution only when necessary. Headquarters, Department of the Army (MILPERCEN), will furnish the team a MOS substitution manual. The manual will provide the means of achieving maximum accuracy in matching MOS assets with MOS requirements on a first-, second-, or third-choice basis. Substitutions reflected in the manual will assure minimum refresher or OJT training of reinforcements to achieve MOS proficiency. The following criteria will apply in the selection of reinforcements:

- Commissioned officers in the required MOS (4- or 5-digit as appropriate), branch and grade or one grade lower, except for MC, DC, VC, ANC and AMSC officers for whom one grade deviation higher or lower is authorized.
- Warrant officers in the required MOS. Pay grade substitutions are authorized.
- Enlisted reinforcements in the required four character MOSC (5 character MOSC for special qualification identification) and grade when resources are available. As resources become exhausted, personnel in the lower grades may be substituted in accordance with Chapter 3, AR 600-200, up to a two-grade deviation to fill requirements in higher grades except that resources in Grade E-3 will not be substituted against requirements For example, Grade E-4, MOS 11B, may be substituted for for Grade E-5. Grade E-6, MOS 11 B, if Grades E-5 and E-6 are not available. Higher grades will not be substituted for lower grades. Specialists may be assigned to NCO positions, but NCOs may not be assigned to specialist positions. For Grade E-4 and below, any lower grade substitution within the MOS career group is permissible. Any 3 character "A" MOS may be substituted for a "B" MOS in the same entry group if the requirement does not exceed Grade E-4. MOS substitutions within career groups will be permitted for Grades E-2 and E-3.

- The instructions outlined above will apply in making machine substitutions for commissioned officer and warrant officer personnel. Machine substitutions for enlisted personnel will be made on the basis of the following criteria listed in order of precedence: (1) selection of required grade and MOS; (2) selection of one grade lower with required MOS; (3) selection of specialist for NCO within grade and MOS; (4) selection of specialist for NCO with one grade lower deviation within MOS; (5) selection of required grade and secondary MOS; (6) selection based on 3-digit MOS without grade substitution; and (7) selection of required MOS with a two-grade substitution.
- EEA 3b: Can the IRR fill the gap between the assigned and wartime authorized strength, by grade and MOS? Reliable data are unavailable. MOBEX-76 was not designed to test the adequacy of the IRR to meet full mobilization needs. However, it was planned to gather such data during MOBEX-76 for a sampling of AA and RC units. Problems with the automated management information systems including the receipt of unit authorization data precluded assembly of the data desired. The overall results of IRR fill as reported by RCPAC are given under Subobjective 1 above of this research category. Ft. Benning concluded that the IRR pool cannot be relied upon to fill requirements above Grade E-5 since IRR assets rarely exceed that grade and most of IRR are in Grade E-4 and below. Accordingly, 27% of the IRR fillers selected for Ft. Benning were 2 or more grades lower than the grade requested. Since authorizations are established for specific grades and skills, it was stated that the utilization of the lower-grade, less experienced personnel would impede mission accomplishment. A more serious problem identified in MOBEX-76 (draft) after-action reports from all major commands, was the failure of the IRR to arrive in time to deploy with EDUs departing before M+30.
- EEA 3c: What are the planned requirements for IRR personnel at full mobilization? Requirements for fillers and replacements have been identified by CMF for the period FY 78 FY 82. These classified data are available in ODCSPER (DAPE-PBP). Specific requirements for IRR have not been separated from the training base output and the Standby Reserve. IRR assets alone do not meet the filler and replacement requirements.
- d. <u>Subobjective 4:</u> <u>Determine the probable IRR availability rates.</u>

 Availability of IRR personnel is estimated by DOD for planning purposes as 70% of the population. These rates should be investigated through the IRR-APST survey.
- e. Subobjective 5: Determine the timeliness of the Arrival of IRR fillers. Title 10 of the U.S. Code specifies that a reasonable time (alert period) be allowed between the date an IRR member ordered to active duty is alerted for that duty and the date he is required to enter upon that duty. When the military situation permits a 30-day alert period is authorized. On the other hand, the Secretary of the Army is authorized to order the IRR to active duty with little advance notice if warranted. Attempts to develop reliable factors on estimated IRR times of departure for mobilization stations during the MOBEX survey were unsuccessful because of the high non-response rate.

EEA 5a: How many fillers are expected to arrive at home/mob stations on or before the date specified? The data are unavailable.

 $\underline{\text{EEA 5b:}}$ What percentage of fillers are expected to arrive at mobilization stations more than 30 days after notification? These data are unavailable.

EEA 5c: What are the principal reasons for late arrival of fillers at mobilization stations or units? Probable reasons include personal or community hardships, students pursuing graduate courses of study in health professions or the ministry, and personnel employed in seasonal industry. Other reasons cannot be predicted. Future surveys should investigate this area.

EEA 5d: What is the estimated average delay imposed on fillers by processing at mobilization stations? Estimated in-processing time at station (before assignment to unit) is 2-3 days.

 ${\it CLQ~5d(1)}$: What are the principal causes for delay at the mobilization stations? The principal causes are processing requirements and associated processing capabilities. The capabilities will vary depending on the status of the mobilization station (active, semi-active or inactive) and the replacement of deploying administrative units needed for processing IRR fillers.

f. Subobjective 6: Determine the adequacy of plans for orientation and assimilation of IRR personnel into their units.

EEA 6a: Are procedures established for receiving and processing TRR fillers? All AA installations have procedures for processing "replacements" in peacetime. It is logical to assume that wartime procedures will build on the existing procedures recognizing that processing requirements for IRR filler personnel will greatly exceed those for AA fillers. On the other hand, it is necessary for semi-active and inactive mobilization stations to plan in peacetime for early establishment of the necessary processing capability and insure that the necessary administrative units are included on the mobilization TDA. Sampling of two mobilization stations during MOBEX-76 (Ft. Benning and Camp Roberts) revealed the above to be the case. The principal problem identified was that these mobilization stations did not know how many IRR fillers to expect and when they would arrive.

CLQ 6a(1): How many units/mobilization stations are planning IRR reception and processing? Data on units are unavailable. Indications are that all mobilization stations have such plans.

CLQ 6a(2): Does the reception and processing provide for complete POR qualification? Affirmative for mobilization stations sampled.

EEA 6b: Will unit commanders give personal attention to the reception and integration of fillers? This is a normal command responsibility.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 6b(1)}}$: What percentage of unit commanders delegate responsibilities for reception to subordinates and to whom? Data are unavailable.

- EEA 6c: What proportion of the IRR understand their mobilization obligation? These data can best be collected in the IRR-APST survey.
- g. Subobjective 7: Determine the impact of the integration of the IRR fillers on unit training readiness.
- EEA 7a: What percentage of the IRR require new equipment training? See CLQ below.
- ${\rm CLQ}$ 7a(1): For which MOS and what type equipment is new equipment training required? No data are available to answer this EEA and CLQ. IRR, in many instances, have trained on the newer equipment that AA units have received but RC units have not.
- $\overline{\text{EEA 7b}}$: What percentage of the fillers require refresher training? These data are unavailable and should be investigated in the IRR-APST Survey.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ 7b(1)}}{\text{Data}}$: What are the MOSs of fillers requiring such training? Data are not available on training requirements by MOS.
- EEA 7c: Do units plan for new equipment and refresher training? Mobilization planning directives require unit commanders to plan for post mobilization training. During MOBEX-76, numerous problems arose with respect to coordinating training plans with mobilization stations and specifying training requirements such as ranges and training areas. Data to answer the following CLQ 7c(1) and 7c(2) are not available but post mobilization training plans, in general, assume that fillers will be available to increase strength (if required) enough to conduct meaningful unit training.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 7c(1)}}$: Are training programs developed in advance? post mobilization training programs?
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 7c(2)}}$: Are adequate training equipment and facilities available at the mobilization stations to meet the added training requirements for the IRR filler?
- <u>CLQ 7c(3)</u>: How many weeks are estimated to be required for units to attain a fully trained status both before and after IRR fillers report? The time phased reporting of training readiness was not operational during MOBEX-76. However, Active Army units are maintained fully trained at training REDCON C-1. Reserve component units vary from fully trained units to some that estimate 12 weeks are required to reach C-1. Criteria for determining training REDCON, based on AR220-1, Unit Readiness Reporting, are displayed in Table A-4.

Table A-4
Training REDCON Criteria

	Weeks		d to at	tain a fully us
Unit Designation	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
Div, Bde/Regt, Bn/Sqdn	0-2	3-4	5-6	7 Plus
Btry/Co or below	0-1	2	3-4	5 Plus

Note: Hospitals, regardless of number of beds, are considered larger than Btry/Co size for purposes of computing training REDCON.

<u>CLQ 7c(4)</u>: What are the major constraints to attaining a fully trained status before and after IRR fillers report for duty? Presently, RC units are prevented from attaining fully trained status because of inadequate training areas, MOS imbalance, shortage of personnel, excessive personnel turnover, and equipment shortages. In the post-mobilization environment, after units receive IRR fillers, the problems of equipment shortage and sufficient time to complete unit training would still remain. Adequate training areas might still be a problem, depending on the type unit and the mobilization station facilities (e.g., a tank battalion at a station without tank firing ranges).

EEA 7d: Are there sufficient casualty replacements who are fully trained and POR qualified? There are not enough IRR personnel to supply 180 days of predicted casualty replacements with qualified (matching MOS) personnel if it is assumed that IRR is the sole and first priority source for such fillers. POR qualification requires completion or up-date after the filler reports for active duty. All IRR would require POR qualification.

A-2 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY

a. <u>Subobjective 1</u>: <u>Estimate the frequency of changes in unit fill</u> requirements.

<u>EEA la</u>: What is the organizational and operational structure for management of IRR personnel? See discussion in Chapter 2 and Figure A-1.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1a(1)}}$: What are the staff/command channels for the flow of IRR policy, planning guidance and other information? The relations of RCPAC within the DA are shown in Figures A-2 and A-3.

EEA 1b: What quantitative and qualitative criteria are applied in assigning personnel to units? No IRR, except voluntary preassignees, are assigned to units in peacetime. Post-mobilization criteria (following guidance in AR 135-301) are discussed under the Readiness Category, Sub-objective 3, Qualitative/Quantitative Adequacy of the IRR.

EEA 1c: What developments will generate requirements for changes in unit fill requirements? Peacetime developments that generate changes in filler requirements are as discussed in Annex B for this Subobjective and EEA. An additional category that does not affect preassignee fill requirements but does affect Active Army filler requirements is the deployment/redeployment of units. Major CONUS-based units may have some subordinate units based in Europe (or other OCONUS). The OCONUS units are maintained at different authorized strengths. This may change M-day requirements for fillers. The magnitude of changes may be assessed from the following analysis of part of the Army strength. FY 77 data (STRAF units) show the following percentage changes by category:

		Warrant		
Category	Officer	Officer	Enlisted	Total
Inactivations				
Struct. Str.	35	33	44	43
Auth. Str.	29	27	-:42	45
Activations				
Struct. Str.	+2.64	+2.70	+3.17	+3.12
Auth. Str.	+2.81	+2.69	+3.03	+3.29
Reactivations				
Struct. Str.	+.49	+1.98	+1.08	+1.06
Auth. Str.	+.53	+1.79	+1.02	+1.10
Dep1./Redp1.				
Struct. Str.	35	07	53	50
Auth. Str.	34	07	47	50
Net Change				
Struct. Str.	+2.43	+4.29	+3.29	+3.24
Auth. Str.	*2.71	+4.15	+3.15	+3.44
Total Changes				
Str. Str.	+3.84	+5.07	+5.22	+5.11
Auth. Str.	+3.96	+4.82	+4.93	+5.34





Figure A-1 Organization of RCPAC



RCPAC RELATIONSHIP with COMMANDS, AGENCIES, & ACTIVITIES




Figure A-3 RCPAC Relations with Commands and Agencies

- EEA 1d: How often is it estimated that changes to requirements (fillers/casualty replacements) are made? Changes to the force and unit structures and unit authorized strengths are a continuous process and are too numerous to itemize for this study. These changes do not affect the IRR as presently managed.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1d(1)}}$: What is the estimated time required for completing the cycle for processing a fill requirement change? The average time to complete the cycle is not known but it may require as much as 13 months.
- b. Subobjective 2: Estimate the frequency of changes in individual orders for IRR personnel. Under the current system no orders are issued before M-Day to individuals who have not volunteered for pre-assignment. Since voluntary preassignment is discussed in Annex B, the following discussion applies to post-mobilization conditions only.
- $$\operatorname{\underline{EEA}}$2a:$$ How are assignment orders managed and administered? This EEA is discussed in Chapter 2.
- EEA 2b: What personnel policies can generate requirements for rescinding individual orders (e.g., physical disability, change of status, etc.)? IRR may request exemption according to policies set forth in AR 135-301 and AR 601-25.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}$: What is the profile of the causes for rescinding orders? No current data exist to answer this CLQ.
- $\overline{\text{EEA 2c}}\colon$ How often is it estimated that individual orders are changed? See CLQ below.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2c(1)}}$: What is the estimated time required for completing the cycle for processing a change in individual orders? Data do not exist to respond to this EEA and CLQ. Individual orders would be changed after the IRR report for active duty and are subject to reassignment by MILPERCEN.
- c. Subobjective 3: Determine the most cost-effective mailing/notification procedures for contacting IRR fillers.
- EEA 3a: What is the method of transmitting official notifications and other required documents to IRR fillers? Mobilization orders are sent to IRR members by certified mail, return receipt requested. Other communications are sent by 3rd class U.S. mail.
- EEA 3b: What information and type documents does the IRR filler require to complete the requirement for official notification? The IRR filler requires a complete set of mailed orders requiring him to report for active duty. These orders list the reporting (mobilization) station and date he is to report.
- <u>CLQ 3b(1)</u>: How is official notification verified? Notification is verified by the individual by telephone or by telegraphing RCPAC.
- <u>EEA 3c</u>: What are the costs of the notification procedure? Cost of this procedure is approximately 1.45/man (25¢ for personnel cost, 17¢ for supplies and 1.03 for postage) and takes an average of 5 days to reach the individual.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 3c(1)}}$: How reliable is the procedure? Reliability of this procedure under post-mobilization conditions prevailing in CONUS is unknown.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 3c(2)}}$: How much time elapses between issuance and individual receipt of orders? An average of five days elapses between issuance and receipt of orders.

CLQ 3c(3): What are the advantages/disadvantages and costs/benefits of the system? The advantage of the system is that orders can be prepared and issued as required to fit the needs of the mobilizing units including the best choice of mobilization stations and selection of the most appropriate time for reporting. The disadvantages are delay in receipt of orders, problems in locating personnel who may change residence, and a time-consuming method of enforcing orders. (See AR 135-210, para 4-9d, for actions to be taken when IRR personnel fail to report for active duty in compliance with orders.) The cost of the system in dollars is currently \$1.45 per man, which is relatively inexpensive. Time may be lost notifying IRR personnel if mails are delayed.

d. Subobjective 4: Determine RCPAC and Transfer Point workloads due to maintaining and mobilizing the IRR.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 4a}}$: What peacetime functions are performed by RCPAC and Transfer $\overline{\text{Points}}$ to maintain a mobilizable IRR? How are they organized? RCPAC administers all members of the IRR, maintains their records and plans for their mobilization. The peacetime system functions may be summarized as follows:

- (a) Maintaining and Updating Personnel Records
 - USAR Master Tape (updated twice yearly) (AR140-25) (DA Form 3725)
 - DA Forms 201 (MPRJ)
 - Accessions and discharges
- (b) Notification of Service Obligations
 - DA Form 3725: Army Reserve Status and Address Verification (semi-annually)
- (c) Screening and Classification Action
 - AR 135-133 and AR 140-135
- (d) Security Requirements
 - National Agency Check (NAC), AR 381-130
 - DA Forms 66: Officer Qualification Record
 DA Forms 20: Enlisted Qualification Record
 AR 640-2

(e) Reporting/Computer Service

 \bullet Provide DA and other Army agencies/commands/offices with periodic computerized reports on IRR strengths, etc.

(f) Testing

• Mobilization Procedures

Transfer Activity (TA) personnel are shown in Figure A-4. At these TAs, the MPRJs for enlisted personnel are collected and forwarded to Ft. Benjamin Harrison; those for officers are collected and forwarded to MILPERCEN. Personnel losses are transmitted to MILPERCEN by SIDPERS. A list of personnel eligible to re-enlist together with their expected home address is sent to USAREC. (Figure A-4 applies only to Fort Dix, other TAs will vary.)

EEA 4b: What functions specifically related to IRR will RCPAC and Transfer Activities perform on mobilization? Functions related to the IRR performed at RCPAC on mobilization are discussed in Chapter 2. Transfer Activities will perform no functions related to the IRR unless the TAs are assigned functions by coordinating/supporting installations or by mobilization stations (if located at either type installation) that pertain to mobilization of the IRR.


 $\underline{\text{CLQ 4b(1)}}$: What resources are required to perform mobilization functions? Resources required for personnel and ADPS augmentation for MOBEX-76 are shown in Appendix 1 to this Annex (page A-32). Alternative sites and EDP facilities have been identified by RCPAC in case of damage to their facility.

e. <u>Subobjective 5: What are the workloads of mobilization stations</u> and gaining units specifically related to IRR?

EEA 5a: What system functions related to IRR fillers and casualty replacements do mobilization stations and gaining units perform during peacetime? During peacetime units and mobilization stations perform no functions specifically related to IRR fillers. Requisitioning, processing and assignment of IRR are exercised in varying degrees of mobilization CPXs. M-Day planning is performed by stations and units with respect to reception and processing of fillers. In MOBEX-76, installation planning was incomplete because of lack of knowledge of number of IRR fillers arriving and their times of arrival.

EEA 5b: What additional manpower is required at mobilization stations or gaining units to administer the program during peacetime? No additional personnel are needed to accomplish the planning required. This planning can easily be absorbed within other planning functions and responsibilities.

EEA 5c: What system functions will mobilization stations and gaining units perform for the IRR on mobilization? See CLQ below.



Atch for Admin Sup, Supv & Control

Direct Line of Supv

NOTE

 ${\rm CLQ~5c(1)}$: How are the reception and processing responsibilities for ${\rm IRR~fillers}$ divided between the mobilization stations and gaining units? A description of the system is given in Chapter 2. Responsibilities for processing are centralized at the installation level to the extent possible with most completed before the IRR filler arrives at his unit. Local conditions will dictate specific assignment of responsibilities.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 5c(2)}}$: How are IRR MPRJs established for the personnel files of gaining units? The system, as of January 1977, is for RCPAC to send a computerized form (FID "Q") to the mobilization station listed on the filler's orders and to MILPERCEN. The MPRJ will remain at RCPAC.

EEA 5d: What are the planned filler reception and processing capacities of active, semi-active and inactive mobilization stations? Current planning is based on unit wartime structure strength. Therefore, overall planning figures include unit operating strength plus fillers. Data on specific reception and processing capacities are unavailable. However, MOBEX-76 highlighted the problem of conducting the required physical examinations. If mobilization stations such as Camp Roberts do not have the medical personnel or facilities to conduct these examinations, filler personnel will be delayed in reporting, since the examination must be conducted at another location.

EEA 5e: How are mobilization stations organized to perform filler reception and processing functions on mobilization? The organization at mobilization stations to perform these functions varies depending on local conditions and available facilities. As mentioned above, centralized processing is desirable with the receiving unit relieved of as much administration as feasible. Local SOPs will govern.

CLQ 5e(1): How are the reception and processing capacities affected by deploying administrative units? Mobilization plans must take into account the loss of administrative capabilities at an installation when administrative units deploy, such as did occur at Ft. Benning during MOBEX-76. This loss should be covered by timely call-up of similar type units to perform the required functions. If the latter units are themselves scheduled to deploy, they may simultaneously provide installation support while preparing for deployment.

f. Subobjective 6: Estimate the dollar costs of operating the baseline system for maintaining and mobilizing the IRR.

EEA 6a: What are the annual operating costs for the current IRR system? Dollar costs to maintain the IRR data base, mobilization plans and regulations are not readily identifiable. This situation was noted in the Defense Manpower Commission report to the President and Congress, April 1976, which says "Inadequate data exist in the relative costs of each kind of Defense manpower." The total RCPAC budget is about \$18 million with approximately 80% of this cost attributable to the IRR. This covers manpower (hours), TDY, ADPS and other O&M costs. Based on an enlisted IRR strength of 173,200 in 1976, the estimated cost is \$49.50 per IRR enlisted

^{*}Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: "The Keystone of National Security," Report to the President and the Congress, Washington, D. C., April 1976.

man. Other costs are incurred at the DA level. The most feasible costing procedure is to consider incremental/decremental new system costs to the present cost (amount unquantified) and compare on a relative rather than absolute basis.

EEA 6b: What additional estimated investment and annual operating costs by budget appropriations are required to operate the system in the future? If the present system remains unchanged, no additional incremental costs are foreseen at this time. A number of changes requiring new legislation have been proposed for the IRR. There are substantial costs associated with these proposals (i.e., NPS enlistment in IRR for a bonus or other economic incentives). A mobilization would, of course, involve substantial costs. RCPAC costs for MOBEX-76 were estimated by budget appropriation. Cost factors used for this cost effort, useful for estimating IRR-APST concept system costs, are found in the Appendix to this Annex.

A-3 ATTITUDES CATEGORY

a. Subobjective 1: Determine the degree of motivation and job satisfaction of IRR. Data available during the baseline collection period show that 1645 enlisted IRR are serving although they are in a non-obligated status. There is no other direct evidence available that bears specifically on motivation or job satisfaction. These areas could be explored further through the IRR-APST surveys if considered necessary.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 1a}}$: What methods are employed in assigning IRR fillers to units? $\overline{\text{IRR fillers}}$ are chosen by computer program at RCPAC based on specified criteria. (See description of the current system, Chapter 2).

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1a(1)}}$: What MOS/grade substitution criteria are applied? These criteria are given in AR 135-301 and are discussed under the Readiness Category, Subobjective 3, EEA 3a. The extent to which these substitution criteria were applied during MOBEX-76 has not been determined.

EEA 1b: How many IRR are willing to retrain to join a specific Active Army or Reserve Component unit? No data are currently available to answer this EEA. The IRR-APST survey may investigate this option.

b. Subobjective 2: Determine the nature and extent of offical complaints, special requests or other special correspondence initiated by IRR personnel.

 $\underline{\text{EEA 2a:}}$ Is there a mechanism for feedback information from the IRR? The official mechanism for correspondence with IRR is DA Form 3725, Army Reserve Status and Address Verification.

CLQ 2a(1): What is the nature and extent of the feedback RCPAC requests that IRR members update DA Form 3725 semi-annually This form gives the reservist an opportunity to correct his name, rank, SSN, grade/branch, primary MOS, marital status and number of dependents, civilian education level, and present civilian occupation. They may also request a review of reserve status, and may request transfer to "Standby" if they are engaged in a critical civilian occupation, employed in a key government position, preparing for the ministry or under a religious missionary obligation, or if entry would create an extreme community hardship. Moreover, if entry on extended active duty would create an extreme personal hardship, personnel may request discharge. They must certify that they are physically able to serve and understand their service obligation. Documentary proof must be provided if a change of status is requested or if personnel cannot certify that they are physically fit for military duty. IRR members with other problems may enclose letters, requests, etc., when they return this form.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 2b}}$: How many official complaints are received by DA from the IRR annually? For purposes of this study the answers to this EEA and CLQ 2b(1) are essentially negative.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}{\text{offices/agencies/commands such as RCPAC}}$: How many individual complaints are dispatched to

EEA 2c: What is the profile of the substance of total complaints received? Investigation at DA has revealed that official complaints deal almost universally with unresolved matters relating to the individual's active duty or his veteran's status and benefits but not with his IRR status. Since the IRR no longer are required to serve on active duty for training, there is no correspondence that is IRR-related, except for the special category of officers in the mobilization designee program.

c. <u>Subobjective 3</u>: <u>Identify evidence bearing on the social and</u> political impact of the current system.

EEA 3a: To what extent are IRR utilization plans publicized? According to CINFO*, the current system is not publicized. An examination of periodical indices 1, 2 shows very little discussion of the IRR. Only one article, Bold Thinking is Needed to Vitalize the Ready Reserve³, was primarily concerned with the IRR. Two others 4, 5 include some mention of this component. (These articles are available in baseline data files.)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 3b}(1)}\colon$ What rationale supported negative reactions? See CLQ below.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 3b(2)}}\colon$ What rationale supported positive reactions? Lack of reaction (EEA 3b) prevented any analysis of positive or negative reaction factors.

^{*} Maj. J. D. Gilbert, CINFO, SAPA, 30 Oct 76.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature, Unabridged, March 1975
- January 1977. The H. W. Wilson Co., Vol 75 - Vol 77.

Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals; July - Sept. 1976, Vol. 27, No. 3; April - June 1976, Vol. 27, No. 2; January - March 1976, Vol. 27, No. F; Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL

Bold Thinking is Needed to Revitalize the Ready Reserve, Col. T.G. Westerman & Lt. Col. Wayne C. Knudson, Army 26: 34-38 May 1976

Are America's Reserve Forces the "Keystone" of National Security?

Defense Panel (Def. Manpower Commission) Says Yea and Nay
Nat'l Guardsman 30: 8-11 June 1976

A Roadmap to National Defense, Maj. Gen. Duane L. Corning (S.D.) Air National Guard, President NC AUS, The National Guardsman, 30:6, June 1976.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 3c}}$: What is the ratio of distribution of minority groups in the IRR? The distribution of IRR members by race and by sex is displayed in CSRES - 163, a report prepared by ODCSPER (DAPE PBO).

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 3c(1)}}$: Will minority groups be assigned on a random basis? Race will not be considered as a criterion in the assignment of the IRR on mobilization. Assignment of female members will be in accordance with AR 600-200 and AR 611-201.

EEA 3d: Does the current system include provisions for utilization of females? Although current regulations do not require them to serve in the IRR, females may serve as IRR volunteers. The DCSPER - 46 report of 30 November 1976, shows 1,002 officers and 1,156 enlisted members of the Woman's Army Corps in the IRR.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 3e}}$: Does the current system present any potential problems with respect to equality of treatment by race or sex? The current system is committed by policy to equal treatment for both sexes and all races with the exception of the exclusion of women from combat.

d. Subobjective 4: Determine the impact of the current system on Active Army and Reserve Component recruiting and retention.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 4a}}$: What percentage of personnel leaving the Active Army with an $\overline{\text{IRR}}$ obligation are enlisting in the Reserve Components?

CLQ 4a(1): ARNG

Approximately 4% for

CLQ 4a(2): USAR

each component

EEA 4b: What are the principal reasons given by IRR for neither reenlisting in the Active Army nor enlisting in the Reserve Components? Specific reasons are not presently available but may be gathered in the IRR-APST survey. Personnel interviewed at the Transfer Activity at Ft. Dix believe that recent REFRAD personnel re-enlist in the Active Army because they cannot find satisfactory employment; join RC units for the extra income; and accept a mobilization preassignment to avoid a possible mandatory assignment or call to annual training.

EEA 4c: What are the attitudes of key Active Army and Reserve Component unit personnel with respect to the impact the current system has on recruiting and retention? At present, the IRR system is not seen to have a measureable effect on Active Army or RC recruiting and retention.

 ${\rm CLQ}$ 4c(1): What proportion of the key personnel questioned concluded that the current system is adversely effecting recruiting and retention? This CLQ and those listed below are not applicable since no effect is currently seen.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 4c(2)}}$: What are the principal reasons for adverse effects cited by key personnel?

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 4c(3)}}$: What proportion of the key personnel conclude that the current system has a favorable impact on recruiting and retention?

 $\frac{\text{CLQ 4c(4)}}{\text{Elects}}$: What are the principal reasons for favorable

A-4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS CATEGORY

- a. Subobjective 1: Determine the geographic distribution of IRR personnel.
- EEA la: What is the geographic distribution of IRR personnel? Geographic distribution of the IRR, by state, is shown in Table A-5. These data were derived from those in the DCSPER-46 Report, Strength of the Army (U), Part III, Strength, Reserve Components, USAR, 30 November 1976. The location of units, by state, for the AA, ARNG and USAR may be found in Troop Basis Reports (blue, buff, green). There are ARNG and USAR units in every state and AA units in most states.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1a(1)}}$: What are the locations of units that do not deploy directly from home stations? Most USAR/ARNG units do not deploy directly from home stations. These units and their mobilization stations are available at FORSCOM Hq..
- <u>CLQ 1a(2)</u>: Is distance one of the criteria by which IRR personnel are assigned? Distance within CONUS is not a specific criterion by which IRR are assigned on mobilization. However, RCPAC first tries to match requirements with assets available in the state where the gaining unit is being mobilized; if this fails, an attempt is made to fill requirements from the CONUSA area involved; and finally, if the requirement is not met, RCPAC looks nationwide.

EEA 1b: What is the impact of geographic distribution?

 ${\it CLQ~1b(1)}$: Does geographic distribution give rise to excessive and unnecessary cost? These data are unavailable. The IRR selection process could give rise to large travel costs but these may be necessary.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ1b}(2)}{\text{LRR arrival}}$: Does geographic distribution impact on the timeliness of IRR arrival? Yes, when IRR are required to travel unnecessary distances, delays in arrival will result.

b. <u>Subobjective 2</u>: <u>Determine the extent of potential compromise</u> of classified mobilization information.

<u>EEA 2a</u>: What is the extent of compromise of classified mobilization information? No cases of compromise of classified information through operation of the IRR program could be identified.

IRR and Voluntary Mobilization Preassignee (VMP) Distribution by Location of Residence Table A-5

TOTAL $a/$ $b/$ ' IRR $(\frac{a}{b})$ $VMP^{-}(\frac{a}{b})$		5.3		S		1.3 1.6	4.0 4.3	.3	1.5 1.6	.5	2			3.1 3.0	.2	2		2.1 2.2										
LOCATION OF RESIDENCE	New Jersey New Mexico	New York Nowth Carolina	North Dakota	Ohio	Okiahoma	Oregon	Pennsylvania	Rhode Island	South Carolina	South Dakota	Tennessee	Texas	Utah	Virginia	Vermont	Washington	West Virginia	Wisconsin	Wyoming					Puerto Rico			Unknown	
VNI) (%)	2.1	1.1	11.1	1.6	9.	.2	.1	3.9	3.3	.1	.7	4.4	4.	1.6	1.1	2.2	2.2	.7	1.5	1.5	5.4	2.5	1.4	1.7	.5	.1	.3	
TOTAL a/ IRR (%)	6.5	1.0	8.8	1.5	s.	.3	9.	3.4	2.9		.5	4.5	2.4	1.6	1.1	1.8	1.8	s.	1.7	1.8	3.9	2.3	6.	3.9	s.	6.	.3	
RESTON OF RESTORAGE		Arkansas Arizona	Cali fornia	Colorado	Connecticut	Delaware	District of Columbia	Florida	Georgia			lilinois	Indiana			Kentucky	Louisiana		Maryland	Massachusetts	Michigan	Minnesota	Mississippi	Missouri	Montana	Nebraska		

DCSPER - 46, Strength of the Army (U) Part III, 31 Dec 1976
RCFAC, PRE 20 Race and Sex
Distributed by State 13 Nov 1976 $\frac{a}{\sqrt{a}}$

/q

- ${\rm CLQ}$ ${\rm 2a(1)}$: In what areas (e.g. unit personnel shortages, mobilization and deployment plans, stationing plans) might compromise occur? The possibilities are remote because this information is not available to members of the IRR.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(2)}}$: Is it necessary to declassify mobilization information to test IRR mobilization and to what extent? Exercises to date have not required such action.
- EEA 2b: What activities create the situation for potential compromise? Potential compromise is minimized because the administration of the IRR and the status of IRR personnel do not reveal details of mobilization planning.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}{\text{cleases responsible for compromise?}} \ \ \text{No cases of compromise} \\ \text{have been identified.} \ \ \text{Negative answers are also applicable to the CLQ} \\ \text{listed below.} \\$
- <u>CLQ 2b(2)</u>: Is publicity associated with objections, Congressional complaints, and other inquiries responsible for compromise?
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b(3)}}$: What other areas of potential (or actual) compromise of classified information are identifiable?

Report Number: DCSPER-178-Part I

Title: Consolidated Authorized and Actual Strength by MOS of Reserve Components of the

Army

Prepared for: DAPE-PBM

Prepared by: RCPAC CONFIDENTIAL

Example of format:

Section A - Commissioned Officers Grade - Major

MOS	BR			U	SAR Units	IRR	MOB-DE	S	Standby
		TOE	Auth	Act-Male	Act-Female	Act	Auth	Act	
0205	SC	123	123	56	0	32	32	32	20
2120	AG	95	95	44	1	9	3	3	0

Section B - Warrant Officers

MOS			USAR Un	its	IRR	Standby
	TOE	Auth	Act-Male	Act-Female	Act	Act
411A	46	80	56	0	7	4

Section C - Enlisted

MOS			USAR units		IRR	
	TOE	Auth	Act-Male	Act-Female	Act	Act
72E4	461	461	37	12	188	301

Inclosure 1 to Annex A Description of Format, DCSPER-178-Part 1

Report Number: DCSPER-178-Part II

Title: Consolidated Authorized and Actual Strength by MOS of the Reserve Components

of the Army

Part II Ready Reserve Mobilization Reinforcement Pool.

Prepared for: DAPE-PBM Semi-annually or as requested (?) (latest - 31 March 1976)

Prepared by: RCPAC FOUO

Example of format:

Section A - Commissioned Officers Grade - Captain

MOS	Br	Aggr Act	Completed ACDUTRA	Completed 2/3 yr AD	No Obligation	Other
1193	FA	881	69	13	795	4

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: RCPAC Costs for MOBEX-76

- 1. LTC Knowlen, DCSOPS, AUTOVON 22-54089, by fonecon 29 Mar 77 requested actual costs to RCPAC for participation in MOBEX-76.
- 2. On 4 Apr 77, I called LTC Knowlen and advised him that incremental costs to RCPAC was approximately \$25,700. Note: the costs shown below were obtained thru coordination with RPPD, SSD and SOD:

	FY 76	FY 77	FY 77
Civilian Pay (incl Overtime)	2,308	600 (600)	12,340 (1,800)
TDY	2,300	700	200
Computer Time			6,400
Supplies			2,045

3. LTC Knowlen asked if the RCPAC automated system for IRR mobilization required any changes as a result of the Exercise. I suggested that he refer to the RCPAC after action report or call LTC Monahan, Ch, RPPD.

R. L. KITTINGER Ch, Prog & Bud Div Comptroller

CP:

LTC Monahan

CONTENTS

		Paragraph	Page
READINESS	CATEGORY	. B-1	B-1
RESOURCE R	EQUIREMENTS CATEGORY	. B-2	B-20
ATTITUDES	CATEGORY	. B-3	B-30
SPECIAL PR	OBLEMS CATEGORY	. B-4	B-35
	l to Annex B - Voluntary Mobilization ment Orientation		B-46
Inclosure	2 to Annex B - RCPAC Monthly Summary Repo	orts	B-49
	3 to Annex B - Sample Copy Individual ment Orders		B-56
ODCSPER (4 to Annex B - Memorandum for Record, DAPE-PBP), Voluntary Preassignment Impact ruiting, 15 Sep 76		B-61
TABLES			
B-1	IRR Personnel Authorized and Assigned Strength by Category		B-2
B-2	Personnel Subindicator REDCON Definition	1	B-5
B-3	Authorized and Assigned Voluntary Mobilization Preassignee Strengths by U	Jnit	B-8
B-4	Officer/Warrant Officer VMP Authorized a Assigned Strengths and IRR Strength by		B-13
B-5	VMP Authorized and Assigned Strength and IRR Strength by MOS		B-14
B-6	Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment MOS Authorized Twenty or More Spaces	3	B-17
B-7	Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment 1 April - 31 Dec 1976		B-27
B-8	Cost Data, Voluntary Preassignment Progr	am	B-29

ANNEX B

DETAILED BASELINE DATA, VOLUNTARY
MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT (VMP) PROGRAM

TABLES		Page
B-9	Racial Distribution of Voluntary Preassignees in Each Component and in Total Program	B-34
B-10	Distribution of Voluntary Preassignees Among the Components by Race	B-34
B-11	IRR and VMP Distribution by Location of Residence	B-36
B-12	Mobilization Stations and Home Stations of Units Selected for Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment	B-38
B-13	VMP Mileage Statistics	B-40
B-14	Distribution of Preassignees by Distance Traveled to Mobilization Stations	B-43
FIGURES		
B-1	Fort Dix Transfer Activity	B-26

ANNEX B

DETAILED BASELINE DATA, VOLUNTARY

MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT (VMP) PROGRAM

B-1 READINESS CATEGORY

a. Subobjective 1: Determine the flexibility of the system in meeting demands for IRR personnel in real-world situations and the adaptability of the system to changing IRR assets and requirements.

EEA 1a: How are preassignee assets apportioned under the system? The number of spaces available during Phase I of the VMP program (406 officer/warrant officer, 12,087 enlisted, 12,493 total personnel) is determined by ODCSOPS from units deploying during the period M+15-M+60 under conditions of full mobilization. The unit allocation is based on the difference between structure strength and authorized strength by MOS/SSI. The list of units is revised semiannually. The number of spaces by MOS/SSI is determined by computerized extraction of data from the VTAADS tape.

CLQ la(1): What percentage of IRR assets, by MOS and grade, will be voluntarily preassigned to units? Table B-1 shows both the percentage of IRR assets that could be preassigned if all authorizations were filled and the percentage that are currently preassigned. Less than 1% of officers/warrant officers, 7.11% of enlisted personnel and 5.65% of total IRR personnel might be preassigned if all spaces authorized were filled. Since a potential overfill of 20% is allowed in the VMP program, these percentages of preassigned assets might attain a maximum of almost 1% of officers/warrant officers, 8.54% of enlisted personnel and 6.77% of the total IRR. At present, the VMP program spaces are less than 50% filled.

CLQ 1a(2): Will assets meet requirements for OPLAN 4102? for other OPLANS? full mobilization? partial mobilization? At the time of this report, VMP assets were short of meeting requirements overall by approximately 50%. However, many MOS/SSI were overfilled while others were underfilled or unfilled. Insofar as units with preassignees are included in other OPLANS and retain the same structure, their requirements will be met. If other units are required, they will need all their fillers from the Active Army or other IRR. At partial mobilization, preassignees may be assigned as needed. Details of the call-up of the preassignees during a partial mobilization are not defined and VMP orders are not valid for such a contingency.

EEA 1b: What are the procedures and associated time factors for changing preassignee requirements for fillers? Requirements for preassignee fillers change as unit strength requirements change. See discussion below.

Table B-1

IRR Personnel Authorized and Assigned Strength by Category

		Officer	Percent of Officers	Enlisted	Percent of Enlisted	Tota]	Percent of Total
-	IRR Assets	50,289	100.0	156,732	100.0	207,021	100.0
2.	MOBDES Program						
	Authorized	6,912	13.74	274	.17	7,186	3.47
	Assigned	5,568	11.07	52	.03	5,620	2.71
r,	Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment						
	Authorized	408	.81	12,030	7.68	12,438	6.01
	Assigned	143	. 28	8,789	5.61	8,932	4.31
4.	MOBDES and VMP						
	Authorized	7,320	14.56	12,304	7.85	19,624	9.48
	Assigned	5,711	11.36	8,841	5.64	14,552	7.03
5.	Available IRR						
	Potential (Assets minus Auth)	42,969	85.44	144,428	92.15	187,397	90.52
	Actual (Assets minus Assigned)	44,578	88.64	147,891	94.36	192,469	92.97
	Officer AD Obligor/ Enlisted Delayed Entry	3,661	7.28	366	.23	4,027	1.95
9	IRR Available on M-Day		•				
	Potential (all auth preassignments filled)	39,308	78.16	144,062	91.92	183,370	88.58
	Actual	40,917	81.36	147,525	94.13	188,442	91.03

- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b(1)}}$: Who initiates changes? ODCSOPS provides RCPAC with updated lists of units and their mobilization and peacetime authorized strengths by MOS. From these basic fill requirements RCPAC prepares the preassignment authorizations by unit, MOS and number required.
- CLQ 1b(2): What are the causes of changes in requirements for unit fillers? Changes in requirements are caused by changes in the force structure, changes in unit authorization (based on budgetary constraints or structure) and changes in MOS/SSI.
- CLQ 1b(3): What is the estimated frequency of changes? The troop list prepared for the VMP program has been artificially stabilized during the first year of program operation. It was not updated periodically to reflect changes to the post-mobilization deployment list (PMDL). As a result, during the initial period of operation there has been minimal change (48 spaces dropped). An updated requirements tape is to be sent to RCPAC every six months. RCPAC requires one week to make changes and one week to provide new lists to Transfer Activities; changes will be incorporated in the next monthly cycle at the Transfer Activities.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b(4)}}$: What agency implements the changes? RCPAC and the Transfer Activities implement the changes.
- ${\rm CLQ~1b(5)}$: What is the estimated time period between initiation of a change and its final implementation? The time from initiation to implementation of a change may be as much as one year. 12 RCPAC may not cancel orders if the unit is still a valid unit so some changes may take as much as another two years to implement. For example, a voluntary preassignee may have MOS no longer required by the unit but until he leaves the program (as long as 2 years later is possible) the full change process will not be accomplished.
- EEA 1c: What are the procedures and associated time factors for reassigning or diverting preassignees during peacetime and wartime? Preassignees will not be reassigned during peacetime unless they volunteer for reassignment. In wartime they may be reassigned within their parent unit or may be declared excess and made available to MILPERCEN for reassignment in accordance with Active Army procedures.
- ${\rm CLQ\ 1c(1)}$: Who initiates changes in individual orders? In peacetime, the volunteer or RCPAC will initiate changes; in wartime, the parent or subordinate unit personnel section will initiate changes in individual orders based on existing personnel policies and instructions.

Department of Army, People Management, The Final Report of the People Committee, ODCSPER, 25 April 1975.

CLQ 1c(2): What are the causes of changes in individual orders? No volunteers have requested adjustments in their VMP selections. However, as of 11 November 1976, orders had been cancelled for the following reasons:

Request of Voluntary Preassignee	6
Assigned to ARNG	65
Assigned to USAR	198
Transferred to Standby Reserve	591
Discharged	96
Death	1
Reenlisted in Active Army	53
Assigned to MOBDES	1
Non-locatees	105
TOTAL	1,116

Total cancellations represent about 12% of the orders issued since the program started.

<u>CLQ 1c(3)</u>: What is the estimated frequency of changes for voluntary preassignees (pre- and post-mobilization)? for other IRR post-mobilization? The frequency of change for VMP (pre-mobilization) is as shown in CLQ 1c(2). Under post-mobilization conditions, the frequency cannot be estimated. However, current RCPAC reports show 2,555 volunteers assigned as overages to existing spaces or against MOS not required by their unit. If these preassignees were not required to fill spaces authorized by the unit MTOE and not filled with assigned unit personnel, they might receive a post-mobilization change of orders. Currently, turbulence could affect 29% of the VMP program.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c}(4)}$: What is the estimated time period between initiation of a change in orders and receipt of orders by the person involved? Data are not available to answer this CLQ.

b. <u>Subobjective 2</u>: <u>Determine the effect of the system on unit personnel readiness</u>. For this study effort, unit personnel readiness is taken as defined AR 220-1, Unit Readiness Reporting. The personnel readiness condition (REDCON) is the lower of two personnel subindicators, strength and MOS qualification. They are determined as shown in Table B-2.

Table B-2
Personnel Subindicator REDCON Definition

Sub- indicator		REDCON		
(1) Strength	C-1 Operating strength not less than 95% of full MTOE.	C-2 Operating strength not less than 85% of full MTOE.	C-3 Operating strength not less than 75% of full MTOE.	C-4 Operating strength less than 75% of full MTOE.
(2) MOS	Not less than 86% of full MTOE strength are personnel in the operating strength who are qualified to perform the duties of the position to which assigned.	Not less than 77% of full MTOE strength are personnel in the operating strength who are qualified to perform the duties of the position to which assigned.	Not less than 68% of full MTOE strength are personnel in the operating strength who are qualified to perform the position to which assigned.	Less than 68% of full MTOE strength are personnel in the operating strength who are qualified to perform the duties of the position to which assigned.

EEA 2a: What is the personnel REDCON of units selected for voluntary preassignment before and after the voluntary program? The personnel REDCONs of Active Army units have not been affected by the VMP Program. Under conditions of full mobilization, their strengths would increase by a small number of officers per unit but the improved personnel picture for the Active Army lies in the improved personnel readiness of the RC round-out battalions since the MOS listed as available in Active Army units are based on spaces in the structures of their round-out and affiliated units. The following discussion, therefore, addresses the personnel REDCON of RC units with and without their voluntary preassignees.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(1)}}$: What percentage of structure strength is each unit's assigned strength, both before and after receiving voluntary preassignees? Strength REDCONs for all units with VMP have been calculated with these personnel added to their operating strengths. These data are classified. However strength REDCONs improve for most units. Percentage distribution of strength REDCONs calculated with and without VMP is as follows:

Percentage Distribution of Sample by Strength REDCON

	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
USAR Units				
w/o VMP	9%	0%	36%	55%
w/ VMP	22%	11%	22%	45%
ARNG Units				
w/o VMP	28%	33%	28%	12%
w/ VMP	48%	37%	13%	0%

With VMP, all ARNG units and over half of the USAR units are at least marginally ready. If the RC units had men assigned to all authorized VMP spaces, 58% would be at strength C-1, 25% at C-2, 12% at C-3 and 6% at C-4.

CLQ 2a(2): What percentage of structure strength is MOS qualified, both before and after receiving preassigness? All preassignees are qualified to serve in their MOS position. When these personnel are added to each unit's qualified strength, MOS REDCONs are substantially improved. Without VMP, MOS REDCONs were lower than strength REDCONs in 60% of the sample units, thus lowering personnel REDCONs and, in many cases, overall REDCONs. In some cases, units had less than 50% of their own personnel considered MOS qualified. MOS REDCON distribution calculated with and without VMP is as follows:

		MOS REDCO	N .	
	C-1	C-2	C-3	C-4
Without VMP	6%	29%	24%	40%
With VMP	23%	35%	25%	17%

CLQ 2a(3): Which is the lower of the personnel indicators listed above, strength or MOS? Without VMP, strength REDCONs were lower for 14% of the units, MOS REDCONs lower for 36% of units and the same (usually C-3 or C-4) for 50% of the units. With VMP, strength REDCONs were lower for 2%, MOS REDCONs lower for 58% and the same for 40% of the units. Since the personnel REDCONs were based on the lower MOS REDCON and in many cases, the overall REDCON was degraded because of personnel, the unit personnel readiness is statistically improved.

EEA 2b: What is the state of readiness of the preassigned personnel? Data are not available to answer this EEA and the following CLQ. They may become available following the IRR-APST survey. A presumption of near 100% deployability may be made for volunteers who have not withdrawn from the program.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2b}(1)}\colon$ What percentage of the preassigned personnel are nondeployable?

CLQ 2b(2): What are the principal reasons for nondeployability?

CLQ 2b(3): What percentage of the preassignees are POR qualified?

EEA 2c: What percentage of the unit operating strength is non-deployable before and after addition of preassignees? Data on unit non-deployable strength, although requested for unit readiness reports, are not reported.

 ${\it CLQ~2c(1)}$: What percentage of the unit operating strength is POR qualified both before and after the preassignees report for duty? Data are not available to answer this ${\it CLQ}$.

EEA 3a: What are the planned requirements for preassignees at full mobilization? The planned requirements for preassignees at full mobilization by unit and totals are as displayed in Table B-3 in the

Table B-3

Authorized Assigned Authorized and Assigned Voluntary Mobilization Preassignee Strengths by Unit Authorized Assigned ENLISTED Authorized Assigned OFFICERS Admin. Co., 40th Inf. (M) Div. 11th Spec. Forces 20th Spec. Forces Admin. Co., 49th Armd. Div. 25th Inf. Div. 38th Inf. Div. Admin. Co., 50th Armd Div. Admin. Co., 82nd ABN Div. Admin. Co., 9th Inf. Div. Admin. Co. 2nd Armd Div. 1st Cav. Div. Admin. Co., 4th Inf. Div Admin. Co., Admin. Co. Admin. Co. Unit HHC

Table B-3 (continued)

Unit	OFF Authorized	OFFICERS ed Assigned	ENLISTED Authorized Ass	STED Assigned	Authorized	Assigned	,
HHC 99th SC Bn	0		06	55	06	55	
Admin. Co. 101st ABN Div.	29	4	339	909	368	439	
HHC 30th Inf. Bde	1	0	323	162	324	162	
HHC 31st Armd Bde	1	0	286	92	287	92	
HHC 32nd Inf. Bde	-	0	323	181	324	181	
HHC 107 Armd Cav. Regt	0		269	161	269	161	
HHC 116 Armd Cav Regt	0		260	80	260	80	
HHC 146 SC Bn	0		06	79	06	79	
HHC 155th Armd Bde	1	0	286	76	287	76	
HHC 157th Inf Bde	12	0	367	337	379	337	
HHC 163 Armd Cav Regt	0		269	235	269	235	
HHC 194th Armd Bde	17	102	258	420	275	452	
HHC 197th Inf Bde	6	13	78	122	. 87	135	

Unit	OFFICERS Authorized Ass	CERS Assigned	ENLISTED Authorized Ass	STED Assigned	Authorized	Assigned
HHC 218 Inf Bde	1	0	328	142	329	142
Admin. Co. III Corp Arty	12	7	20	201	32	208
Admin XVIII ABN Crp Arty	15	15	3	137	18	152
HHC 201 EN Bn	0		99	23	99	23
HHC 203rd EN Bn	1	0	81	15	82	15
HHC 223rd EN Bn	-	0	81	12	82	12
HHC 244 EN Bn	1	0	81	31	82	31
HHC 321 EN Bn	1	0	100	26	101	26
HHC 391 EN Bn		0	100	18	101	18
HHC 489 EN Bn	1	0	100	19	101	19
HHC 877 EN Bn	1	0	43	14	44	14
HHC 878 EN Bn	1	0	81	∞	82	8 0
HHC 1457 EN Bn	0		56	26	56	26

Table B-3 (continued)

0 37 5 38 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31	Unit	OFFICERS Authorized Assigned	ICERS Assigned	ENLISTED Authorized Assigned	STED Assigned	Authorized Assigned	Assigned
0 - 31 8 31 1 0 - 37 5 38 1 1 0 37 5 38 1 1 0 444 21 45 1 0 444 14 14 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 444 14 14 45 1 0 444 11 45 1 0 444 11 45 1 0 444 11 45 1 0 444 11 45	##B 1/17 FA Bn	1	0	33	10	34	10
1 0 37 5 38 1 0 37 5 38 1 0 44 14 45 1 0 44 14 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 37 6 38	41B 3/75 FA Bn	0		31	80	31	80
1 0 37 5 38 1 0 44 21 45 1 0 0 44 1 45 1 0 0 44 1 45 1 0 0 37 22 38 1 0 0 44 5 1 0 0 44 14 14 45 1 0 0 44 5 45 1 0 0 44 5 6 45 1 0 0 37 6 38	418 3/83 FA Bn	0		31	м	31	3
1 0 44 21 45 1 0 44 21 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 5 1 0 44 5 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 6 45	urB 4/113 FA Bn	1	0	37	v	38	s
1 0 44 21 45 1 0 44 14 14 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 37 14 58 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 5 45 1 0 37 6 58	urB 5/113 FA Bn	1	0	37	ın	38	3
1 0 44 14 45 1 0 44 14 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 44 5 1 0 44 5 1 0 44 5 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 6 45	4	1	0	44	21	45	21
1 0 44 14 45 1 0 37 22 38 1 0 44 5 44 58 1 0 44 5 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 6 45	FA	1	0	44	1	45	1
1 0 37 22 38 1 0 37 14 38 1 0 44 5 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 45 1 1 0 37 6 38	UIB 1/147 FA Bn	1	0	44	14	45	14
1 0 37 14 38 45 45 45 11 0 44 11 45 45 11 0 44 6 45 45 11 0 37 6 38 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 110 11	FA	1	0	37	22	38	22
1 0 44 5 45 1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 45 1 0 37 6 38	#IB 1/158 FA Bn	1	0	37	14	38	14
1 0 44 11 45 1 0 44 6 45 1 0 37 6 38	IHB 1/180 FA Bn	1	0	44	Ŋ	45	ıs
1 0 44 6 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45	##B 1/201 FA Bn	1	0	44	11	45	11
38 38 58 6 38	FA	1	0	44	9	45	9
27701 22001 22001	## 1/623 FA BN	1	0	37	9	38	ø
X V C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C	Tot	als 405	132	12033	00	12478	8932

Data as of 17 January 1977, RCPAC VMP Report, PRED4, Preassignment Statistics and Projected Losses

authorized strength columns. The requirements by MOS are on file in RCPAC Report, PRE 03. At the time of this report, the authorized spaces create a requirement for 370 officers/warrant officers and 12,068 enlisted personnel for a total of 12,438 IRR personnel. There are requirements for personnel in 43 officer/warrant officer MOS and 113 enlisted MOS. Among the VMP authorizations, 19 officer, 2 warrant officer and 16 enlisted MOS are among those defined as critical military skills in AR 135-133, 19 June 1975. Medical and allied professions account for most officer spaces. At present, if all authorized spaces were filled, 0.8% of the IRR officers/warrant officers, 7% of the IRR enlisted personnel and 6% of the total IRR strength would be preassigned. As IRR strength declines (or if the number of authorized preassignee spaces is increased) these percentages will rise. Currently, an overfill problem exists in certain units and MOS. Overfill is considered acceptable up to 120% of the requirements. On this basis, 52 officers/warrant officers and 5,342 enlisted men are assigned within allowable limits. However, 3,185 IRR have orders assigning them to the units in the VMP program and are overfill to valid MOS above the 120% allowed (2,329 persons) or are assigned to units that have no requirement for their MOS (856 persons).

EEA 3b: Do the preassignees fill the gap between the peacetime assigned and authorized strength by grade and MOS for selected units? Under the present VMP system, preassignees are not assigned against this gap. Although some would undoubtedly be assigned to these spaces if recalled to active duty, currently they fill none of the gap.

EEA 3c: Do the preassignees fill the gap between the peacetime authorized and wartime structure strengths, by grade and MOS? Although preassignees are not assigned by grade, most are within the substitution criteria established in AR 135-301, Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), for selection of IRR fill to meet mobilization requirements. Overall, 13% of the officer/warrant officer, 41% of the enlisted and 40% of the total authorized VMP spaces were filled at the date of this report.

EEA 3d: What substitution criteria are authorized by grade and MOS? No substitution criteria are authorized by MOS. Members of the IRR may volunteer only for their primary MOS. No criteria are established for a grade/rank match of VMP spaces.

EEA 3e: What are the shortages and overages by MOS and grade?
MOS spaces authorized, assigned and percent filled are shown in Tables B-4 and 5.
A recapitulation, prepared as monthly tables, issued by RCPAC is included in this report as Inclosure 2. Shortages, overages and zero-fill MOS are listed. These data require some explanation above the mere listing. Many of the shortage/overage conditions exist in MOS that require very few people. Table B-6 shows spaces and assigned strength for those MOS that are authorized 20 or more people. These MOS are only 45% filled and they are all critical.

Table B-4

OFFICER/WARRANT OFFICER VMP AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTHS
AND IRR STRENGTH BY SSI

		VMP		WP		VMP as	% IRR	MOB I	DES	Critical
Officer	SSI	Author- ized	Assign	Assigned as % Auth.	IRR Total	Author- ized	Assign- ed	Author- ized	Assign- ed	Military Skill
200	000	,			·	<	c	9	•	
beneral ornicer	900	7	0		0	-	0	01	01	
Infantry Officer, Gen.	11A	0	4		2999	0	7	432	432	
FA Trg. Acq. Officer	13D	1	1	100	62			7	7	
Combat Signal Officer	25A	1	0	0	2310	∵	0	332	332	
Radio Freq. Eng. Officer	27A	1	0	0	80	41	0	3	3	
Law Enforcement Officer	31A	3	0	0	1318	41	0	116	116	
Fac. Intell. Officer	35A	9	4	0	466	7	-	251	251	
Pers. Memt. Officer	41A	8	0	0	137	5	0	52	52	
Finance/Acct. Officer	44A	-	0	0	75	1	0	23	23	
Psych. Ops. Officer	488		0	0	84		0	42	42	•
Ops. & Force Dev. Officer	54A	6	7	22	2	300	67	-		
Judge Advocate	55C	12	0	0	593	2	0	165	165	
Exec. Medicine Officer	60A	51	0	0	18	283	0	1	1	•
Prev. Medicine Officer	209	10	0	0	00	12	0	4	4	
Gen. Medical Officer	60E	106	80	œ	231	46	3	м	2	
Dermatologist	709	7	1	14						
Internist	61F	27	7	26	122	22	9	1	1	
General Surgeon	613	58	11	19	106	55	10	3	8	
Orthopedic Surgeon	61M	6	1	11	38	24	3	1	1	*
Flight Surgeon	61N	3	0	0	23	13	0	1	7	*
Gen. Dentistry Officer	63B	2	27	1350	88	2	30	0	0	
Nurse Anesthetist	66F	80	0	0	27	30	0	0	0	
Field Med. Assist.	67B	20	М	15	1320	2	7	69	69	•
Patient Admin. Officer	67E	1	3	300	26	4	12	1	1	
Health Serv. Mat. Officer	67K	3	3	100	65	S	2	7	7	•
Optometry Officer	68K	1	0	0	66	1	0	2	2	•
Tank/Gr. Mob. Mat. Mgmt.	77A	1	0	0	337	7	0	58	5.8	
Motor Officer	77D	2	54	1080	589	1	6	25	25	
Hwy. Trans/Trans Pl. Officer	88A	3	0	0	1211		0	138	138	
Maint. Mgmt. Officer	91A	2	0	0	109	2	0	30	30	
Supply/Serv. Officer	91B	2	0	0	2	100	0	3	3	
Trans. Mgmt. Officer	95A	1	0	0	50	2	0	27	27	
Warrant Officer										
Rat. Wing pilot, OH & Lt	1008	28	0	0	541	2	0	0	0	•
& Lt Cargo							•	,	,	,
Rat. Wing Pilot, Attack	100E	S.	0	0	89	_	0	0	0	•
Pilot, OH-58	1000	-	0	0	14	1	0	0	0	
Unit Pers. Tech	711A	3	0	0	9	20	0	0	0	
Data Proc. Tec./ADPS	741C	1	0	0	85	1	0	0	0	
Military Phys. Asst.	911A	1	0	0	2	20	0	0	0	

* Critical Military skill as defined in AR 135-133, 19 June 1975

Table B-5

VMP ALTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH AND IRR STRENGTH BY MOS

Critical Military Skill									•																						٠		•		*				
.R Assigned		0	0		0	7	9	9	0	15	7	6	10	10	12	24	7	2	6	0	80	11	4	2	4	4	8	-	0	0	4	s	3	0	0	7	2	14	
VMP as % IRR Authorized A		2	4	2	4	1	9	4	4	2	3	24	27	36	38	2	19	1	8	0	17	6	3	1,340	2	33	31	2	<1 <1	~ 1	1	S	15	20	-	1	2	4	
IRR		123	28	92	92	76	16	531	542	1,000	1,651	11,325	2,208	1,180	2,796	21	4,093	704	244	0	5,801	840	475	20	258	117	808	158	803	244	223	1,564	164	10	119	71	48	28	
VMP Assigned as % Auth.	0	0	0	100	0	100	100	155	0	283	201	40	38	29	31	200	37	183	110	33	46	128	120	<1	250	20	26	99	0	0	450	119	21	0	0	100	100	400	
Assigned	0	0	0	1	0	1	1	34	0	147	113	1,065	229	123	333	S	282	11	22	13	449	95	18	1	10	00	99	2	0	0	5	88	S	0	0	1	1	4	
Authorized	2	2	1	1	3	1	1	22	21	52	98	2,664	965	431	1,063		191	9	20	39	983	74	15	268	4	39	251	3	1	1	2	74	24	2	1	1	-		
Description	Enlisted aide	Cornet/trombone player	Baritone/eur onium player	Trombone player	Saxaphone player	Percussion player	Piano player	Radio operator	Radio/Teletype operator	Voice radio operator	Radio/TT operator, non-Morse	Infantryman	Hvy wpns infantryman	Armor recon crewman	Armor crewman	Maneuver cpt arms sgt.	Combat engineer	Bridge crewman	Atomic demo. muni. spec.	Cht. eng. trkd. veh. crew	Cannon crew	Cannon fir. dir. spec.	H J rocket crew	Lt ADA crew (RC)	ADA Ops/intell asst	FA radar crewman	Grnd. surv. radar crew	Cht. area surv. radar rpmn		Fld. radio rpmn.	Teletypewriter rpmm	Multi chan. comm. eqp. oper	Fac. circuit controller	Area comm chief	Spec. elect. devices rpmn.	Avionic comm. equip. rpmn.	Avionic navig. equip. rpmn.		1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
3-digit	H00	02B	02C	02E	02L	02M	02N	058	050	05E	05F	118	110	115	11E	112	128	120	12E	12F	138	13E	15F	16F	16H	178	17K	26C	313	31E	31.1	31M	31N	312	35E	35L	35M	NSE	

Table B-5 (continued)

				VMP Assigned	IRR	VMP as % IRR	~	Critical Military	
3-digit	Description	Authorized	Assigned	as % Auth.	Total	Authorized	Assigned	Skill	-
360	Tele installer/lineman	152	75	49	1,198	13	9	•	
366	Manual central office rpmn.	4	9	150	120	3	2	•	
36K	Tac. wire op spec.	719	300	42	4,189	17	7		
41C	Fire Cont. inst. rpmn	6	14	156	15	09	93	•	
45B	Small arms rpmn	1	7	700	265	¢1	3		
453	AC Armanent rpmn	2	2	100	28	7	7		
45K	Tank turret romn	14	13	93	295	5	4		
45M	AC Armt sub-syst. mech.	2	0	0	234	1	0		
518	Carpenter	2	09	3,000	904	¢1	7		
513	Heating/Ventilating spec.	13	0	0	53	25	9		
51K	Plumber	41	15	37	337	12	4		
51N	Water Supply spec.	35	17	49	213	16	∞		
51R	Electrician	2	21	1,050	359	41	9		
52B	Power genr. equip oper/mech	52	123	237	1.994	3	9		
52D	Power genr equip romn	6	22	244	306	8	7	•	
54A	Chem ops asst	2	0	0	53	6	0		
54E	Chem. staff spec.	7	6	129	80	6	11		
558	Ammunition spec.	9	43	717	614	1	7	•	
62B	Eng. equip. rpmn	49	77	157	1,187	4	9	•	
62E	Crawler tractor oper.	30	11	33	220	14	S		
62F	Crane operator	15	0	0	272	9	0		
62M	Rough terrain Fk lift/ldr oper	81	39	48	580	14	7		
63B		29	353	1,217	5,775	1	9		
630	Tracked vehicle mech.	394	183	46	2,465	16	7		
63G	Fuel/elect. syst. rpmn	2	3	150	205	1	1	•	
63H	Automotive rpmn	16	101	631	1,194	1	8	*	
633	QM equip. rpmn	5	6	180	211	2	4		
64C	Motor transport oper.	331	466	141	6,359	2	7		
67N	UH-1 hlcptr rpmn	14	0	0	170	8	0		
AL9	01+6/0H58 Hlcptr rpmn	8	31	387	388	2	8		
ML9	Hicptr tech insp	1	0	.0	2	50	0	•	
47A	AH-1G hlcptr. rpmn	152	22	14	367	41	9		
68B	A/c Turbine eng. rpmn	4	3	75	46	6	7		
68E	A/C Rotor/Promp rpmn	2	1	20	49	3	1		
686	Airframe romn	4	4	100	107	4	4		
718	Clerk-typist	118	492	417	6.817	2	7		
717	Stenographer	-		0	190				
2	orenographics.		,	>	224	•	,		

Table B-5 (continued)

Critical	Skill		•																										*							
TRR	Assigned	9	15	4	8	10	10	œ	6	7	80	6	13	10	6	6	1	7	0	9	80	9	7	26	3	0	6	16	10	8	6	9	9	0	00	9
VMD as %	Authorized	1	22	7	2	2	4	2	ю	9	2	S	1	3	9	4	2	4	0	3	15	4	2	7	-	333	9	3	4	10	2	31	9		2	3
TPD	Total	909	46	447	316	931	542	199	273	459	1,856	1,400	260	1,012	1,848	416	1,725	627	0	478	414	174	5,544	27	197	3	1,033	145	125	5,525	246	78	5,788	0	8,722	181
VNF	as % Auth.	975	70	1.700	200	556	279	375	267	111	150	165	1,420	286	154	211	30	165	0	223	52	143	128	350	300	0	158	575	240	78	575	21	66	0	204	200
	Assigned	39	1	17	25	80	52.5	15	24	30	148	124	71	100	165	38	13	43	0	29	32	10	362	7	9	0	95	23	12	433	23	2	362	0	734	10
	Authorized	4	10	-	S	16	19	4	6	27	66	75	S	35	107	18	43	26	1	13	61	7	282	2	2	10	09	4	S	557	4	24	365	8	157	S
	Description	[enal	Court Reporter	Postal clerk	Med. records spec.		Chanlain's asst.	Traffic memt. coord.	Information spec.	Switchboard oper, cent. office	Telecomm. cont. spec.	Finance spec.	Computer/machine oper.	Pers. mgmt. spec.	Pers. rec. spec.	Pers. act. spec.	Materiel supplyman	Stock control supplyman	Materiel Supply Specialist	Storage supplyman	Petr. storage spec.	Subsistence supplyman	Unit. drg. supplyman	Sr. supply Sgt.	General draftsman	Rodman and Tapeman	Artillery surveyor	Still photographer	Still photo lab. spec.	Med. Lab. spec.	Environ. hith. spec.	Ballistics meteorology crew	Food service spec.	Food service super.	Military policeman	Intelligence analyst
	3-digit	912	715	71E	716	711	71M	718	710	72C	72E	73C	74D	75C	75D	75E	76D	76P	760	767	76W	76X	76Y	762	81A	82A	82C	84B	846	918	516	93F	948	942	958	968

Table B-6
Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment MOS
Authorized Twenty or More Spaces

MOS	Description	Strength Authorized	Strength Assigned	Assigned
05	Radio Operator	22	34	154
05 05C	R/TT Operator	21	0	0
05E	Voice Radio Operator	52	147	283
05F	R/TT Operator, non Morse	56	113	202
11B	Lt. Weapons Inf.	2664	1065	40
11C	Lt., Incl. Fire	596	229	38
110	AR Recon. Spec.	431	123	29
11E	AR Crew	1063	333	31
12B	Combat Engineer	757	282	37
12F	Combat Engineer Trained with Crew	39	13	33
13B	FA Crew	983	449	46
13E	FA Fire Dir. Ass.	74	95	128
16F	Lt. ADA Crew, RC	268	0	0
17B	FA Radar Crew	39	8	21
17K	Gnd. Surv. Radar Crew	251	66	26
31M	Multi Channel Comm Eq. Opr.	74	88	119
31N	Tac Circuit Contr.	24	5	21
36C	Lineman	152	75	49
36K	Field Wireman	719	300	42
51K	Plumber	41	15	37
51N	Water Supply Spec.	35	17	49
62B	Eng. Equip. Repairman	49	77	157
62E	Crawler Tractor Operator	30	11	37
62M	Rough Terrain Fork Life Ldr./Opr.	81	39	48
63B	Wheel Vehicle Mechanic	29	322	1110
60A	Executive Medical Officer	51	0	0
60E	General Medical Officer	106	8	8
61F	Internist	27	7	26
61J	General Surgeon	58	11	19
67B	Field Medical Assistant	20	3	15
OOB	Rotary Wing Pilot, OH & Lt. Cargo	28	0	0
	Total	8850	3935	45

NOTE: All these MOS are listed as critical in AR I35-30.

d Subobjective 4: Determine the probable preassignee availability rates.

EEA 4a: What is the overall preassignee availability rate? As part of the VMP agreement, each volunteer signs DA Form 4489, under which he agrees to report for duty unless he cancels the agreement before M-Day. Data on the program to date show that less than 1% of the preassignees have withdrawn and returned to IRR status. Although it is unlikely that all will be available, it is reasonable to assume that the availability rate will be near 100%. The IRR-APST Survey may yield a more accurate availability rate.

e. Subobjective 5: Determine the timeliness of the arrival of preassignees. Paragraph 4 of the Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment agreement (DA Form 4489) signed by each volunteer reads as follows: "Preassigned members will be required to report to their mobilization assignment within a specified period of not less than 10 days after announcement of a full mobilization." In the absence of contradictory data, approximately 100% of the preassignees may be assumed to report in a timely manner, subject to unforeseen travel and transportation conditions arising on or after M-Day. Data to answer the other EEA/CLQ under this subobjective will not be available until voluntary preassignees are surveyed during the IRR-APST. These EEA/CLQ are listed below.

EEA 5a: How many preassignees are expected to arrive at the home/mobilization station on or before the date specified?

 $\frac{\text{EEA 5b:}}{1\text{ate?}}$ How many preassignees are expected to arrive at mobilization

EEA 5c: What were the principal reasons for late arrival of preassignees at mobilization stations or units?

EEA 5d: What percentage of preassignees consider the alert period in the system to be adequate?

EEA 5e: If full mobilization were declared today, how soon would preassignees be able to start traveling?

EEA 5f: What is the predicted average delay imposed on preassignees by processing at mobilization stations?

 $\underline{\mathrm{CLQ}}$ 5f(1): What are the principal causes for delay at the mobilization station?

f. Subobjective 6: Determine the adequacy of plans for orientation and assimilation of preassignees into their units.

EEA 6a: Are procedures established for receiving, processing and orienting preassignees? Procedures for receiving, processing and orienting preassignees are the same as those for unpreassigned IRR (see Chapter 2 and Annex A).

CLQ 6a(1): Does the reception and processing provide for complete POR qualification? POR qualification is part of the required processing procedure for all personnel scheduled for deployment.

CLQ 6a(2): What proportion of the selected units plan peace-time contact, reception and orientation of voluntary preassignees? Comprehensive data to respond to this CLQ are not available. One USAR Brigade has written letters and sent brigade literature to its preassignees living in a four state area surrounding the brigade. Several ARNG battalions are known to have made similar contacts. The State Adjutants General have recently requested and have been sent rosters of all persons preassigned to the ARNG and living in the state. As this program continues, more contact between units and preassignees may take place.

 $\underline{\text{EEA 6b:}}$ What proportion of preassignees understand the missions of their unit and their roles and responsibilities? Data to answer this $\underline{\text{EEA}}$ and $\underline{\text{CLQ 6b(1)}}$ and $\underline{\text{(2)}}$ are not currently available. This area may be queried in the IRR-APST Survey.

CLQ 6b(1): What proportion of preassignees understand SOPs?

themselves as members of the team? have been contacted by their unit? how soon? What is the unit/component profile?

 $\underline{\text{EEA 6c:}}$ Do unit commanders give personal attention to the contact, reception and integration of preassignees? Data to answer this EEA and CLQ 6c(1) and (2) are not currently available. This area may be investigated by IRR-APST analysts.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 6c(1)}}$: What percentage of unit commanders delegate responsibilities for contact and reception to subordinates and to whom?

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 6c(2)}}$: What percentage of unit commanders conduct follow-up checks on the status of preassignees?

EEA 6d: To what extent did preassignees earnestly attempt to become part of their units? volunteer for AT? The extent of preassignee participation with and attempt to become part of their units is unknown. This area may also be investigated by IRR-APST analysts in conjunction with EEA 6c. Thus far 18 preassignees have volunteered for annual training. Plans are being made to invite their participation and a request for limited funds to cover this will be made.

h. <u>Subobjective 7</u>: <u>Determine the impact of the integration of the IRR</u> fillers on unit training readiness.

EEA 7a: Have the units planned for new equipment and refresher training? See discussion under the Readiness Category, Subobjective 7, Current System (Annex A).

<u>CLQ 7a(1)</u>: Have training programs been developed in advance? post-mobilization training programs? Specific training programs that address the needs of voluntary preassignees have not been developed.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ 7a(2)}}{\text{at the mobilization station to meet the added training requirements for the preassignees?}$ Data are unavailable to answer this CLQ.

EEA 7b: What are the selected units' estimates of training REDCONs with/without voluntary preassignees? Active Army units are at training REDCON C-1. The USAR units with VMP are at C-3 and C-4 (one exception at C-1). ARNG units with VMP are primarily at C-2 and C-3. Taken as a whole, RC units with VMP are 4% at C-1; 26% at C-2; 44% at C-3; and 26% at C-4. The preassignment orders issued for units in peacetime do not change the pre-mobilization posture of the unit. However, after M-Day these orders will add a block of fully qualified men to the unit with recent professional, full-time experience. This should decrease the postmobilization training time required for the unit.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 7b(1)}}$: How many weeks are estimated to be required for units to attain a fully trained status both before and after preassignees report for duty? The range of required training weeks for RC units with VMP is 2 to 13 weeks with 67% requiring 4-6 weeks, 26% requiring 7 or more weeks and 7% requiring less than 4 weeks.

 ${\rm CLQ}\ 7{\rm b(2)}$: What are the major constraints to attaining a fully trained status both before and after preassignees report—for duty? With respect to Active Army units, there are no major constraints to attaining a fully trained status as they are currently at training REDCON C-1. Currently, RC units are prevented from attaining fully trained status because of inadequate training areas, MOS imbalance, shortage of personnel, excessive personnel turnover, and equipment shortages. In the post-mobilization environment, after units receive preassignees, the problems of equipment shortages and insufficient time to complete unit training would still remain. Adequate training areas might still be a problem, depending on the type unit and the mobilization station facilities (e.g., a tank battalion at a station without tank firing ranges).

B-2 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS CATEGORY

a. <u>Subobjective 1</u>: <u>Estimate the frequency of changes in unit fill</u> requirements.

EEA 1a: What is the organizational and operational management structure for voluntary preassignees? The preassignee management structure is discussed under the Resource Requirements Category, Subobjective 4, RCPAC Workloads, EEA 5a.

<u>CLQ la(1)</u>: What are the staff-command channels for the flow of policy, planning guidance and other information? RCPAC (and its subordinate division) is charged with the management of the VMP system. They receive information, policy and guidance from ODCSPER, ODCSOPS and FORSCOM. In turn, they provide guidance and information to receiving units and Transfer Activities.

EEA 1b: What quantitive and qualitative criteria are applied in preassigning personnel to units? Preassignees are assigned based on the requirements for their VPMOS (3-digit) in the available units. Rank/grade are not criteria. Overstrength of 20% is allowed.

EEA 1c: How often are preassignments reviewed, updated and revalidated? Preassignments are not reviewed, updated or revalidated except on an individual basis. Each preassignee may elect to extend his IRR service and his preassignment. If not, he becomes part of the Standby Reserve. Preassignment spaces available are updated by RCPAC and sent to the Transfer Activities monthly. ODCSOPS provides RCPAC with a tape of total preassignment spaces by unit, 3-digit MOS, officer or enlisted, and mobilization station every 6 months.

EEA ld: What developments will generate requirements for changes in unit preassignee requirements? The following developments will generate requirements for changes in number of preassignees:

- Changes in the force structure. This includes the activation, reorganization, reactivation and inactivation of units. For example the ARNG 38th Infantry Division, located in 3 states, has recently had one brigade separated to become a separate brigade. This means that preassignees assigned to the division headquarters based on spaces in the brigade will be excess unless their orders are changed. Changes in the Active Army round-out program will also affect the VMP program.
- Changes in unit structure. This includes subtraction or addition of spaces by number required or MOS. These changes may be the result of reduction/increase in authorized strength as governed by DA budgetary constraints; the result of addition of new or different equipment requiring additional MOS; phase-out of other equipment functions requiring subtraction of MOS; or changes in unit mission.

EEA le: How often is it estimated that changes to filler requirements are made? The system has not been operational long enough to project or estimate number of changes in requirements. During the period of this study, changes in authorizations for preassignees have occurred in only one unit - the 218th Infantry Brigade. This unit* has lost 48 spaces as follows:

^{*}Based on changes in a subordinate FA battalion.

Authorized Preassignees

MOS	As of 24 September	As of 16 November	Number Lost
3100	1	0	1
13B	52	19	33
13E	5	0	5
36K	26	21	5
91B	16	15	1
94B	8	5	3
Subtotal	108	60	48
TOTAL UNIT	377	321	48

This change represents a 0.3% reduction in the number of preassignees authorized during the first 8 months of operation. A small number of other changes have occurred but these are the result of normal problems associated with the initiation of a new system.

<u>CLQ le(1)</u>: What is the estimated time required for completing the cycle for processing a unit TOE/MIOE change? The complete cycle for processing a unit TOE/MTOE may take up to 13 months. An additional maximum of 6 months may be necessary for RCPAC to incorporate the change in the data base.

b. Subobjective 2: Estimate the frequency of changes in individual orders for IRR personnel.

EEA 2a: How will preassignment orders be managed and administered? post-mobilization orders? VMP orders are managed and administered by RCPAC (see Chapter 3). Post-mobilization orders will be handled in accordance with Active Army procedures.

EEA 2b: What personnel policies will generate requirements for rescinding individual preassignment orders (e.g., physical disability, change of residence, etc.)? post-mobilization orders? See answer under CLQ below.

 $\frac{\text{CLQ 2b(1)}}{\text{RCPAC data}}$: What is the profile of the causes for rescinding orders? RCPAC data (as of 30 November 1976) show orders rescinded to date as follows:

Non-locatee	129
Voluntary request	9
Joined ARNG	65
Joined USAR	218
Transferred to Standby	592
Discharged	96
Death	1
Entered Active Duty	53
TOTAL	1,163

Forty-eight spaces contributed by the 1/111 FA Bn have been deleted from the authorized program. This caused the revocation of 5 orders.

EEA 2c: What developments generate requirements for changes in individual preassignment orders (e.g., changes in mobilization stations, changes in the force structure, etc.)? post-mobilization orders? See answer under CLQ below.

CLQ 2c(1): What is the projected profile of the causes for changes in individual preassignment orders? post-mobilization orders? Changes in unit orders for personal reasons are discussed above (EEA 2b). Major changes in structure - the elimination of a unit or the relocation in its mobilization station - could cause changes in individual orders. Misassignments, such as overassignment in excess of 120% or assignment to an MOS not required by the units, are being allowed to phase-out by attrition. As the system continues to operate, improved system management and control are eliminating these problems. An examination of stationing plans shows that neither Active Army units nor major RC units with VMP have changed their mobilization stations during the period 31 March 1974 to 30 September 1976. A careful tracking of the magnitude of changes in orders caused by changes in stationing plans should be part of the VMP management. During the first year of operation, there has been no effect. There are no data to support an analysis of post-mobilization changes in orders. These could occur if the unit determines that preassignees are not required or if either the installation or MILPERCEN have a higher priority use for the preassignees.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 2d(1)}}$: What is the estimated time required for completing the cycle for processing a change in preassignment orders? post-mobilization orders? Too few orders have been changed during the 9 months of system operation to develop predictive factors to answer this EEA and CLQ.

c. Subobjective 3: Determine the most cost-effective mailing/notification procedures for contacting preassignees. Preassignees are contacted by third class, U.S. Mail. M-Day notification will be by news media (i.e., radio, T/ announcement).

- EEA 3a: What information and type documents will the preassignees require to complete the requirement for official notification? The VMP system requires no documents to complete official notification. Preassignees will require news media announcement of M-Day to activate orders previously mailed to them.
- EEA 3b: What are the costs of the notification procedures? There are no costs currently foreseen for M-Day notifications.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 3b(1)}}$: How reliable is the procedure? The reliability of the current method, relying on media at M-Day, cannot be predicted.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 3b(2)}}$: How much time elapses between issuance and individual receipt of orders? RCPAC estimates an average of 5 days is required.
- <u>CLQ 3b(3)</u>: What are the advantages/disadvantages and costs/benefits of the system? The principal advantage of the preassignment system is that it does not depend on the postal system as it will exist on M-Day to deliver orders. The principal disadvantage is that it depends on the individual hearing and acknowledging activation of orders by news media announcement. Another disadvantage is that orders may be lost, mislaid or destroyed before M-Day. An average of 5 days is saved if the preassignee responds to the media announcement.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 3b(4)}}$: How will official notification be verified? Official notification may be verified by telephone, or by telegraphing RCPAC. The telephone number and address are included in the original orders.
- d. Subobjective 4: Determine RCPAC and Transfer Activity workloads due to maintaining and mobilizing preassignees.
- $$\rm \underline{EEA}$$ 4a: What peacetime functions are performed by RCPAC and Transfer Activities for the preassignment system? How are they organized? See CLQs below.
- <u>CLQ 4a(1)</u>: What procedures, programs or facilities have been added since February 1976? RCPAC manages the system through the Mobilization Preassignment Office. This office formulates, develops and administers approved plans and programs pertaining to the Preassignment Program and Mobilization Designation Program. Within this office, the preassignment program is managed by the Preassignment Branch. This Branch plans, coordinates, supervises and implements approved plans and programs pertaining to the preassignment of members of the IRR. It monitors MOS vacancy lists


and advises on separation activities; maintains program statistics for current and future analysis; processes DA Form 4489 (Voluntary Preassignment/Refusal Form); analyzes and coordinates computer programs pertaining to preassignment; and distributes preassignee rosters. Thirty new computer programs (2 man years of work) have been written to support the program. Transfer Activities* brief personnel being released from active duty (REFRAD) on the VMP program after they have been briefed on their option to join ARNG and USAR units. A draft copy of the briefing is displayed as Inclosure 1 to this Annex. A descriptive film prepared by RCPAC is also shown to REFRADs. Forms for accepting/rejecting preassignment and listing of units/MOS/mobilization stations are passed out. Each man selecting preassignment receives individual counseling to assure that a correct selection of unit/MOS has been made. The volunteer's word is taken as to his verified primary MOS. Officers receive individual briefings covering all their options. However, they do not see the film. The briefings and counseling are performed by currently assigned RC counselors. No new personnel have been added for this task. It is estimated that a large REFRAD load (such as at Fort Dix) adds about 1-2 hours per day to the counselor's workload. Approximately 2 days per month are required for preparation of reports to TRADOC (by phone, monthly and written reports, quarterly) and to FORSCOM [CSRSV-130(R1) - USAR ARNG]. The normal Transfer Activity staffing at Fort Dix (4 officers, 40 enlisted persons and 37 civilians) is shown in Figure B-1. This Transfer Activity outprocessed 32,817 people during the period 1 April 1976 - 31 December 1976, 2,473 of whom volunteered for preassignment. (See Table B-7.)

CLQ 4a(2): What are the manpower requirements at RCPAC, and Transfer Activities? RCPAC was authorized 2 officers and 6 civilians. Four enlisted RC counselors handle all work related to the preassignment system at Fort Dix, probably the maximum at an individual Transfer Activity.

 $\underline{\text{EEA 4b}}$: What functions specifically related to the preassignment system will RCPAC perform on mobilization? After preassignees report for active duty and are accessioned, RCPAC forwards personnel data to MILPERCEN. The definition of these data is now under preparation.

 ${\rm CLQ}$ 4b(1): Does establishment of the voluntary system cause changes in mobilization procedures? What are they? The establishment of the system decreases the number of IRR available for any assignment but does not change requisitioning procedures at RCPAC.

^{*}Transfer Activity analysis is based on observation at Fort Dix.



Atch for Admin Sup, Supv & Control

Table B-7

Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment at TRADOC Installations | April - 31 Dec 1976

Installation	Total Out Processed	Total Eligible	Volunteers	% of Eligible
Fort Selvoir	666	354	16	ro
Fort Senning	7702	1011	12	-
Fort 8115S	3726	706	36	ıo
Carlisle Barracks	61	. 42	0	0
Fort Dix (Plus Hamilton)	32817	1,289	2473	21
Fort Custis	1104	879	99	O
Fort Sandon	6020	27.9	57	20
Fort Harrison	439	12	.22	5.5
Fort Jackson	29936	777.8	3393	77
Fort Knox	7158	643	104	16
Tort Leavenworth	434	1.67	80	43
Fort Legnard Wood	2263	190	111	3.
Sent "colellan	1303	971	63	7
Tort Monroe	171	25	m	9
Tont Rucker	1200	COC	6	O
Tort 5111 '	9529	725	162	22
Jort 1,00	1902	67.	28	6:
1017/	106808	27625	6502	24

- e. Subobjective 5: Determine the workloads of mobilization stations and gaining units specifically related to the voluntary preassignment system.
- EEA 5a: What system functions related to preassignees do mobilization stations and gaining units perform during peacetime? Units receive rosters of their preassignees. They are not required to perform any functions related to them. Some have initiated mailings of unit information, letters of welcome, etc., to strenthen ties with their preassignees on a voluntary basis. Other units (as a result of MOBEX-76) have made some plans to equip preassignees at M-Day. No functions are required from units or mobilization stations during peacetime.
- EEA 5b: What manpower is required at mobilization stations or gaining units to administer the program during peacetime? No additional manpower (or man hours of work) is required during peacetime.
- $\overline{\text{EEA 5c}}$: What system functions will mobilization stations and gaining units perform for preassignees on mobilization? Mobilization stations and units will perform the same functions for preassignees as for other fillers. These functions are described in Chapter 2 and in Annex A.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 5c(2)}}$: How will preassignee MPRJs be established for the personnel files of gaining units? The unit will receive the computerized copy of DA Form 2 (RC) from RCPAC (FID "Q" format). The MPRJ will remain at RCPAC.
- EEA 5d: What are the planned preassignee reception and processing capacities of active, semi-active and inactive mobilization stations? Preassignees are included in the planned capacities at mobilization stations as they are part of the unit structure strength on which reception and processing capacities are based.
- f. Subobjective 6: Estimate the dollar costs of operating the system for maintaining and mobilizing the voluntary preassignees.
- EEA 6a: What investment costs have been incurred (e.g., costs to expand data bases and management information systems, costs for additional staff, and training costs) to establish the voluntary preassignment system? Costs to establish the VMP program through 30 November 1976 have been supplied by the Controller, RCPAC, and are as shown in Table B-8. The investment dollar cost has been \$93,948. Minimal costs to other commands and agencies have been absorbed in current operating budgets.

Table B-8

Cost Data, Voluntary Preassignment Program 1975-76

TOTAL	\$17,000	28,241	5,351	006	4,803	73,529	20,283	5,040	326	1,083 1,300 11,960 1,451 1,059	\$1/2,526
OPERATING COSTS	\$ 5,200	10,610	4,029	678	886	46,248	8,540			238 1,300 649	\$78,378
INVESTMENT COSTS PERIOD OF OCT 75-30 JUN 76	\$ 11,800	17,631	1,322	222	3,917	27,281	11,743	5,040aJ	326	845 11,960 1,451 410	\$93,948
Cost Category PERIOD	TDY Costs.	Manhour Costs of Computer Programming.	Computer Machine Hours @ \$100.00 per hr.	Computer Operator Manhour Costs.	Reproduction Machine Operator Manhours.	Manhour Costs for all Subject Briefings, In-House and External and Assigned Military personnel	Manhour Costs for Clerical/Administrative Support to Project Chief (Military and Civilian).	Video Tape Project.	Program Test Costs (Early 1976)	Costs for Office Supplies and Services, Printing, Paper, Graphic Arts, & Mailouts. Postage (estimated) Typewriters Communication Equipment - Telephone.	TOTAL

a/Cost incurred after 30 Jun 76

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 6a(1)}}$: What operating costs are incurred (e.g., salaries and unit/installation operating costs) annually to implement voluntary preassignment? Operating costs for the first 5 months of the program are displayed in Table B-8. An average monthly operating cost based on these data (unadjusted for inflation or expansion factors) is approximately \$15,675 per month or \$188,000 per year.

EEA 6b: What are the additional estimated investment and annual operating costs by budget appropriation required to operate the system in the future? At present no additional major investment costs are contemplated. The expansion of the system to include management of several thousand additional spaces in Phase II is the only present foreseen expense.

B-3 ATTITUDES CATEGORY

a. Subobjective 1: Determine the degree of motivation and job satisfaction of preassignees. As volunteers, preassignees are presumed to be satisfied with their assignments. Of all persons assigned since the program was initiated (10,027) only 9 have requested removal (as of 30 November 1976).

EEA la: What methods do unit commanders employ in assigning preassignees within their units? No data are available to answer this question. Although preassignees are assigned against spaces not available in the authorized peacetime strength, commanders might choose to assign them to other spaces after mobilization.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ la(1)}}$: What MOS/grade substitution criteria will be applied? No data are available on the substitution criteria employed within units.

CLQ 1a(2): Are preassignees granted opportunities to choose their assignment from spaces available? No data are available to answer this CLQ.

 $\underline{\rm EEA~1b}\colon$ How many MOS/grade mismatches remained in each unit after application of MOS/grade substitution criteria to preassignees? No MOS mismatch should result from the preassignment program and only about 10% serious grade mismatch. The MOS/grade mismatch would remain in the operating strength of RC units unless these personnel were transferred to other units.

EEA 1c: What percentage of the preassignees were satisfied/dissatisfied with their assignments after receiving orders separately identified into three categories - Active Army, Reserve and National Guard? Data to answer this EEA will become available from the IRR-APST Survey.

CLQ 1c(1): What were the principal reasons for satisfaction/dissatisfaction? See EEA 1c.

- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c(2)}}$: What percentage volunteer to remain preassigned to their original choice after they have reached the end of their six-year obligation? The number who have elected to remain at the end of their six-year obligation is currently unknown. Data will become available only on a continued operation of the system. Thus far 6% of total have been transferred to the Standby and 1% have been discharged (as of 30 November 1976).
- CLQ 1c(3): How many would be willing to retrain to join a specific Active Army or Reserve Component unit or occupy a voluntary preassignment position if not already in that status? See EEA 1c. This option is not currently available.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 1c(4)}}$: Would voluntary preassignees encourage other IRR personnel to enter the voluntary program? See EEA 1c.
- b. <u>Subobjective 2</u>: <u>Determine the nature and extent of official</u> <u>complaints</u>, special requests or other special correspondence initiated by preassignees.
- $$\operatorname{\underline{EEA}}$2a$$: Is there a mechanism for feedback information from preassignees? See CLQ below.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(1)}}$: What is nature and extent of the feedback mechanism? There is no formal mechanism for feedback from preassignees.
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 2a(2)}}\colon$ To what extent do preassignees use the mechanism? There is no record to date of preassignee correspondence that is related to their preassignee status.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ 2a(3)}}{\text{In the absence of a formal mechanism, preassignees may}}$ write, call or visit RCPAC when they have questions or complaints about their status.
- EEA 2b: How many official complaints are received by DA from preassignees annually? No complaints have been received that are related to preassignment status.
- $\frac{\text{CLQ }2\text{b}(1)}{\text{Congressional channels?}}$ None.
- CLQ 2b(2): How many individual complaints are dispatched to other Army offices/agencies/commands such as RCPAC and MILPERCEN? None.
- $\overline{\text{EEA 2c}}$: Are significant trends in the IRR formal complaints identifiable? No.

EEA 2d: What is the profile of the substance of total complaints received? No data are available to answer this EEA.

c. Subobjective 3: Identify evidence bearing on the social and political impact of voluntary preassignment.

EEA 3a: To what extent has the voluntary preassignment program been publicized? The VMP program has been publicized within the Army. RCPAC conducted an extensive orientation program for Transfer Activities, FORSCOM and other DA elements. A color film was also prepared and is being shown to separatees as part of their out-processing. The film explains this post separation option. Several articles have appeared in Army oriented publications such as Army, The Armed Forces Journal and the National Guardsman. An example of this type publicity extracted from the "Soldiers" magazine is as follows:

Whats New

PICK A UNIT

Soldiers released from active duty and transferred to individual ready reserve (IRR) may select a unit they would prefer to serve with during full mobilization...Officers may select only active Army units...EM may choose active Army, National Guard or Reserve unit...Neither will have to train with unit.

An examination of the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature¹³ and the Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals¹⁴ with follow-up examination of potentially relevant articles revealed no publicity on or reference to the VMP program. OCINFO sources say that they have not issued any publicity on the program as it was not considered a public issue.

EEA 3b: What is the profile of the substance of reaction to the voluntary preassignment system in the news media or other publications? There has been no publicity with attendant reactions to this program.

 $\overline{\text{EEA 3c}}$: What is the profile of Congressional reaction to voluntary preassignment. There is no evidence of Congressional reaction to the program thus far.

Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature Unabridged, March 1975 - Jan 1977. The H. W. Wilson Company, Vol. 75 - Vol. 77.

Air University Library Index to Military Periodicals, July - Sept 1976, Vol. 27, No 3; April - June 1976, Vol. 27, No. 2: January - March 1976, Vol. 27, No. 1; Air University Library, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL.

EEA 3d: What is the ratio of distribution of minority groups in the unit selected for preassignment? The distribution of preassignees by race and sex is found in two RCPAC reports - PRE 19, Race, Sex and State Distribution of VMP by Unit, and PRE 20, Race and Sex Distribution by State. These are both quarterly reports. The baseline data file contains copies prepared 15 November 1976. There are 15 women in eight units residing in 13 states. Eleven are caucasians and four are black. Since Phase I of the VMP program consists primarily of early deploying combat units, not many spaces were available to women. An analysis should be made when the VMP program is enlarged to determine if female participation has increased. A summary distribution by race among preassignees is shown in Table B-9 and Table B-10. The former displays the distribution or races in the VMP program and in each of the three components; the latter, the percentage of each race as they are represented in the total and in the three components.

EEA 3e: Does the voluntary preassignment system include provisions for preassignment of females although current regulations do not require them to serve in the IRR? Yes, females may volunteer for the VMP program.

EEA 3f: Is there any evidence of potential problems with respect to equality of treatment by race or sex? No evidence of potential problems is available at this time. Percentage distribution by race among preassignees is approximately that of distribution in the Active Army, USAR and ARNG. This is an item for investigation during the FY 78 IRR-APST Program.

d. <u>Subobjective 4:</u> <u>Determine the impact of voluntary preassignment</u> on Active Army and Reserve Component recruiting and retention.

EEA 4a: What percentage of personnel leaving the Active Army with an IRR obligation are volunteering for preassignment? Approximately 17% eligible personnel have volunteered for preassignment. However, 2% have not been assigned for reasons that include invalid MOS, invalid unit, no MOS vacancies and ineligibility. Transfer Activity personnel state that a small additional number would volunteer if their MOS were listed as qualifying. If this program is enlarged, a wider variety of MOS may become available. A memorandum prepared by ODCSPER, DAPE-PBP, Subject: Voluntary Preassignment Impact on RC Recruiting, 15 Sept 1976 discussing this subobjective area is included as Inclosure 4 to Annex B, p. B-61.

 $\underline{\text{EEA 4b}}$: What percentage of personnel leaving the Active Army with an IRR obligation are enlisting in the Reserve Components? ARNG? USAR? See Attitudes Category, Subobjective 4, Recruiting and Retention, EEA 4a, Current System.

Table B-9
Racial Distrubtion of Voluntary Preassignees In

Each Component and In Total Program (15 November 1976)

Race of Preassignees (%)	Race	of	Preassignees	(%)
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Component	Caucasian	Negro	Other	Unknown
Active Army	83.2	14.6	2.0	. 2
USAR	75.3	22.2	2.2	.3
ARNG	80.3	17.5	2.1	.1
Total Program	80.9	16.9	2.0	. 2

Table B-10

Distribution of Voluntary Preassignees

Among the Components By Race (15 November 1976)

Race of Preassignees (%)

Component	Preassignees (% of Total)	Caucasian	Negro	Other
Active Army	33.9	34.8	29.3	32.4
USAR	7.4	6.9	9.8	7.8
ARNG	58.7	58.3	60.9	59.8

- EEA 4c: What are the principal reasons given by unit preassignment volunteers for neither reenlisting in the Active Army nor enlisting in the Reserve Components? The data to answer this EEA and EEAs 4d, e, and f below are not available. This attitudinal area may be covered in the IRR-APST Survey.
- EEA 4d: What are the principal reasons given by voluntary preassignees for electing the voluntary preassignment program?
- EEA 4e: What are the principal reasons given by obligated personnel for not electing the voluntary preassignment program?
- EEA 4f: What proportion of IRR preassignees understand that preassignment is terminated on enlistment in the Reserve Components or reenlistment in the Active Army?
- $\overline{\text{EEA 4g}}$: What are the attitudes of key Active Army and Reserve Component unit personnel with respect to the impact of the voluntary preassignment system on recruiting and retention? The voluntary program is not currently seen as having a measurable impact on recruiting and retention. Therefore, data are not available to answer this EEA and the following CLQ 4g(1)-(4).
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 4g(1)}}$: What proportion of the key personnel questioned concluded that voluntary preassignment is adversely affecting recruiting and retention?
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 4g(2)}}$: What are the principal reasons for adverse effects cited by key personnel?
- $\underline{\text{CLQ 4g(3)}}$: What proportion of the key personnel conclude that voluntary preassignment has no impact on recruiting and retention?
- <u>CLQ 4g(4)</u>: What proportion of the key personnel conclude that voluntary preassignment has a favorable impact on recruiting and retention?

B-4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS CATEGORY

- a. <u>Subobjective 1</u>. <u>Determine inequities in the geographic distribution</u> of preassignees.
- EEA la: What is the geographic distribution of preassignees? The geographic distribution of voluntary preassignees is shown in Table B-11 with percentages of the total IRR and of total preassignees by residence location. There are preassignees from all fifty states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.

Table B-11

IRR and VMP Distribution By Location of Residence

VMP (%)		7.
TOTAL a/ IRR (%)	2 . 2 . 2	2.5
LOCATION OF RESIDENCE	New Jersey New Mexico New York North Carolina North Dakota Ohio Oklahoma Oregon Pennsylvania Rhode Island South Carolina South Dakota Tennessee Texas Utah Virginia Vermont Washington West Virginia Misconsin Wyoming Puerto Rico	OCCUNUS
VMP (%)	2	. r. c.
TOTAL a/ IRR (%)	1 1181	i ii ii
LOCATION OF RESIDENCE	Alaska Arkansas Arizona California Colorado Connecticut Delaware District of Columbia Florida Georgia Hawaii Idaho Illinois Indiana Iowa Kansas Kentucky Louisiana Maine Maryland Massachusetts Michigan Minesota Mississippi Mississippi Mississippi Missouri Montana Nebraska	Nevada New Hampshire

2/DCSPER - 46, Strength of the Army (U) Part III, 31 Dec 1976

_/RCPAC, PRE 20 Race and Sex Distributed by State, 13 Nov 1976 <u>CLQ la(1)</u>: What is the geographic distribution of the gaining units for preassignees (identified separately as to Active Army, Army National Guard or Army Reserve)? The location of the home stations/mobilization stations of units with preassignees by component is displayed in Table B-12, Mobilization Stations and Home Stations of Units Selected for Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment. Only the state is given for ARNG and USAR units since almost all are composed of smaller units in 5-50 different stations.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1a(2)}}$: What are the locations of the mobilization stations of units that do not deploy directly from home stations? At present, only the listed Active Army units deploy directly from home stations. (Table B-12)

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1a(3)}}$: Is distance one of the criteria by which preassignees are assigned? Under the present program, distance of individual's residence from his unit's mobilization or home station is not a criterion for preassignment.

EEA 1b: What is the impact of inequities in geographic locations? At full mobilization state constraints will not apply. Therefore, no state or locality will bear an inequitable burden of call-ups or casualties. Inequities in geographic location of preassignees may result in delayed arrival at mobilization stations, arrival of individuals at mobilization stations ahead of their units and excessive transportation costs.

 $\underline{\text{CLQ 1b(1)}}$: Does the geographic location of preassignees give rise to mobilization inequities? No, all preassignees and other IRR will be called up upon announcement of full mobilization.

CLQ 1b(2): Do inequities give rise to excessive and unnecessary cost? The distance a preassignee must travel to his ordered mobilization station has not been a limiting factor. The distances to be traveled by preassignees are shown in Table B-13, VMP Mileage Statistics, and Table B-14, Distribution of Preassignees by Distance Traveled to Mobilization Stations. Approximately half of the preassignees live within 600 miles of their reporting station. The computer program used at RCPAC to compute these distances employs a grid location system that gives a near maximum mileage traveled. The Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment Program mileage statistics are computed quarterly and show distance from preassignee's residence to mobilization station calculated as the sum of the North-South and East-West distances as follows:

Table B-12

Mobilization Stations and Home Stations of

Units Selected for Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment

UNIT	HOME STATION LOCATION	MOB STA LOCATION
ACTIVE ARMY		
1st Cav Div 2nd Armd Div 4th Inf Div 9th Inf Div 25th Inf Div 82nd Abn Div 101st Abn Div (Ambl) 194th Armd Bde 197th Inf Bde III Corps Arty XVIII Abn Corps Arty	Ft Hood, TX Ft Hood, TX Ft Carson, CO Ft Lewis, WA Schofield Bks, HT Ft Bragg, NC Ft Campbell, KY Ft Knox, KY Ft Benning, GA Ft Sill, OK Ft Bragg, NC	Ft Hood, TX Ft Hood, TX Ft Carson, CO Ft Lewis, WA Schofield Bks, HI Ft Bragg, NC Ft Campbell, KY Ft Knox, KY Ft. Benning, GA Ft Sill, OK Ft Bragg, NC
RESERVE COMPONENT DIV		
38th Inf Div (ARNG) 40th Mech Div (ARNG) 49th Armd Div (ARNG) 50th Armd Div (ARNG)	OH/MI/IN CA TX NJ/VT	Cp Grayling, MI Ft Irwin/Roberts, CA Ft Hood, TX Ft Drum, NY
RESERVE COMPONENT BDE		
30th Inf BDE (M) (ARNG) 31st Armd Bde (ARNG) 32nd Inf Bde (M) (ARNG) 107th Armd Cav Regt (ARNG) 116th Armd Cav 155th Armd Bde (ARNG) 157th Inf Bde (M) (USAR) 163rd Armd Cav Regt (ARNG) 218th Inf Bde (M) (ARNG)	NC AL WI OH ID/OR MS PA MT/NV SC	Ft Bragg, NC Cp Shelby, MS Ft McCoy, WI Cp Grayling, MI Gowen Field, ID Cp Shelby, MS Ft Pickett, VA Ft.Carson, CO Ft Stewart, GA
SEPARATE UNITS 201 Eng Bn (Cbt) (ARNG) 203 Eng Bn (Cbt) (Hvy) (ARNG) 223 Eng Bn (Cbt) (Hvy) (ARNG) 244 Eng Bn (Cbt) (Hvy) (USAR) 321 Eng Bn (Cbt) (USAR) 391 Eng Bn (Cbt) (USAR) 489 Eng Bn (Cbt) (USAR) 877 Eng Bn (Cbt) (Hvy) (ARNG) 878 Eng Bn (Cbt) (ARNG) 1457 Eng Bn (Cbt) (ARNG)	KY MO MS CO ID SC AR AL GA	Ft Campbell, KY Ft Riley, KS223 Eng Bn Ft Benning, GA Ft Carson, CO Ft Lewis, WA Ft Bragg, NC Ft Hood, TX Ft Rucker, AL Ft Stewart, GA Ft Carson, CO

Table B-12 (continued)

UNIT	HOME STATION LOCATION	MOB STA LOCATION
Artillery 4/17 FA Bn (8' SP) (USAR) 3/75 FA Bn (155 SP) (USAR) 3/83 FA Bn (155 SP) (USAR)	NC MO MS	Ft Bragg, NC Ft Sill, OK Ft Sill, OK
4/113 FA Bn (8" SP) (ARNG)	NC	Ft Bragg, NC
5/113 FA Bn (8" SP) (ARNG)	NC	Ft Bragg, NC
1/114 FA Bn (155 SP) (ARNG)	MS	Cp Shelby, MS
4/114 FA BN (155 SP) (ARNG)	MS	Cp Shelby, MS
1/147 FA Bn (155 SP) (ARNG) 2/157 FA Bn (8" SP) (ARNG) 1/158 FA Bn (8" SP) (ARNG)	SD CO OK	Ft Carson, CO Ft Carson, CO Ft Sill, OK
1/180 FA Bn (155 SP) (ARNG)	AZ	Ft Sill, OK
1/201 FA Bn (155 SP) (ARNG)	WV	Ft Pickett, VA
2/222 FA Bn (155 SP) (ARNG)	UT	Ft Lewis, WA
1/623 FA BN (8" SP) (ARNG)	KY	Cp Shelby, MS
Signal		
99th Sign Bn (OP) (USAR)	NY	Ft Bragg, NC
146th Sign Bn (OP) (USAR)	FL	Ft Campbell, KY
Special Forces		
1st Bn, 11 SFG (USAR)	NY	Ft Bragg, NC
1st BN, 20 SFG (ARNG)	AL	Ft Bragg, NC

71.77			1 1 1 - 20 0			1.7:-1.		TOTAL DESTRUCT TOTAL TOTAL CONTROLS TOTAL	17-11-17	• 3
ANNIE CO 1ST CAV EIV	1000	3118	0123	37.17	1334	2622	2636	5016	0011	2000
10414 30 242 A945 DIV	0001	77.33	6118	2233	0001	0018	2033	2002	2900	3004
ADMIN OG 4TH INF EIV	1027	\$535	0.18	2730	:130	1201	0123	5039	1700	6004
114 11 CO 014 115 111	1000	2800	92 v 0	3.30	\$200	0.643	9034	2020	1034	0100
THE STA SPEC FORCES	1000	0000	9001	\$0:3	9::0	1000	0000	2000	0001	v060
HHC 20TH SPEC FORCES	0001	20.02	1010	2002	6000	5000	0005	5663	5962	7000
ABEIN OG SETH INF DIV	5013	0106	6615	9115	9944	9100	0100	5000	0100	5625
VI - 404 - 414 - 414	3014	0162	5865	K 01	0087	2233	2030	0115	.237	0405
ADMIN CO 40TH ARME DIV	6.50	1603	2200	2.86	2043	0068	6300	1200	1500	2700
ATOUTY TO SETH BAPE ETV	9702	9085	2233	9510	0047	0028	2500	6200	6700	0042
10-11 CC 8215 AB1 DIV	700	6024	5143	07.0	9600	0023	0100	2005	5100	0017
NG 551 SC 9N	1:00	2366	2000	2710	0010	0000	1.00	1000	0000	0000
ADVIN CO 1915T ABN 21V	0016	0.037	1510	0140	6673	5505	8000	5003	2000	9100
4HC 30TH 11F BRE	6100	9500	57.0	2035	0021	9000	2003	0000	9000	0000
THE JIST ARMS BEE	0.000	9016	0.21	2700	0013	5565	4000	5000	1000	
HHC 124.0 14F 80F	5000	9614	9243	0.40	0051	0.024	2000	9000	0010	0000
THE SOT ARMD CAV REST	1000	2300	07.23	0000	9038	0100	9000	2000	0000	0166
LHC 116 4840 CAV 9867	8500	2300	2000	9	8000	4500	C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1 C 1	1012	0015	9000
16 SC 84	9000	9000	9528	79.0	0035	0026	2000	1004	1000	0000
THE 155TH ARYD BEE	5000	0022	11,00	5110	2005	3000	5600	2001	0000	0000
THE 197TH I'VE BEE	0037	2697	9213	2772	0041	7100	6000	2000	0000	5002
-HC 163 ABUD CAV PECT	0010	4000	80 v 0	0.22	0048	2230	6250	0000	0.016	0001
Pre 2044 4740 PTE	6200	9040	2000	0176	9500	3500	9000	6000	0 0 1 7	7000
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NHC 321 EN BY	5000	+006	6950	0110	9000	0100	5005	2005	9000	7203
HHC 391 EN B"	2000	2000	1000	9000	5000	1000	9556	0000	0000	
HC 489 EV B.	1:00	1300	9911	0011	9000	0.000	1100	2000	6000	
HE 87774 ENSR BN	2000	King	5343	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	0000	
HHC 878TH 5159 BY	0	2503	5000	1000	0002	1000	6330	0000	0000	
KHC 1457 EN BV	0.00	5000	2010	8000	5000	2800	0000	1013	0013	2000
ьне 4/17 FA av.	1000	7500	2005	0003	5000	0002	1000	5000	0001	2323
HH 3775 FA 9%	2200		1050	8000	>000	6000	9000	2000	1000	.303
AND 3783 FA BY		2300	2000	0014	9000	2000	3005	0002	0000	:::3
HHS 4/113 FA BN	10:2	0011	0.07	0012	2024	0000	1690	2005	0000	2346
HE 5/113 FA BY	4000	27.0	2000	1000	9000	0001	0000	0000	1000	2330
240 17114 FA BN		1000	0000	0 100	7	\$ U.S.L.	1000	0000	2220	
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HP 2/157 FA 91	1000	1000	5965	9000	1101	0033	0012	2000	2000	6300
KH9 1/158 FA BN	1000	6000	0607	0015	2000	0050	9000	9000	7000	
THE 1/180 FA 84	3053	2000	9000	9011	\$ 0 0 û	2000	8000	0000	2000	- 16.
HHG 1/201 FA BY		2300	00.00	2527	2.	22	0000	2000	3390	5.1.
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Table 8-13 (continued)

Table B-13 (continued)

		41-160	171-300	302-500	101-300 301-500 001-001	40111200	1201-1500	1901-1601	1901-2100	401-1200 1201-1500 1501-1606 1901-2100 2100-
-HE 1/623 FA BV	3365	60.5	10,0	7000	* ::::	0000	0000	90.52	0000	:033
SAND-TOTALS	5341	1360	1270	1117	6000	7567	9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	0434	0210	800
Percent	0.6	10.6	15.0	19.1	12.7	11.2	6.9	5.1	0.0	9.4
Cumulative Percent	4.0	14.6	29.6	48.7	66.4	72.6	79.5	84.6	90.06	100.0


Table B-14

Distribution of Preassignees By Distance Traveled To Mobilization Stations

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Note: All VMP and units are included in the total. Units listed are those with > 100 preassignees.

Distance from A (residence) to B (mobilization station) equals AC plus CB. 15



The actual distances traveled, whether by commercial or private vehicle, will probably be more direct and less lengthy and time-consuming. On the other hand, certain units have consistently attracted personnel from remote locations. Examples are units on the west coast and airborne units. As the system is refined and monitored, the access to any unit can be limited if desired to avoid such preassignments. The motivation for choice of a unit is not known at this time but should be probed in the IRR-APST Survey. Since personnel know only the name of the unit, that it requres their primary MOS, the location of its mobilization station and whether it is Active Army, ARNG or USAR, the reasons for choice are limited (discounting personal experience or hearsay knowledge of the unit). Preassignees are not distributed in a unit in the same proportion as the national distribution of the entire IRR, and a statistically significant sample have chosen units close to their intended residence. There are a few examples of excessive travel - individuals, for example, with orders to travel from New Hampshire and Florida to Fort Lewis, and from Arizona and California to Fort Drum. Units that report to home stations and then move to mobilization stations (RC units) are faced with travel requirements equal to or, in a few cases, exceeding those of individual preassignees. Three-fourths are within 600 miles of their mobilization station but many units with preassignees must move great distances. Examples are the 1/180 FA Battalion which moves from Mesa, Arizona, to Fort Sill, Oklahoma, (980 miles), the 2/222 FA Battalion which moves from 6 different Utah home stations to Fort Lewis, Washington, (<1000 miles) and the 2/252 Armd Battalion which moves from 5 North Carolina locations to Fort Hood, Texas, (< 1200 miles).

<u>CLQ 1b(3)</u>: Do inequities in distribution give rise to excessive and unnecessary cost? The inequities in distribution cited above may give rise to excessive and unnecessary cost.

CLQ 1b(4): Do inequities impact on timeliness of filler arrival? Except for the cases of units and personnel discussed in CLQ 1b(2), most preassignees should arrive at approximately the same time or before their units. The exception might be those assigned to spaces required for early deploying Active Army units (not their RC round-out or affiliated units). These are principally officers. The small number of spaces available to officers has resulted in their selection of a unit without regard to mobilization station and most reside lorg distances from their reporting station (per RCPAC Report PRE-10, UIC Assigned Personnel Roster).

¹⁵ Routing and Transmittal Slip from H. R. Ludden, DAPE - PBP to Litton's Mr. Hobson 19 January 1977.

- b. Subobjective 2: Determine the extent of potential compromise of classified mobilization information.
- $\overline{\text{EEA 2a}}$: What is the extent of compromise of classified mobilization information? No cases of compromise of classified information have been identified.
- EEA 2b: What activities create the situation for potential compromise? Within the context of the current policies and procedures for operation of the VMP system, the activities do not appear to endanger national security.
- CLQ 2b(1): Is publicity on the volunteer program or MOBEX-76 in the news media and official releases responsible for compromise? No compromises have been identified. It would appear that implementation of an involuntary preassignment program with possible objections and complaints by members of the IRR would create a greater security risk than the current situation.

VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT ORIENTATION

The program to be discussed is designed to enhance the Army's ability to mobilize its personnel during a National Emergency. At the present time it is voluntary; however in the near future all individuals in the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) will be preassigned to various type units of the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG), and the US Army Reserve (USAR).

This program has been developed to give those of you who do not intend to join a Reserve Component unit the opportunity to select, in advance, a unit that you would prefer to serve with in the event of full mobilization. This is a program that offers a great deal of flexibility to the individual.

A. Advantages.

- (1) Unit of choice. The member gets to pick the unit with which he/she prefers to serve in the event of full mobilization. He/she receives orders in advance, which lets you know where and when to report. He does not take the change of "luck of the draw".
- (2) Under current regulations certain members of the IRR are subject to mandatory assignment to a reserve unit. Volunteers for this program are exempt from this requirement.
- (3) Certain members of the IRR are also subject to mandatory annual training (two weeks summer camp). Volunteers are exempt from this requirement.
- (4) Preassigned members can volunteer for two (2) weeks annual training with the preassigned units, and their request will be honored, if possible.

B. Disadvantages.

- (1) Reporting to the unit earlier than a non-volunteer. Normally, ten (10) to sixty (60) days.
- (2) In the event of a partial mobilization, a call up by the President, you would not be exempt, if you volunteer for this program.

C. Options.

- (1) Members who join ARNG or USAR units will automatically terminate from the voluntary preassignments.
- (2) The member may withdraw from the program at anytime prior to the date of mobilization alert notification.

Inclosure 1 to Annex B - Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment Orientation

D. Restrictions.

- (1) Preassignment is authorized only to specified units that have been identified for this program.
- (2) Members residing in CONUS can only be preassigned to CONUS based units, and members residing in Hawaii can only be preassigned to Hawaii based units.
 - E. Reserve Officers can be Preassigned to Active Army Units Only.

A form and listing of selected units for voluntary mobilization preassignment will be provided for you to designate your preference or, if you prefer, you may decline to volunteer for a unit.

- A. If you elect a unit, complete the first part of the Agreement/Preference to include the unit, signature, name, grade, SSN, and date.
- B. If you do not elect to volunteer for this program, complete the last part of the Agreement/Preference, signature, name, grade, SSN, and date.

This form is part of your separation documents, it must be completed for your final clearance. Place your roster number in the upper right hand corner.

Do you have any questions?

Please pass the completed forms to the center isle.

Now pass the listing of units to the center isle.

SAMPLE COPY, PREASSIGNMENT/REFUSAL FORM

VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT

For use of this form see AR 635-10; the proponent agency is RCPAC

Voluntary mobilization preassignment to an Active Army, Army National Guard or Army Reserve unit has been developed to give you the opportunity to select, in advance, a unit you would prefer to serve with in the event of full mobilization. Preassignment is applicable only for a full mobilization and has no bearing during a partial mobilization. Preassigned members of the IRR will report to their preassigned unit only during a full mobilization. All members of the IRR including preassigned members will continue to be eligible for mobilization with any unit during a partial mobilization.

Voluntary mobilization preassignment does not require attendance at unit training or annual active duty for training. Preassigned members will not be required to perform mandatory active duty for training. Preassigned members may volunteer for active duty for training and their requests will be honored when possible.

Reserve officers can be preassigned to Active Army units only. Reserve enlisted members can be preassigned to Active Army, Army National Guard or Army Reserve units. Voluntary preassignment may be terminated at any time prior to mobilization alert at the request of the member or due to a change in status which would preclude preassignment. Preassigned members will be required to report to their mobilization assignment within a specified period of not less than 10 days after announcement of a full mobilization.

This form is provided for you to designate your preference. If you volunteer for preassignment, the Commander, US Army Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC), will provide you with preassignment orders approximately 4 to 6 weeks after your release from active duty.

AGR	EEMENT/PREFERENCE	
I elect voluntary mobilization preassignmen	t to the following unit:	
I understand that in the event of full mobilizat with my preassignment orders; I will not be required for training; my mobilization preassignment is a of my obligation during a partial mobilization; any time up to the date of mobilization alert.	rired to participate in unit training or mapplicable to a full mobilization only and	mandatory active duty lit does not relieve me.
(Signature)	(Name, Grade, SSN)	(Date)
I do not desire voluntary mobilization prea I will be mobilized and assigned in accordance w during my obligated service in the Ready Reserve and to mandatory annual training in accordance w	rith the needs of the service at that time of am subject to mandatory assignment to	. I understand that
(Signature)	(Name, Grade, SSN)	(Date)
NAME OF TRANSFER ACTIVITY:		

1 Feb 76 4489

VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT

A. RECAP TOTAL AUTHORIZED AND ASSIGNED STRENGTH

	Аитн		ASSIGNED	
-	1 Ост+	Ост	Nov	
OFF	370	138	140	
ENL	12,068	8429	8724	
TOT	12,438	8567	8864	


B. NR MOS's OVERFILLED


	NR MOS'S	NR 1105's OVERFILLED		
	15 MAR	Ост	Nov	
OFF	43	5	5	
ENL	113	56	56	
TOT	156	61	61	

C. NR MOS'S HAVING NO FILL

	NR MOS'S AUTH	NR MOS'S HAVING NO FILL		
	15 MAR	Ост	Nov	
OFF	43	30	29	
ENL	113	17	15	
TOT	156	47	114	

*DELETED 1 BN 111 FA (48 SPACES)





MOS	<u>EM</u>
81A	General Draftsman
82 C	Artillery Surveyor
84B	Still Photographer
84G	Photographic Laboratory Spec
91S	Preventive Medicine Spec
95B	MP
96B	Intelligence Analyst
96 <u>D</u>	Image Interpreter
56	TOTAL

Officer Overages

MOS	OFF
0600	Motor Off
2010	Chief of Staff
3170	General Dentistry Off
3530	Patient Admin Off
4010	Supply Staff Off (G4, S4)
5	TOTAL

ENLISTED OVERAGES

1:05	EM	MOS	<u>EM</u>
02E	Trombone Player	63G	Fuel & Electrical Systems Repairman
05B	Radio Operator	63J	QM Light Equip Repairman
05E	Voice-Radio Operator	64C	
05 F	Radio TT Oper (Non Morse)		Motor Transport Operator
112	Maneuver Combat Arms Sgt	67V	OH-6/OH-58 Helicopter Repairman
12 C	Bridge Spec	71B	Clerk-Typist
12E	Atenic Demolitions Munitions Spec	71D	Legal Clerk
13E	Field Artillery Cannon Operations/	/1F	Fostal Clerk
	Fire Direction Assistant	71G	Medical Records Spec
15F	Honest John Rocket Crevian	71L	Ad ifn Spec
16H	Air Defense Arty Operations & Intel	71M	Chaplain's Asst
	Assistant	71N	Movements Spec
31 J	TT Repairman	71Q	Information Spec
31M	Radio Relay & Carrier Attendant	72 C	Telephone Switchboard Oper
35N	Avionic Flight Control Equipment	72E	Telecommunications Center Spec
36G	Manual Central Office Repairson	/3C	rinance Spec
41C	Fire Control Instrument Repairn	74D	ADPS Machine Operations Spec
45B	Small Arms Repairman	75C	Personnel Management Spec
51B	Carpenter	75D	Personnel Record Spec
51 R	Electrican	75E	Personnel Actions Spec
52B	Power Generation Equip Oper/Mech	76P	Stock Control & Acct Spec
52 D	Power Generation Equip Repairman	76V	Equip Storage Spec
54E	Chemical Staff Spec	76X	Subsistence Storage Spec
55B	Assumition Storage & Operations Spec		
62B	Eng Equip Repairs an	76 Y	Arzerer/Unit Supply Spec
63B	Wheel Vehicle Mech	162	Senior Supply Sergeant

MOS	<u>EM</u>
00H	Enlisted Aide
02C	Estitone or Euphonium Player
02L	Saxophone Player
02 M	Percussion Player
02N	Piano Player
05C	Radio Teletypewriter Cartator
31E	Field Radio Repairman
312	Area Communication Chief
35E	Special Electrical Devices Repairman
45M	Aircraft Armament Subsystem Mechanic
51J	Heating & Ventilating Spec
67W	Helicopter Technical Inspector
76Q	Special Purpose Equip Repair Parts Spec
82A	Rodman & Tapeman
94Z	Food Service Supervisor
15	TOTAL.

(over)

MOS	<u>EM</u>	MOS	<u>EM</u>
02 B	Cornet or Trumpet Player	67Y	AH-1G Helicopter Repairman
118	Light Weapons Infantry	68B	Aircraft Turbine Eng Repair
110	Infantry Indirect Fire Crewman	71E	Court Reporter
110	Armor Recon Spec	76D	Military Supplyman
11E	Armor Crewman	76W	Petroleum Storage Spec
12B	Combat Engineer	91B	Medical Spec
12F	Combat Engineer Tracked Vehicle	93F	Ballistic Netorology Crawman
120	Crewman	94B	Cook
13B	Field Artillery Crewman	32	TOTAL
16F	Light Air Defense Arty Crewman		
17B	Counter Battery/Counter Motar Radar		
17K	Ground Surveillance Radar Crewman		
26C	Combat Area Surveillance Radar Repairman		
31N	Tactical Circuit Controller		
36C	Lineman		
36K	Field Wireman		
51A	Construction & Util Worker		
51K	Plumber		
54A	Chamical Operations Apprentice		
62E	Crawler Tractor Operator		
62F	Crane Operator		
62M	Rough Terrain Forklift & Loader Opera	tor	
63C	Track Vehicle Mechanic		
63H	Automotive Repairman		
67N	UH-1 Helicopter Repairman		

(over)

OFFICER 0-MOS FILL

Mos	OFF	MOS	OFF
0002	General Officer	7881	Radio Frequency Eng Off
0609	Highway Transport Planning Off	9100	Provost Marshall
0660	Highway Transport Off	9110	MP Off
0692	Transportation Off	911A	Military Physician's Asst
1003	Rotary Wing Pilot, obsn util, 1t cgo	9305	Psychological Operations Off
100E	Rotary Wing Pilot, Attack	29	TOTAL
100G	Pilot, OH-58		
1010	Combat Signal Unit Commander		
2030	Aide-de-Camp		
2260	Personnel Staff Officer (Gl, Sl)		
3000	Medical Staff Officer		
3005	Preventive Medicine Off		
3160	Aviation Medical Off		
3340	Optometry Off		
3445	Anesthetist		
3590	Health Sves Material Off		
4011	Maintenance Staff Off		
4200	Supply & Service Off		
4201	Supply Management Off		
4803	Maintenance Off		
4815	Mechanical Maintenance Off		
6100	F&A Off		
711A	Unit Personnel Technician		
741C	Data Processing Technician, ADPS		

MOS	OFF
2162	Operations & Training Staff Officer (G3, S3)
3100	General Medical Officer
3112	Dermatologist
3139	Internist
3150	General Surgeon
3153	Orthopedic Surgeon
3506	Field Medical Assistant
8103	Judge Advocate or Judge Advocate Ceneral
9301	Tactical Intelligence Staff Officer (G2, S2)
9	TOTAL

28 APR 76

PY,

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

NMENT ORDERS

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63132 SAMPLE COPY, INDIVIDUAL PREASSIGNMENT ORDERS

ORDERS 04-450005 AGUZ-RCPD-MP

1LT 0600 TC ANNUAL TRAINING

GRAVEL JOHN C 608-38-2104 17 DUCHESS AVE S BURLINGTON VT 05401

EFFECTIVE UPON DECLARATION OF FULL MOBILIZATION YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AND ASSIGNED AS INDICATED BELOW. THE NEWS MEDIA WILL ANNOUNCE FULL MOBILIZATION. YOU WILL PROCEED FROM YOUR CURRENT LOCATION TO THE REPORTING STATION SPECIFIED BELOW.

RELIEVED FROM: USAR CONTROL GROUP ANNUAL TRAINING

ASSIGNED TO: HHC 194TH ARMD BDE FT KNOX KY 40

KY 40121

AUTHORITY: 10 USC 672 (A)
PURPOSE: PREMOBILIZATION PROCESSING

REPORTING DATE: WITHIN 15 DAYS OF FULL MOBILIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT REPORTING STATION: HHC 194TH ARMD BDE

SEE REVERSE SIDE. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: DO NOT REPORT AT THIS TIME. FORMAT: 181 KY 40121 FT KNOX

TAG, RCPAC OFFICIAL

ROBERT S. YOUNG BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA COMMANDING

DISTRIBUTION: 114

Inclosure 3 to Annex B - Sample Copy Individual Preassignment Orders

SAMPLE COPY, INDIVIDUAL PREASSIGNMENT ORDERS

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: ASSIGNMENT AND REPORTING DATE IS EFFECTIVE ONLY UPON ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF A FULL MOBILIZATION THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA. IF THE MOBILIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A FULL MOBILIZATION, OR, IF YOU ARE IN DOUBT, YOU MAY OBTAIN VERIFICATION FROM THIS CENTER BY TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH. TELEPHONE: AREA CODE (314) 268-7428. TELEGRAPH: CDR, RCPAC

ATTN: AGUZ-RCPD-PMT 9700 PAGE BLVD ST. LOUIS, MO 63132 SETTLEMENT OF TRAVEL ALLOWANCES DUE YOU WILL BE MADE AT THE REPORTING STATION. PERSONNEL WITHOUT FUNDS MAY APPLY FOR TRANSPORTATION AT THE NEAREST MILITARY INSTALLATION PROVIDED THIS ACTION DOES NOT DELAY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE ORDERS. MOVEMENT OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THESE ORDERS.

AS A PREASSIGNED MEMBER YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN TRAINING WITH YOUR PREASSIGNED UNIT NOR ARE YOU REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANNUAL ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING. IF YOU DESIRE TO VOLUTNARILY PARTICIPATE WITH YOUR PREASSIGNED UNIT, YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE UNIT COMMANDER AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN AS THE "ASSIGNED TO" UNIT ON YOUR ORDERS. THESE ORDERS WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR THE DURATION OF YOUR PREASSIGNMENT OR UNTIL CANCELLED BY PROPER AUTHORITY. THIS VOLUNTARY PREASSIGNMENT MAY BE CANCELLED AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION ALERT UPON YOUR REQUEST. A CHANGE IN STATUS SUCH AS TRANSFER TO THE STANDBY RESERVE CONTROL GROUP, ASSIGNMENT TO A ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OR ARMY RESERVE UNIT, OR DISCHARGE AUTOMATICALLY WILL CANCEL THIS PREASSIGNMENT.

SANPLE COPY,

INDIVIDUAL PREASSIGNMENT ORDERS

OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63132

ORDERS 05-451175 AGUZ-RCPD-MP

12 MAY 76

WESTON ALAN G 001-40-3524 32 BOULDER DR LONDONDERRY NH 03053

ANNUAL TRAINING 63B10 SP4

EFFECTIVE UPON DECLARATION OF FULL MOBILIZATION YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY AND ASSIGNED AS INDICATED BELOW. THE NEWS MEDIA WILL ANNOUNCE FULL MOBILIZATION. YOU WILL PROCEED FROM YOUR CURRENT LOCATION TO THE REPORTING STATION SPECIFIED BELOW.

RELIEVED FROM: USAR CONTROL GROUP ANNUAL TRAINING ASSIGNED TO: ADMIN CO 40TH MECH DIV CP ROBERTS CA93541

SEE REVERSE SIDE. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: DO NOT REPORT AT THIS TIME.

FORMAT: 181

TAG, RCPAC OFFICIAL

ROBERT S. YOUNG
BRIGADIER GENERAL, USA
CONMANDING

DISTRIBUTION: H4

SAMPLE COPY, INDIVIDUAL PREASSIGNMENT ORDERS

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: ASSIGNMENT AND REPORTING DATE IS EFFECTIVE ONLY UPON ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF A FULL MOBILIZATION THROUGH THE NEWS MEDIA. IF THE MOBILIZATION ANNOUNCEMENT DOES NOT IDENTIFY A FULL MOBILIZATION, OR, IF YOU ARE IN DOUBT, YOU MAY OBTAIN VERIFICATION FROM THIS CENTER BY TELEPHONE OR TELEGRAPH. TELEPHONE: AREA CODE (314) 268-7428. TELEGRAPH: CDR, RCPAC CDR, RCPAC

ATTN: AGUZ-RCPD-PMT 9700 PAGE BLVD

ST. LOUIS, MO 63132

SETTLEMENT OF TRAVEL ALLOWANCES DUE YOU WILL BE MADE AT THE REPORTING STATION. PERSONNEL WITHOUT FUNDS MAY APPLY FOR TRANSPORTATION AT THE NEAREST MILITARY INSTALLATION PROVIDED THIS ACTION DOES NOT DELAY COMPLIANCE WITH THESE ORDERS. MOVEMENT OF DEPENDENTS AND SHIPMENT OF HOUSEHOLD GOODS IS NOT AUTHORIZED UNDER THESE

AS A PREASSIGNED MEMBER YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN TRAINING WITH YOUR PREASSIGNED UNIT NOR ARE YOU REQUIRED TO PARTICIPATE IN ANNUAL ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING. IF YOU DESIRE TO VOLUNTARILY PARTICIPATE WITH YOUR PREASSIGNED UNIT, YOU SHOULD CONTACT THE UNIT COMMANDER AT THE ADDRESS SHOWN AS THE "ASSIGNED TO" UNIT ON YOUR ORDERS.

AUTHROITY. THIS VOLUNTARY PREASSIGNMENT MAY BE CANCELLED AT ANY TIME PRIOR TO MOBILIZATION ALERT UPON YOUR REQUEST. A CHANGE IN STATUS SUCH AS TRANSFER TO THE STANDBY RESERVE CONTROL GROUP, ASSIGNMENT TO A ARMY NATIONAL GUARD OR ARMY RESERVE UNIT, OR DISCHARGE AUTOMATICALLY WILL CANCEL THIS PREASSIGNMENT. THESE ORDERS WILL REMAIN IN EFFECT FOR THE DURATION OF YOUR PREASSIGNMENT OR UNTIL CANCELLED BY PROPER

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY SAMPLE COPY, INDIVIDUAL ADT ORDERS

U.S. ARMY RESERVE COMPONENTS PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION CENTER OFFICE OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI 63132

ORDERS T-07-10672 AGUZ-PMT-TA

20 JULY 1976

YPSILANTI, MI 48197 WILLIAM E. BURGESS 640 GILL

236 80 3325 SP4 11B1U USAR CON GP (REINF)

YOU ARE ORDERED TO ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING (ADT) FOR THE PERIOD INDICATED. UPON COMPLETION OF THE PERIOD OF ADT, UNLESS SOONER RELIEVED OR EXTENDED BY PROPER AUTHORITY, YOU WILL RETURN TO THE PLACE WHERE YOU ENTERED ADT AND BE RELIEVED FROM SUCH DUTY.

PERIOD: 16 DAYS PLUS ALLOWABLE TRAVEL TIME.

REPORT TO: SAME AS ATTACHED TO

REPORTING DATE: BETWEEN 0730 AND 0800 HOURS 31 JUL 76 ATTACHED TO: HHC 38TH INF DIV CAMP GRAYLING MI 49738

PURPOSE: ACTIVE DUTY FOR TRAINING

ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS: TRAVEL BY PRIVATELY OWNED VEHICLE AUTHORIZED PROVIDED IT DOES NOT INTERFERE WITH REPORTING DATE. EER REQUIRED.

AUTH: 10 USC 672 (d) FOR ARMY USE

SCTY CLNC: NA

ACCT CLAS: 21 2070 11-7 00 P3224-1100-1210 P3229.1-2190 (Tv1) P3229.2-2190 (P/D) S23185 MOS/SSI: 11B1U HOR: NA

FOR THE COMMANDER: FORWAT: 260

MAJ, GS: ASST ADJUTANT M.K. MALABEY

DISTRIBUTION: DI PLUS 2-CDR HHC 38TH INF DIV CAMP GRAYLING, MI 49738 1-IAG STATE OF INDIANA MIL DEPRT OF INDIANA STOUT FIELD INDIANAPOLIS IN 46241 FM 2166-4

AGUZ FL 1 JUL 76

Replaces AGUS FL 253a, 1 Dec 74, and AGUZ FL 253b, 1 Jan 75, which are obsolete.

SUBJECT: Voluntary Preassignment Impact on RC Recruiting

- 1. Evaluation of all available information indicates that the Voluntary Preassignment Program is not having any negative impact on recruitment of prior service personnel into Reserve Component units.
- 2. COL K. C. Randle, Chief, Recruiting & Retention Branch, OCAR, told the undersigned by phone 5 Aug 76 that there was no impact provided balanced briefings of the various reserve programs were presented at the Transfer Points. This same observation was also made by Reserve Component Career Counsellors at the Transfer Points at Forts Dix and Jackson.
- 3. SGM Graeve of NGB Recruiting Office reported on 5 Aug 76 that none of the 53 NCB Recruiting and Retention Officers throughout the United States has reported any negative impact from the Preassignment Program.
- 4. Analysis of 1975-76 data from the Transfer Points at Forts Dix and Jackson and Oakland Army Base indicates that since the start of Voluntary Preassignment in March 1976 assignment of personnel to Reserve Component Units has continued at the same rate as before the program was started. (See Inclosure 1) Although not related to Preassignment, this data shows the possibility that recruitment of personnel for RC units may be restricted by excessive work-load pressure on facilities and personnel at Forts Dix and Jackson during surge periods of out-processing large numbers of separatees.

H. R. LUDDEN


Mobilization Plans Officer


Inclosure 4 to Annex B - Voluntary Preassignment Impact on RC Recruiting


VOLUNTARY PREASSIGNMENT AND ASSIGNMENT OF FERSONNEL TO RESERVE COMPONENT UNITS, 1975-76, FORTS DIX AND JACKSON, AND OAKLAND ARMY BASE


- 1. Data provided by the Transfer Points at Forts Dix and Jackson and Oakland Army Base have been processed and are displayed in Figures 1-4.
- 2. Figure 1 shows the combined data from all three Transfer Points. Section A shows the fluctuating monthly totals of separatees eligible for assignment to RC units, and Section B shows the number of separatees assigned to RC units during the out-processing at the Transfer Points. Comparison of the two curves indicates that peaks and valleys generally coincide in time, however, the percentage of eligibles assigned to RC units fluctuates in a relative narrow range as indicated by the bottom curve in Section C. This percentage in turn appears to be influenced by the percentage of eligibles that are interviewed by the Reserve Component Career Counsellers, shown in the top curve of Section C.
- 3. Examination of the actual levels of the curves in Figure 1 show a gradual increase in the numbers assigned to RC units and a gradual rise in the percent of eligibles being assigned. Comparison of the March-July 1976 period, since the start of the Voluntary Freassignment Program, with the March-July 1975 period indicates that both the number and percent of eligibles assigned to RC units are higher in the 1976 period.
- 4. Figures 2-4 show the data for each of the Transfer Points individually and also include data on the Voluntary Preassignment Program.
- 5. The Oakland data in Figure 2 shows the dramatic results of personnel and procedural changes between June and July 1975 which resulted in a jump in the rate of interviewing eligible personnel from approximately 20% to a rate of around 80%. This in turn appears to have more than doubled the percentage of eligibles assigned to RC units from 7% or loss to approximately 20%. It should be noted that Oakland processes only about 1/10 as many separatees as does Ft Dix and 1/5 as many as Jackson. Thus, Oakland rarely processes more than 20 eligibles in any given day and is, therefore, able to interview practically all except those who arrive at odd hours of the day or chose who miss the interview sessions while receiving physical exams. Comparisons between the Mar-Jul 75 and 76 periods are difficult to interpret because of the drastic change between June and July 1975. However, Oakland has achieved its highest percent of eligibles being assigned to RC units during the period since the start of preassignment.
- 6. The data from Dix and Jackson, Figures 3 and 4, are quite similar to each other as well as to the combined data in Figure 1 of which they make up such a great portion. It Dix shows an apparent restriction on recruiting for RC units because of over-loading of facilities during

peak months—peaks in the number of eligible separatees processed tend to be matched by valleys in the percentage of eligibles interviewed by RC Career Counsellors. This in turn apparently causes a drop in the percent of eligibles assigned to RC units. A similar but less pronounced relationship appears in the Jackson data. It Jackson, averaging about 1 the number of eligible separatees that It Dix handles, achieves slightly higher percentages of eligibles interviewed and assigned to RC units. (Note: The number of eligible separatees was not available at Jackson for January-April 1975, so estimates were used. The dotted lines on Figure 4 indicate the portions of the curves affected by those estimates and should be used with caution. The numbers of preassignment volunteers at Jackson could not be fitted into the scale used in Section B and are as follows: March — 60; April — 182; May — 233; June — 460; July — 394.)









ANNEX C

BASELINE DATA COLLECTED AND DATA
STILL REQUIRING COLLECTION,
CURRENT IRR MOBILIZATION SYSTEM

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Current IRR Mobilization System

Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	18,50	Holding	Evaluation Evaluation	Evaluation Evaluation OF THE STATE OF THE	2.00	Data Elements Required
Category 1						
READTNESS						
Subobjective 1						
Plexibility &						
Adaptallility	×					
Est 1.a.	×		×	×		
CLQ 1.a.(1)	X			×		
(2)			X	X		
(3)			×		×	IRR residual strength by MOS/grade (assets not required for units)
(4)	×				×	Filler requirements by OPLAN
REA 1.b.		X	X	×		
CLQ 1.b.(1)			Х	×		
(2)			X	X		
(3)		×		×		
(4)			х	×		
(5)		X	×	×		
EEA 1.c.	X	Х	Х		×	Time to divert or reassign IRR, post mobilization
CLQ 1.c.(1)			X	X		
(2)			X	×		
(3)		×			×	No. of orders changed, post mobilization
(4)		X			×	Time between initiation/receipt, changed orders

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*See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ. **Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation. Key:

1 * critical to comparative evaluation
2 * helpful to comparative evaluation but not critical
3 * required for detailed description of concept

**			1	Evaluation	tion	1	
	Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	19.77 to	Todars	84.5. C.	67.50	1 *.	
	Subobjective 2						
XXX XX XX XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X	Readiness	×					
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 2.a.	×				Х	Personnel REDCON of units
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	CLQ 2.a.(1)	X				X	Unit's assigned strength & authorized strength before & after receiving IRR fillers
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	(2)	×				X	Unit's authorized operating strength MOS qualified, both before & after receiving fillers
X	-		×		×		
X XX XX X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X		×				X	Personnel REDCON of units
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x		X				X	Number of nondeployable IRR
X	(2)			Х		X	Reasons for nondeployability
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	(3)	X				×	Number of IRR not MOS qualified for their assignment
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	(4)	Х				×	Number of fillers required by unit after receiving IRR
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	(5)			Х	X		
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	_			X	X		
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 2.c.	X				X	Unit operating strength nondeployable, before & after fillers report
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	CLQ 2.c.(1)	×				X	Unit operating strength POR qualified before & after fillers report
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	Subobjective 3						
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	of IRR	×					
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 3.a.			×	×		
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 3.b.		x		×	×	Specific IRR requirements by OPLAN
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 3.c.	X			X	×	Specific IRR requirements
T X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	Subobjective 4 IRR Availability		×				
×××× ××××	EEA 4.a.		×	×	×	×	IRR availability rate
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	Subobjective 5 Timeliness of IRR Arrival	×					
5.b. x x x x x x x x 5.c. x x x x x x 5.d. (1) x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x	EEA 5.a.	×				×	Number of IRR fillers expected to arrive at home/mobilization station on or before date specified
5.c. X X X X X 5.d. X X X X 5.d. (1) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	EEA 5.b.	×				×	Number of fillers expected to arrive at mobilization stations late
5.d. (1) X X X X X S.d. (1) X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	EEA 5.c.			×		×	Principal reasons for late arrivals
S.d.(1) X X X	EEA S.d.	×		×		×	Predicted average delay imposed on fillers by processing at mobilization stations
	CLQ 5.d.(1)			×		×	Principal causes for delay at mobilization stations

*See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Current IRR Mobilization System

Subobjective 6 Orientation/ Assimilation EEA 6.a. CLQ 6.a (1) EEA 6.b. CLQ 6.b.(1) EEA 6.c. Subobjective 7 Unit Training X		1000	1	
	××	×	×	Unit procedures for receiving, processing, orienting fillers
	××	× >		
	< × ×	X	×	Unit reception procedures
	+		>	Nichom of TDD monimum now continuent tweining
CLO 7.a. (1) X			< ×	Number of Int requiring for equipment charming. MNS & tyne equipment training required.
			×	Number of IRR requiring refresher training
	-		×	MOSs of IRR requiring refresher training
EEA 7.c.	×	×		
CLQ 7.c.(1)	X		X	Unit post mobilization training programs for fillers
	Х		Х	Adequacy of training equipment and facilities at mobilization stations
(3) X	××	X	×	Est, time attain fully trained status, w/wo fillers. Est, unit trng REDCON w/wo fill rdr.
EEA 7.d. X	< ×	×		
Category 2 RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS				
Subobjective 1 Changes in				
Unit Fill X				
-	×	×		
CLQ 1.a.(1)	×	×		
EEA 1.b.	×	×		
EEA 1.c.	×	Х		
EEA 1.d. X	×	X		

*See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

tive 2 in ors or: (1) (1)	*	×××× ×××	×××		 X Number of IRR post mobilization orders rescinded X Frequency of changes in individual orders X Estimated time for processing change in orders
EEA 2.a. EEA 2.b. CLQ 2.b.(1) EEA 2.c. CLQ 2.c.(1) Subobjective 3		×××× ×××	**	×××	Number of IRR post mobilization orders rescinded Frequency of changes in individual orders Estimated time for processing change in orders
CLQ 2.b.(1) EEA 2.c. CLQ 2.c.(1) Subobjective 3		××× ×××	×××	**	Number of IRR post mobilization orders rescinded Frequency of changes in individual orders Estimated time for processing change in orders
EEA 2.c. CLQ 2.c.(1) Subobjective 3		**	×××	××	Frequency of changes in individual orders Estimated time for processing change in orders
Subobjective 3		×××	×××		
		×××	×××		
Notification X		×××	×××		
EEA 3.a.		× ×	××		
CIO 3 b (1)			~		
EEA 3.c. X			×		
				×	Number of mailings lost/delayed in transit by type of document
			×		0
(3) X			×		
Subobjective 4					
RCPAC Trans Pt. X					
EEA 4.a. X		×	×		
EEA 4.b. X		Х	×		
CLQ 4.b.(1) X			×		
Subobjective 5					
Mork Joad					
aining Unit X					
EEA 5.a.		X	×		
EFA 5.b. X			×		
EEA 5.c.		Х	×		
CLQ 5.c.(1)		×	×		
(2)		×	Х		
EEA 5.d.		×	×		
EEA 5.e.		×	×		

^{*}See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

^{**}Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

			Evalua	tion		[or]
Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	\(\frac{1}{2}\)\(\fra	Sull of	de Refin	Silve S	5 * / 5°	Data Elements Required
Subobjective 6 Incremental Dollar Costs	x					
EEA 6.a.	X			X	1	
EEA 6.b.	X			X		
Category 3 ATTITUDES Subobjective 1 IRR						
Satisfaction	X					
EEA 1.a.			X	X	1	
CLQ 1.a.(1)			X	Х		
EEA 1.b.		X			X	Number IRR willing to retrain
Subobjective 2 IRR Complaints	Х					
EEA 2.a.		X	V	X		
CLQ 2.a.(1)			X	X	_	
(2)			X	X		
EEA 2.b.	Х			X	-	
CLQ 2.b.(1)		X		X	-	
EEA 2.c.		X		X	-	
Subobjective 3 Social/ Political						
Impacts	X					
EEA 3.a.			X	X		
EEA 3.b.	X			X		
CLQ 3.b.(1)		X		X		
(2)		X		X		
EEA 3.c.			X	X		
CLQ 3.c.(1)			X	X		
EEA 3.d.			X	X		
EEA 3.e.	X			X		

^{*}See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

^{**}Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	Sing.	Support	Evaluat		*/*	Data Elements Required
Subobjective 4 Recruiting & Retention	X					
EEA 4.a. CLQ 4.a.(1)	X X X			X X X		
EEA 4.b. EEA 4.c. CLQ 4.c.(1)		X X X		X X X		
(2) (3) (4)		X X X		X X X		
Category 4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS Subobjective 1 Geographic Distribution	X					
EEA 1.a. CLQ 1.a.(1)		Х	X X	X		
(2) EEA 1.b.	X		X	X		
CLQ 1.b.(1) (2)	X			X	X	Dollar cost IRR transportation to assignment
Subobjective 2 Compromise of Classified Information	X					
EEA 2.a. CLQ 2.a.(1) (2)	X X X		X	X X X		
EEA 2.b. CLQ 2.b.(1)		X	X	X		
(2)		X		X		

^{*}See Annex A for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

^{**}Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

ANNEX D

BASELINE DATA COLLECTED AND DATA
STILL REQUIRING COLLECTION,
VOLUNTARY MOBILIZATION PREASSIGNMENT SYSTEM

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

Evaluation Evaluation Color of South Color of Color of South Col			,	X X	X	X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X		X X X	X	X	X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X	X		X X Erequency of post mobilization changes in orders	
Category/ Subobjective/ HGA/CLQ *	Catagory	READINESS Subobjective 1	Hexibility 6	ETA 1.a.	CLQ 1.a.(1)	(2)	EEA 1.b.	(2)	(3)	(4)	EEA 1.c.	CLQ 1.c.(1)	(2)	(3)	

*See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

**Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

Kcy:

1 * critical to comparative evaluation
2 * helpful to comparative evaluation but not critical
3 * required for detailed description of concept

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

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*See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	10,00	entato dans	ent (40 01 E	. \	Data Elements Required
Subobjective 6						
Orientation/ Assimilation		×				
EEA 6.a.		×	×	Х		
CLQ 6.a.(1)		×		Х		
(2)		*	×	×	X	Number of preassignees understand role/obligation/unit mission
CLO 6.b. (1)		×			×	
(2)		×			X	Number of preassignees feel part of unit/have been contacted by unit
EEA 6.c.			Х		X	Number of unit COs contacting/planning reqt/proc of preassignees
CLQ 6.c.(1)			×		×	Number of units' subordinates (by type) responsible for preassignees
(2)			×		×	
EEA 6.d.		X			×	Number of preassignees participating in any unit activity (type)
Subobjective 7 Unit Training						
Keadiness FFA 7 a		X	X		×	Number of units planning for new equipment & refresher training
CLQ 7.a.(1)			×		×	
(2)			X		×	Training equipment/facilities available/requirements
EEA 7.b.		×		×		
CLQ 7.b.(1)	×			×		
(2)			x	×		
Category 2 RESOURCE REOUIREMENTS						
Subobjective 1						
System Generated	*					
EEA 1.a.			×	×		
CLQ 1.a.(1)			X	×		
EEA 1.b.			×	×		
EEA 1.c.			×	×		
EEA 1.d.	,		× >	X		
EEA 1.e.	X		Y	X		

*See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

Category/		1	Evaluation	tion	1	101,335	
Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ *	(4),(7)	todars	Martines of College	** 0 () () () () () () () () () (**	A3 1.100 \$ 1.00	Data Elements Required
Subobjective 2							
Individual Generated	×						
EEA 2.a.			×	X			
EEA 2.b.			×	×			
CLQ 2.b.(1)			×	× ;			
CIO 2 C (1)			× ×	× >			
EEA 2.d.	X				×	Number of orders issued	ssued and changed per year (or estimated)
CLQ 2.d.(1)		×			×	Estimated time req	to process change in
Subobjective 3							
Mailing/ Notification	×						
EEA 3.a.			×	×			
EEA 3.b.	X			Х			
_	X				X	Number of preassig	preassignees who fail to receive M-Day announcement
(2)	× ×			××			
(4)	<		X	×			
Subobjective 4							
Workload,							
Transfer							
Activities	×						
	×		×	×	-		
CLQ 4.a.(1)			×	×			
(7)	\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \		V	×	-		
CIO 4 b (1)	V		X	X	-		
(1):(1)					1		

^{*}See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

^{**}Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

Osta Elements Required																		X CO's methods for assigning preassigness within units	+	+		X Preassignees satisfied with assignment	- 1		Number of	X Number of preassignees willing to encourage others to Join program
uation unation			X	X				×				×	×	×				×		××	×		×		×	X
Eval Syllotics																		+			×			×		
1850		×		×							×	×	×	×			,	<				×				
Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	Subobjective 5 Workload,	Mob. Sta./ Gaining Units	EEA 5.a.	EEA 5.b.	EEA 5.c.	CLQ 5.c.(1)	(2)	EEA 5.d.	Subobjective 6	Incremental	Dollar Costs	EEA 6.a.	CLQ 6.a.(1)	EEA 6.b.	Category 3	Subobjective	IRR	FFA 1 a	(1) (1)	9.	EEA 1.b.	EEA 1.c.	CLQ 1.c.(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)

*See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

Baseline Data Collected and Data Still Requiring Collection, Voluntary Mobilization Preassignment System

Data Elements Required																						Reasons not joining AA/RC unit, preassignees	Reasons selecting preassignment, preassignees		d, reup AA/ entistment	Impact of preassignment program on recruiting/retention	Number believe adverse impact	Reasons for adverse impact	Number believe no impact	Number believe favorable impact
160 07/1		+				+																×		X	×	×	×	×	×	X
uation attion		××	××	+	X	×	×					X	×	X	×	X	X			X	X								X	
1.24-06 1918		×	××	+	,							X	-	X		X					-	X			×	X	X	X		
(4.5.7.7.1.1.4.5.1.1.1.4.5.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1.1		X		+		X	X								X		X			X	X									
1	e 2 nts X			×			y	23			X	^						e 4	. J	-							((-
Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ*	Subobjective 2 IRR Complaints	EEA 2.a. CLQ 2.a.(1)	(3)	EEA 2.b.		(2)	EEA 2.d.	Subobjective 3	Social/	Political	Impacts	EEA 3.a.	EEA 3. C.	EEA 3.d.	CLQ 3.d.(1)	EEA 3.e.	EEA 3.f.	Subobjective	00	FEA 4 3	EEA 4.b.	EEA 4.c.	EEA 4.d.	EEA 4.e.	EEA 4.f.	EEA 4.8.	-		(3)	(4)

*See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

		1	Evaluat	tion	1	/01.	/
Category/ Subobjective/ EEA/CLQ *	0,500	Suppor	dive Defini	51° (8		collection (Data Elements Required
Category 4 SPECIAL PROBLEMS Subobjective 1 Geographic Distribution	X						
EEA 1.a.	^	X	X	X			
CLQ 1.a.(1)			X	X			
(2)			X	X	 		
(3)			X	X	 		
EEA 1.b.	X		<u> </u>	X			
CLQ 1.b.(1)	X			X			
(2)	X			X			
(3)	X			X			
(4)	X			X			
Subobjective 2 Compromise of Classified Information	х						
EEA 2.a.	X			X			
CLQ 2.a.(1)	X			X			
EEA 2.b.			X	X			
CLQ 2.b.(1)		X		X			

^{*}See Annex B for definitions of Subobjectives, EEA and CLQ.

D-7

^{**}Empirical data will require updating as appropriate at time of test and evaluation.

ANNEX E

TASKING FOR PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION

OF MANDATORY PREASSIGNMENT

ANNEX E

TASKING FOR PARTIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF MANDATORY PREASSIGNMENT

In order to successfully conduct the IRR-APST, it is necessary to partially implement the two concept systems and operate them for a specified period of time. This implementation is contingent upon accomplishment of certain actions, decisions and detailed concept system design well in advance of the initiation of the Test Directorate. The two tables contained in this Annex contain the tasks with their target dates assigned by the IRR-APST Steering Group to various U.S. Army agencies to be completed during the pre-test period.

Table E-1.

MANDATORY PREASSIGNMENT TO EARLY DEPLOYING UNITS (EDU) Tasks and Target Dates for Partial Implementation by 30 Jun 77

1			
1	Tasks	Responsible Agencies Ten	Tentative Target Dates
1.	Identify EDU, home/mob stations & M-dates of deployment a. Total system b. Portion required for partial implementation c. Units participating in BOLD EAGLE 78	OUCSOFS, FORSCOM MILPERCEN, RCPAC FORSCOM, ODCSOPS	1 Dec. 76 1 Jan 77 1 Jun 77
2.	Develop system for determining selection, fill & terms of preassignment to EDUs	ODCSPER, RCPAC, MILPERCEN	1 Dec 76
e, E	Develop Preassignment Requirements Packages for AA & RC EDUs a. Total system b. Partial implementation group c. BOLD EAGLE units	ODCSPER, NGB, OCAR, FORSCOM RCPAC FORSCOM, RCPAC	OM 1 Feb 77 15 Feb 77 15 Jun 77
-23	Develop computer programs to operate the system	RCPAC	1 May 77
5.	Identify preassignees within IRR	RCPAC	31 May 77
6.	System for changing, updating & revalidating orders	ODCSOPS, FORSCOM, RCPAC	1 Jun 77
7.	Develop, prepare & issue orders a. Determine content of orders & special instructions b. Determine accompanying explanatory materials	RCPAC RCPAC, DCSLOG RCPAC	15 Jun 77 1 Mar 77 1 Apr 77
ω.	Notify gaining units of preassignees a. Partial implementation group b. BOLD EAGLE units	RCPAC RCPAC	31 Jul 77 31 Jul 77
9.	Develop procedures for unit contact of preassignees	ODCSPIC. FORSCOM, NGB, OCAR	1 Mar 77
.0	Early Post-implementation Actions a. Activation of Test Directorate b. Units contact preassigness c. Invitation to volunteer for AT during BOLD EACLE	FORSCOM, RCPAC AA & RC units RCPAC or FORSCOM	1 Jul 77 July 1977 31 Jul 77

Table E-2.

MANDATORY PREASSIGNMENT TO NOBILIZATION STATIONS Tasks and Target Dates for Partial Implementation by 30 Jun 77

1	Tasks	Agencies	Target Date
1:	Identify mobilization stations: a. For total system b. To be used for partial implementation c. To be used for CPX	FORSCOM, COE, TRADOC FORSCOM or RCPAC FORSCOM	1 Dec 76 1 Dec 76
2.	Determine number of preassignees required for partial implementation	MIL PERCEN,	1 Jan 77
ë	Determine required reporting dates time-phased mob station capabilities to absorb preassignees after M-day	FOR SCOM, COE	1 Feb 77
4.	Develop system to select individual's mob station at Transfer Pts.	RCPAC, FORSCOM, TRADOC	1 Mar 77
ν E-	Develop system for providing preassignment orders at Transfer Pts. prior to separation from active service	RCPAC, FORSCOM, TRADOC MILPERCEN, DCSLOG	1 Mar 77
. 9	Determine time needed to acquire required number of preassignees	FCRSCOM, TRADOC, RCPAC	1 Mar 77
	Develop system for changing, updating and revalidating orders	RCPAC	1 Apr 77
8	Develop computer programs to operate system	RCPAC	1 Sep 77
9.	Develop system for processing preassignees at mob stations after mobilization	FORSCOM, TRADOC, MILPERCEN, RCPAC	1 Jun 77
10.	Start assigning preassignees at Transfer Points	Transfer Points	٠.